new POLITICS

The ILGWU—Fact and Fiction

A Reply to Gus Tyler

Herbert Hill

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Volume II, No. 2

90 cents

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The Manager's Corner

We continue to receive requests for back issues of NEW POLITICS. Many readers ask about a complete file. We do have a limited number of copies of all back issues, but are just about reaching the very end of our supply of Volume I, No. 1. Bound volumes of Volume I may be purchased for $7.50 plus 35 cents postage.

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The last issue sold particularly well. The final tally is not in, but indications are that paid circulation is around 5,500. But bear in mind that each paid copy—except for subscriptions—represents a financial loss of approximately 35 cents. The solution to this problem is not less sales, of course, but more subscriptions and financial aid.

Our $8,000 Fund Appeal has bogged down, as such efforts tend to do. We say this with a note of real concern since the lack of funds has seriously hampered work on promotion. There are some who assume that NEW POLITICS has access to large sums of money. We wish it were so. We have access only to the money that trickles in from friends, supporters and subscribers. It is those funds we depend on for our existence. Recently, a number of subscribers have made monthly pledges to NEW POLITICS. We are extremely grateful for this form of financial support and urge as many who can to become sustaining supporters of NEW POLITICS. If you made a pledge of funds to the appeal, won't you redeem it as soon as possible? If you have not yet sent your contribution, please use the envelope in this issue for that purpose. Your support makes NEW POLITICS possible.

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A number of readers have volunteered as translators since the appearance of the last issue. One reader volunteered to translate from the Polish and Russian, another from the Scandinavian languages. We continue to need translators in all languages. Our thanks to all.

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ERRATA

In Zygmunt Zaremba's article "Communism in the Era of 'Enlightened Absolutism' " (Fall 1962) on p. 112, the sentence beginning with "Its attack was directed against the Stalinist (Nationalists in Poland, Rakosy's group in Hungary) . . ." the word "Nationalists" should have been Natolinists.

Our apologies to Victor Alba for a serious error in his article, "A False Crisis," in our last issue. On page 23, the second paragraph, the sentence that began: "For the United States, the crisis has served to blackmail the U. S. S. R. a little and to eliminate . . ." should have read "For the United States the crisis has taken away from the hands of the U. S. S. R. a blackmail instrument. . . ."

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NEW POLITICS is published quarterly by New Politics Publishing Company at 507 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.
Subscriptions $3 a year. Foreign subscriptions, including Canada, $3.50. All payments from foreign countries must be made by U.S. money orders or checks payable in U.S. currency.
Single copy: $0.90 except for extra-sized issues.
Bundle orders of 5 or more copies: .55 each except for extra-sized issues.
Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.
Application to mail at second class postage rate is pending at New York, N. Y.

VOLUME II • NUMBER 2 • WHOLE NO. 6
Winter 1963

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A Reply to Gus Tyler

The ILGWU—Fact and Fiction

Herbert Hill

IN "THE ILGWU TODAY: The Decay of a Labor Union," which appeared in the Summer 1962 issue of NEW POLITICS, I charged that: *In the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union in New York City, the Negro and Puerto Rican members are concentrated in the low-paid job classifications and with very little employment mobility.* This was my main charge. I further stated that:

> . . . there is a direct connection between the permanent condition of semi-poverty experienced by these workers and discriminatory racial practices. The factual record discloses that Negro and Puerto Rican members of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union are discriminated against both in terms of wages and other conditions of employment and in their status as members of the union . . .

These charges were and remain justified. No statement or explanation by officials of the ILGWU or their apologists refutes the major points of my arguments. On the contrary, their defense of the Union essentially confirms my criticism of the ILGWU's policies and practices.

The most serious effort made to counter my charges was the reply by Gus Tyler, Educational Director of the ILGWU, which appeared in the last issue (Fall 1962) of NEW POLITICS (also distributed in mimeographed form). Much of Tyler's material had previously appeared in a widely circulated document by Harry Fleischman, Director of the American Jewish Committee's National Labor Service, entitled "Is the ILGWU Biased?" November 5, 1962. The Jewish Labor Comittee distributed the same material in the form of a memorandum from Emanuel Muravchik, National Field Director, dated November 16, 1962.

Tyler's technique was to quote me (Hill Charge: . . .) followed by his answer (The Truth: . . .). After almost twelve pages of rapid-fire dialogue between "Hill Charge" and "The Truth" I can readily understand the reader falling under a semi-hypnotic spell. Tyler, the "Truthsayer," writes with such seemingly inviolable "facts" that one might think he is really giving a point by point refutation of my charges. Aside from the failure to refute my charges, his is *not* a point by point discussion of my article. A number of the most important specific charges I made are not commented upon at all, others are obviously distorted or treated so per-

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functorily that he might well have omitted any comment and, most seriously, his "fact" sheet fails completely to come to grips with the basic charges I directed against the ILGWU concerning the source of discriminatory practices suffered by non-white garment workers in New York City.

At *no time* did I charge the ILGWU with discriminatory practices emanating from a conscious racist ideology. What I have argued is that the social fact of discrimination is rooted in the ILGWU today because of the interaction of the old union leadership with the changing social composition of the membership and the nature of the industry.

In the first place, there is the sheer weight of numbers of the Negro and Puerto Rican minorities. They comprise nearly one-third of the national membership and more than a half of the membership in the New York area, the heart of the International Union's operation. Given the rapidly increasing number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the garment industry in New York, they have a unique status within the union which the all-white top leadership clearly sees as a growing threat to its monopoly of control.

A second factor contributing to discriminatory practices relates to the garment industry itself. The industry is made up of many small, highly competitive firms, further threatened by low priced imports. It therefore seeks to draw workers from a large, cheap labor market, one that in New York consists largely of non-white workers. This directly encourages discriminatory practices as the unskilled, lowest paying jobs are the only jobs available to Negroes and Puerto Ricans.

The many problems that the ILGWU faces in the industry are very real. To improve the living standards of its members and particularly those who are doubly victimized by a sick industry because of their color would pose a problem to the best of unions. The issue is *how* to meet the problem: to resist or acquiesce to the employers' demand that the ILGWU maintain a cheap labor market for the garment industry in New York City.

It is clear that some years ago the ILGWU leadership made a fundamental decision to keep the industry in New York City on the basis of maintaining low wages and minimal standards for tens of thousands of unskilled workers, i.e., Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Thus, the union provides itself with a vast dues paying membership which also constitutes the base of its extensive political operations in New York City and State. In this manner the ILGWU has chosen to operate as a *stabilizing force in the industry.*

The present wage rates of the unskilled and semi-skilled garment workers, most of whom are non-white, are below the subsistence levels indicated by the 1960 Interim City Workers Family Budget established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U. S. Department of Labor. (Data given in my previous article.)

A detailed report of wages in New York City, released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on June 27, 1962, clearly indicates that New York City has become a low-wage area. One of the major reasons for this development is the wage policies of the apparel unions.

This U. S. Government report found that between 1950 and 1960, wages for the city's apparel workers fell from second place among 16

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industrial categories to 11th place, and dropped below the national average for all manufacturing.

The tacit collusion between employer and union to maintain a cheap labor market was revealed by the ILGWU's opposition to a bill introduced in the New York City Council in 1962 to establish by law a minimum wage in New York City of $1.50 an hour. The ILGWU representative on the Mayor's Citizens' Commission on the City Economy, E. Howard Molisani, manager of Italian Cloakmakers' Local 48 and a Vice President of the ILGWU, originally voted against the Commission's report which recommended prompt enactment of a law establishing a $1.50 minimum hourly wage in New York City, but, for the public record, later changed his vote to an abstention.

This is evidently "the philosophy of the ILGWU" to which Tyler repeatedly alludes and which Fleischman and Muravchik defend.

Arnold Witte, general manager of the Commerce and Industry Association of New York City, writing in the October 5, 1962 New York *World Telegram & Sun,* cited the ILGWU's opposition to the city minimum wage bill. Mr. Witte noted that "the garment workers, the largest union of the largest industry in the city, has refused to indorse this legislation."

On February 12, 1963, a mass demonstration was held in Albany in support of passage of a $1.50 minimum wage law for New York City. Several major trade unions participated, as did the NAACP, the Negro American Labor Council, and many other groups. The ILGWU was conspicuous by its absence.

There is a third factor behind the discrimination suffered by nonwhite garment workers. It pertains to the in-grown quality of the union leadership. Again, I do not charge that the ILGWU leadership is motivated by a deliberate racist ideology. But it is evident that the top all-white leadership has grown contemptuous of the younger, less educated, the less sophisticated—*the altogether different*—newer members who are overwhelmingly Negro and Puerto Rican.

That many of the older leaders of the ILGWU have nothing in common with their radical past is beside the point; that they have a certain past in common is very much to the point. (Talk about discrimination in his union and David Dubinsky will recount *ad nauseam* how he was imprisoned under the Czar for his socialist activities.) The picture which would emerge from any detailed study of the leading personnel is of an old, conservative, in-grown bureaucracy. It has become an elite club which seeks to preserve for itself the leading power positions in the International, the local unions and the best jobs in the shops for those most closely identified with its own history and nostalgia. It passes these desirable, well-paying positions on from father to son, and from father to son-in-law. The "business" is kept within the family.

Professor Daniel Bell of Columbia University recently commented on this serious problem in an article in *The New Leader* (January 21, 1963):

> . . . The fact is—and this is the 'bite' in Hill's charges—that the Negroes are underrepresented in the leadership of many of the unions where they form a significant proportion of the membership. In the case of these unions,

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what the Negroes want is 'recognition' at the level of top leadership and a growing share of the spoils of office ... For one thing, the realistic political process in the United States, at least in the northern urban centers, has been one of ethnic groups advancing themselves precisely in this fashion; by organizing on bloc lines, electing their own kind, and using the patronage system to enhance the wealth and status of their group ...

Bell concludes by noting that:

> ... In economic and educational opportunity, the Negro is in a position of inequality, and the government is bound to help him move ahead. But doesn't the trade union movement have a *special* obligation to help redress the balance? ...

TYLER KNOWS THAT CRUCIAL to my argument is my characterization of the ILGWU leadership as being rigidly bureaucratic. Yet, his "discussion" of this documented charge is so feeble and unresponsive as to be an unwitting admission of its truth.

I sought to establish that the ILGWU leadership, as is the case with virtually every bureaucracy, has tried to legitimize its privileges through constitutional provisions. While these provisions make everything "legal," they also paralyze initiative from below, prevent an influx of new life into the leading policy making bodies of the organization and transform conventions into tedious rituals. For example, I pointed to the clause in the ILGWU constitution which prohibits a democratic internal life in the organization. Here is what Tyler has to say on the matter:

> ... The caucus clause dates back to the 1920's, when the ILGWU was in a battle with the 'standing' caucuses of the Communist Party. Whatever the merits of the clause—*a good subject for a full set of articles*—it certainly is no bar to Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Cubans, Portuguese, French and other minorities running for and winning office in the union ... " (Emphasis added.)

This will not do. Frankly, I do not know if the clause was justified at the time by the struggle against the Communists. And this might make for a full set of articles by labor historians. But it also makes for a full set of articles by the Labor Secretary of the NAACP and others on the character and practices of the ILGWU *today*. While the clause *deprives the entire membership of democratic rights today, it takes on the added* edge of *discrimination* against those minorities which are thus deprived, in addition, of their right to organize within the union to press for their *special needs* and rights.*

Other constitutional provisions reduce the number eligible to run for the top offices in the union to a few hundred out of a total of over 400,000. This is bad enough. Worse yet, it reduces the number of Puerto Ricans and Negroes eligible to run for the General Executive Board to proportionally a very small number (Tyler says "dozens"!) and those eligi-

* Incidentally, what is interesting about Tyler's answer is that it is almost exactly what I predicted he would say. I wrote in my previous article that "Mr. Dubinsky's spokesmen will answer that this is done to prevent Communists from taking over the union." Mr. Tyler performed as expected. Naturally, he did not quote my rebuttal about this anticipated canned reply which was that "one can only compare" such an answer "to the argument that we should suspend the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights because it endangers the country in fighting subversion."

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ble to run for the offices of President and General Secretary to even less. (Tyler doesn't give a number.)

In the same vein he writes of these constitutional restrictions on democratic rights: "At any convention, *a simple majority* may remove all these qualifications [from the Constitution—H.H.] to elect anyone the delegates want [to the General Executive Board-H.H.] under any qualifications they set up." Getting a "simple majority" at an ILGWU convention is not quite that simple. To do that would require a long, arduous campaign against the solidly entrenched leadership, a campaign which would require far more time than the three-month pre-convention limit on caucuses. And there's the rub. The ILGWU constitution itself, through the extreme limitation and control placed on opposition, is the best, built-in, guarantee that Tyler's "simple majority" will never materialize.

It is as though an assailant caught belaboring a defenseless victim with a club argues that if he is doing wrong, the poor bastard underfoot has the right to take his club away.

IT IS REVEALING TO SEE what sections of my article completely escaped Tyler's roving but very selective eye.

HILL CHARGE: ". . . there is not a single Negro or Puerto Rican on the twenty-three member General Executive Board . . ."

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

HILL CHARGE: ". . . not a single Negro or Puerto Rican Vice-President of the union . . ."

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

HILL CHARGE: ". . . there are no Negro or Puerto Rican local managers who are usually handpicked by the Dubinsky controlled administration."

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

HILL CHARGE: ". . . Dubinsky's practice of requiring a signed undated resignation from all officers of the International union and from members of the General Executive Board, absolutely guarantees the perpetuation of what really amounts to one-man rule of the ILGWU."

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

HILL CHARGE: "I cite the basic contract between Local 98 and the Manufacturers' Association in effect until August 14, 1963. The contract provides the following minimum wages (Pg. 7, Article 4 (a)):

Floor Girls	$1.15 per hour
Operators	1.20
Shipping Clerks	1.20
Cutters	1.20

In September, 1961, the Federal Wage was increased to $1.15 an hour. The current minimum for floor girls is $1.25 an hour at the end of seven months (only 10 cents above the minimum wage required by law) and $1.30 an hour for the other classifications at the end of nine months.

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

(Tyler does try to answer some of the other charges made about wage scales. All the worse for his case, as we shall see.)

HILL CHARGE: "In this case [of the Haffkine Co.] the ILGWU completely organized a group of Negro and Puerto Rican workers employed by a 'sweatshop' employer whose workers engaged in a two-day ILGWU strike for union recognition. However, these striking workers were turned over

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to a local of another international union, one well known for signing 'sweetheart agreements' and generally with an unsavory reputation. This was done by Herbert Pokodner, the manager of Local 98 . . . "

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

HILL CHARGE: " . . . an analysis of the data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U. S. Department of Labor concludes that only 11% of the unionized garment workers in New York can realize the basic earnings necessary for the 'modest but adequate' standard of living established by the Bureau for the 1960 Interim City Worker's Family Budget.

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

HILL CHARGE: "In addition, it must be noted that the very modest figure of 11% has been reached by assuming that these workers will be employed uninterruptedly for 52 weeks. However, given the seasonal character of the New York City garment industry this is highly unlikely.

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

HILL CHARGE: The available data clearly indicates that the wages of workers in the New York City ladies' garment industry have declined relative to the total manufacturing average.

TYLER ANSWER: *Silence.*

These are, among several others, omissions of major points in my article that Tyler, Fleischman and Muravchik make no attempt to answer, although they create the illusion they are "answering Hill Item by Item."

In his article, Tyler writes:

"HILL CHARGE: 'To prevent the admission of non-white persons into that local union (Local 10),' the leadership exerts 'rigid control of admission into various training programs . . . ' including the 'referral of young persons to the Fashion Institute of Technology High School.' "

If we substitute my words for Tyler's three little dots, the quotation would then be that the leadership exerts:

"rigid control of admission into various training programs. *Local 10 exclusively decides who shall be referred to on-the-job training opportunities created as the result of informal arrangement made by the union and employers operating with ILGWU contracts, or into the Grading School operated by Local 10 in its headquarters,* or in the referral of young persons to the Fashion Institute of Technology High School.

Thus, there are *three* training programs mentioned in my article and Tyler dots his way over the first two: 1) the informal arrangement made between employer and union for on-the-job training and 2) the Grading School operated by Local 10 in its headquarters. Why? The answer is clear enough. My charges in these two instances are incontrovertible. Where the union exercises its control, the number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans is so embarrassingly small that Tyler discreetly resorts to his dots. He discusses, instead, only the third form of training, that offered by the New York City Board of Education where the ILGWU, fortunately, does *not* exercise control—and here I stand corrected—about who is admitted. Tyler then rests his case on the non-discriminatory policies of the New York City Board of Education and tacitly concedes that he has no case where the union is concerned.

What is more, the figures Tyler gives of the number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans trained by the Board of Education contradicts any claim

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that the extremely small number of non-white workers in the skilled trades is due to a shortage of skilled Negro and Puerto Rican labor.

The New York Times of August 18, 1962, reporting on the testimony of Moe Falikman, business manager of Cutters' Local 10, before a hearing of the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor states that, "Mr. Falikman explained that Local 10 had no formal training program for cutters and no apprentice system." That led Congressman Roosevelt to observe that "with the changing pattern of population in New York it seems to me you would have gone to some lengths" to provide training and jobs for members of racial minorities.

"We are not an employment agency," Mr. Falikman replied.

"But you are," Mr. Roosevelt declared. "I'd have greater faith in you if you would face this situation honestly and say, yes, this needs looking into."

After consulting with a union attorney, Falikman did agree that he would look into it.

The New York Times of August 25, 1962, in reporting Mr. Dubinsky's appearance before the House Subcommittee stated that "Mr. Dubinsky denied that it was the union's responsibility to upgrade Negroes and Puerto Ricans, as much as we would like to see them go to higher brackets. The union," he said, "is not an employment agency." Other ILGWU officials appearing before the Subcommittee insisted that upgrading and promotion "was not the union's responsibility." "We are not an employment agency," they all said.

But in Mr. Dubinsky's testimony reprinted in the October 1st issue of the ILGWU newspaper JUSTICE (page 10), in reply to a question as to why Negroes and Puerto Ricans do not advance in the union or in the industry, Dubinsky is quoted as saying, "We are doing everything under the sun on this score."

Either the ILGWU is "doing everything under the sun," or "we are not an employment agency, it's not our responsibility." The union cannot have it both ways.

THEN THERE IS THE FOLLOWING sleight-of-hand. According to Tyler:

> HILL CHARGE: Local 10 has been found "guilty" of excluding Ernest Holmes from membership because he was a Negro.

Tyler incorporates this alleged "Hill Charge" in what purports to be an answer to my article in NEW POLITICS. Here is what I actually wrote:

> . . . On July 2, 1962, the New York State Commission For Human Rights, which administers the state's fair employment practices statute, found "probable cause" against Local 10 in the case of Ernest Holmes, a Negro who was repeatedly denied membership in Local 10 although he worked on the cutting tables of a union shop . . .

Tyler's dishonest practice consists of using the word "guilty" attributed to me in an unrehearsed television interview but *nowhere stated in the article he is presumably answering.* In this way, he relieves himself of the responsibility of answering why, *after an eight-month investigation, the New York State Commission for Human Rights found "probable cause" (the first stage in a finding of guilt) against Local 10 of the ILGWU.* On September 14, 1962, Ruperto Ruiz, Investigating Com-

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missioner, New York State Commission for Human Rights, in a letter to Emil Schlesinger, attorney for Local 10, stated that the Commission had "repeatedly requested and for a period of eight months tried to obtain data pertinent to a resolution of the charges of discrimination against the Amalgamated Ladies Garment Cutters Union—Local 10. These efforts were unsuccessful. The failure of representatives of that local to cooperate in the investigation, despite their promises to do so, left me no alternative but to find 'probable cause to credit the allegations to the complaint.' "

SIXTEEN YEARS AGO the ILGWU entered into an agreement with the New York State Commission Against Discrimination (the predecessor to the State Commission For Human Rights) that it would not bar Negroes, Spanish-speaking or other persons from membership in the all-Italian locals. (Elsie Hunter vs. Agnes Sullivan Dress Shop, September 4, 1946.) This was an action brought by a Negro member of Local 22 who was barred from higher paying jobs controlled by Local 89. Today, sixteen years later, not a single Negro or Spanish-speaking person holds membership in the two Italian locals which have control of some of the highest paying jobs in the industry and no action has been taken to comply with the state law forbidding such practices.

Yet in the recent statement prepared by Mr. Tyler, the ILGWU asserted that the NAACP charge that Locals 48 and 89 discriminate is "comical."

What Mr. Tyler must explain is why, if the NAACP charge is "comical" today, the ILGWU agreed to go along with the comedy sixteen years ago.

Tyler makes such a grand production of his comedy; so much joshing. He good humoredly tells us that the reason for all-Italian locals dates back to the days when Italian immigrant unionists who spoke no other language needed their own locals to conduct union business. Being Italian language locals, only those speaking Italian can belong. Not only Puerto Ricans and Negroes are excluded (unless, as Tyler wittily thrusts, they are "Italian-speaking Negroes") but all other non-Italian groups are excluded. What could be more fair? And, if all non-Italians are excluded, how can Hill claim that Negroes and Puerto Ricans are thereby specially victimized? The Jewish Labor Committee and the Director of the National Labor Service also defend this practice in a similar manner.

I submit that it is not "comical" that the largest local in the ILGWU (Italian Dressmakers' Local 89) and the largest local in the coat and suit industry (Italian Cloakmakers' Local 48) bar Negroes and Spanish-speaking persons from membership. I submit that it is not "comical" that as a result of being barred from membership in Local 48 and Local 89, Negro and Spanish-speaking persons are further denied access to certain high paying jobs in the two branches of the garment industry of New York City where such jobs are concentrated.

Other national and religious groupings, all of them white, have access to skilled jobs via other locals which are virtually closed to Negroes and Puerto Ricans on the basis of tradition and practice. That is the point. The practical effects of the operation of Italian language locals is to further keep Negroes and Puerto Ricans concentrated in the low paid unskilled classifications with little opportunity for advancement.

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While it appears that all are equally unequal where the Italian locals are concerned, some are actually far more unequal than others.

It is obvious that the ILGWU's humorous rationalizations and glib assertions completely fail to answer the charge that these locals discriminate against Negro and Spanish-speaking persons. Indeed their admission of the facts is the proof of the charge. I further submit that the barring of Negroes, Spanish-speaking and other persons from Locals 48 and 89 is a violation of the AFL-CIO Constitution and a violation of the non-discrimination pledge which the ILGWU recently signed in the Office of the President of the United States. We of the NAACP do not think, moreover, that it is "comical" that the ILGWU subscribes to no-discrimination pledges for public relations purposes when in reality it fails to put an end to such discriminatory practices. Sixteen years have passed since the ILGWU entered into the stipulation agreement with SCAD concerning the Italian locals, but these locals are still "lily-white." Shall this, too, be hailed as "an impressive demonstration of integration"?

MR. TYLER IS NOT ABOVE borrowing a trick or two from management associations which, when pressed by unions for higher wages, place statistic-ridden ads in *The New York Times* and other newspapers to prove to the world that their employees never had it so good. One such gimmick is to advertise workers' wages without corresponding figures on how many hours of work the payroll represents. Tyler commits the same patent and deliberate fraud.

My report, for example, indicated that "push-boys" and shipping clerks in the "jim crow" auxiliary known as 60A—mainly Negroes and Puerto Ricans—receive extremely low wages.

Tyler "refutes" this charge by arguing that some of these workers earn from $70 to $100 per week. Of course, by working long overtime hours at time-and-a-half wages, by working 60 or 70 hours a week and more, they can earn $80 and $90. But my report, as Tyler knows, describes straight hourly wages, not overtime wages earned at time-and-a half pay. I am describing one week's pay for one week's work, that is, a regular week's earnings for the "normal work week" of 35 hours.

The wages set forth in the section of the union agreements that cover members of 60A are as follows:

> The following minimum rates of pay for the *normal work week*, as hereinafter defined, shall apply to the following employees:
>
> Group I—Assorters, piece goods workers, push boys, porters, delivery boys, packers and errand boys. Minimum wages of $46.00 per *normal work week*.
>
> Group II—Shipping clerks, receiving clerks, chargers, order pickers, checkers. Minimum wage of $50.00 per *normal work week*. (Emphasis added. H.H.)

The overwhelming majority of members of 60A are employed in the job classifications contained in Group I as described above and receive a minimum wage of $46.00 ($1.31 an hour) for 35 hours, a "normal work week."

In my article, I cited the pay of workers—almost all Negroes and Puerto Ricans—in a particular unionized shop as an example of an ILGWU substandard negotiated contract. Tyler takes up the "Hill Charge"

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and then proceeds to demolish only himself with "The Truth" as follows:

> HILL CHARGE: 'I cite the Fine Arts Pillow and Specialties Company of 37 West 26th Street in Manhattan as a typical example of conditions ... Here, virtually all non-white workers, male and female, who are union members are paid $1.15, $1.20 or $1.25 an hour.
>
> THE [TYLER] TRUTH: According to a payroll check, 54 of the 104 employees are paid more than $1.25 an hour. These are overwhelmingly Negro and Puerto Ricans. Of the *top ten* earners—from $1.53 an hour to $3.23 an hour —seven are Negro or Puerto Ricans.

Tyler's truth is that "54 of the 104 employees are paid more than $1.25 an hour." But this means that *50* workers, approximately half the work force, in a unionized shop receive *less than* $1.25 an hour. That is not all. Tyler boasts that the ten top earners receive from $1.53 to $3.23 an hour (how many earn that miserable $1.53 or only a few cents more he doesn't say). What this figure further reveals is that at least *45* additional workers receive between $1.25 and $1.53 an hour (how many are just slightly above the $1.25 scale he doesn't say either). Thus, *at least* 95 out of 104 workers earn from *less than* $1.25 an hour to $1.53 an hour.

To cover himself in the event that some readers might work out the arithmetic presented by his "Truth," Tyler argues that the shop under discussion in any case is "as typical of ILGWU conditions as Mississippi is typical of America." How typical it really is can be seen in the following exhibits of ILGWU-negotiated contracts in New York City where there is the heaviest concentration of Negro and Puerto Rican workers, in some cases as high as 90%.

Corset and Brassiere Workers' Union of N. Y. Local 32 (6,632 members).	Progression Rates for "Unskilled" Workers *Time Intervals (in weeks) and Rates*				Contract Minimum for "Skilled" Workers
	1–8	9–10	11–13	14–16	
Operators	1.15	1.20	1.25	1.30	1.36
	1–8	9–10	11–12		
Pressers	1.15	1.20	1.25		1.30
Cleaners	1.15	1.20	1.25		1.30
Examiners	1.15	1.20	1.25		1.30
Beltmakers' Local 40 (4,504 members):	1–8				
Machine operators	1.15				1.38
Operators	1.15				1.43
General Help	1.15				1.43
Shipper	1.15				1.30
Floor Girls	1.15				1.30

Undergarment and Negligee Workers' Union, Local 62 (16,592 members):	1–8	9–10	13–15	Class R Shops	Class S Shops
Operators	1.15	1.25	1.30–1.33	1.30	1.33
Ironers	1.15	1.20	1.25–1.25	1.30	1.30
Examiners	1.15	1.20	1.25–1.25	1.30	1.30
Finishers	1.15	1.20	1.25–1.25	1.30	1.30

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Childrens' Dress, House-Dress and Bathrobe makers' Union Local 91 (11,943 members):	1–12					
Operators	1.20					1.41
Ironers	1.20					1.38
Cleaners	1.20					1.35
Finishers	1.20					1.35
Rubberized Novelty and Plastic-Fabric Workers' Union, Local 98 (4,403 members previously cited):	1st Mo.	2–6 Mos.	7–9 Mos.			
Operators	1.15	1.20	1.25			1.30
Shipping Clerks	1.15	1.20	1.25			1.30
Cutters	1.15	1.20	1.25			1.30
Floor Girls	1.15	1.20	1.25			1.25
Plastic, Molders and Novelty Workers' Union, Local 132 (5,460 members):	1st Mo.	2–6 Mos.	6–9 Mos.			
All workers other than Molders	1.15	1.20	1.25			1.30
	1st. Mo.	2–4 Mos.	5–7 Mos.	8–10 Mos	11–13 Mos.	
Molders	1.20	1.25	1.30	1.35	1.40	1.45
Unit 60A Sect. of Dress Joint Board Agreement (1,943 members):						
Assorters, Piece Goods Workers, Pushboys, Porters Delivery Boys, Packers and Errand Boys						1.31
Chargers, Order Pickers, Checkers, Shipping Clerks, Receiving Clerks						1.43

"As typical of ILGWU conditions as Mississippi is typical of America"? The United States has only *one* Mississippi. The ILGWU, as the above figures indicate, has a whole flock of them!

It is evident from the data above, that new workers do not even receive the contract minimum for "skilled" workers, but must work a considerable period before they *even receive* this low wage. Indeed, in the case of Local 62, for example, workers must work eight weeks at the federal minimum wage and a full 15 weeks before they receive the contract minimum of $1.30 or $1.33 an hour. At the same time, of course, these workers are required, as a condition of employment, to become members of the union after 30 days and pay an initiation fee and dues.

TYLER'S EXPLANATION FOR THE CREATION of the "jim crow" auxiliary 60A is completely fraudulent. I must repeat some of the facts mentioned in my first article and supply some added information before reviewing Tyler's incredible performance.

60A is a unit composed of "pushboys," packers, piece goods workers, porters and shipping clerks. It has about 2,000 members, of whom *more* than 90% are either Negroes or Spanish-speaking persons. The existence

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of 60A is, in keeping with the tradition of the "old-line" AFL craft unions, an auxiliary to another local, Dress Pressers' Local 60, with less than 1300 members.

60A is a new unit in the ILGWU. While the women's garment industry in New York City has had "pushboys," packers, piece goods workers, porters and shipping clerks for as long as the industry existed, the ILGWU did not consider these workers, virtually all Negroes and Puerto Ricans, worthy of union membership until a few years ago, and then only because other unions began organizing activities among these workers. *The ILGWU, for the sole purpose of preventing another union from getting a toehold in the garment industry, and not because of the urgent needs of the low-paid, exploited Negro and Puerto Rican workers, then reluctantly organized these workers.* Rather than granting them a separate charter, however, the ILGWU made them an auxiliary to Dress Pressers' Local 60.

THE NAACP has charged that this was done among other reasons to prevent a Negro or Spanish-speaking person from rising to the position of local union manager.

It should be noted that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated between the Dress Joint Board and the employers' associations covering the members of the Dress Joint Board locals has two sections concerning wages, hours and conditions of employment: one section covers the members of Locals 10, 22, 60 and 89, and the other covers the members of 60A. Aside from the question of wages, there are other striking and illuminating differences concerning conditions of employment between the two sections which are described below. Here are two clauses in the collective agreements between the Dress Joint Board and the employers' associations:

> FIFTEENTH—HOURS OF WORK (covering members of locals 10, 22, 60 and 89)
>
> A regular week's work shall consist of thirty-five hours in the first five days of the week. *Work shall begin at 9:00 A.M. and end at 5:00 P.M.*, with one hour interval for lunch. There shall be no more than one shift of workers in any day.
>
> During the season, when the inside shop and each of the contracting shops of the manufacturer or jobber for whom a member of the Association is registered or designated as fully supplied with at least a full week's work, and when there are no vacant accommodations in the said shops for additional worker or additional workers cannot be secured, *overtime may be worked by all the workers therein except the cutters, provided the member of the Association notifies Joint Council in writing, in advance of the period during which overtime will be worked. In no event shall overtime worked beyond the first five days of the week exceed one hour per day.* All week workers, when working overtime, shall receive pay at the rate of time and one-half. (Collective Agreement 1961–1964—United Better Dress Matufacturers' Association, Inc., with International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and Dressmakers Joint Council.)

Compare the above (emphasis added) with below, which covers 60A:

> SIXTY-NINTH—The normal work week, for the purpose of this agreement, shall be deemed to mean a 35-hour week. *Each employer shall, in his discretion, be free to fix the hours of the day within which each employee in the unit shall work,* but work in excess of 7 hours performed in any one day shall be

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compensated for at the rate of time and one-half. Saturday work shall likewise be compensated at the rate of time and one-half. *All overtime shall be performed in the discretion of the employer.* (Collective Agreement—United Better Dress Manufacturers' Association, Inc., with International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and Dressmakers Joint Council.)

It is clear from the foregoing that members of 60A are considered by the ILGWU as different than, and inferior to, the members of the other locals affiliated to the Dress Joint Board. With respect to members of 60A, unlike the members of the other Dress Joint Board affiliates, the *employer* has full discretion both as to hours within which they will work and how many hours they will work. It is clear, too, how members of 60A can earn more than $50.00 per week: many long hours beyond the so-called "normal work week."

How does Tyler discuss the status of those consigned to 60A? In the first place, according to him, their segregated position is for their own good. Tyler writes: "The clerks (in 60A) enjoy all the benefits of being united in industrial fashion with a more highly skilled craft. No student of labor relations has to be told why. . . ." I'm afraid that Mr. Tyler takes too much for granted. The supposedly self-evident advantage of the unskilled workers being affiliated to a skilled craft local as argued by Tyler is simply an exercise in fantasy. What, concretely, have been the benefits for the members of 60A getting $46.00 to $50.00 for a normal work week of being affiliated to a craft local with pay scales ranging up to close to $5.00 an hour (the highest in the industry)?

Then there is Tyler's ludicrous analogy designed to counter my charge that 60A is a "jim crow" affiliate:

> Most of its (60A) members [over 90% to be more exact—H.H.] are Negro and Puerto Rican, but to call it a "jim crow" local for that reason would be the same as calling the Sleeping Car Porters' Union a jim crow union because all or most of its members are Negro.

In the first place, 60A is not a local. It is an *auxiliary* to Local 60. Quite a difference there. In the second place, the Sleeping Car Porters' union *would be* a jim crow organization if it had a parallel construction to that of 60A. If the Sleeping Car Porters' union were an auxiliary to, say, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and, if instead of A. Philip Randolph there were the equivalent of a white local manager, selected in reality by the international office of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen to service the needs of the Sleeping Car Porters' local, then the Sleeping Car Porters' Local would be a segregated auxiliary just as 60A is a jim crow unit.

Then we have Tyler the expert on ethnology:

> Hill's suggestion that a separate local of shipping clerks would elect a Negro manager is both inaccurate and vicious. It is inaccurate because Local 60A is "mixed" with no one ethnic group—Negro, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Irish, Jewish or Italian—in a simple majority.

It is Tyler who is inaccurate and vicious. Inaccurate, because I did not say that a separate local would "elect" a Negro manager but that "there would inevitably be a Negro or Puerto Rican manager." While the ILGWU constitution provides for the formal election of local managers they *are not really elected.* In practice they are selected by the Internation-

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al and confirmed by the local!* In the second place, I said "Negro *or* Puerto Rican," and not just "Negro." Tyler decided to omit the Puerto Ricans in his reference in order to make his sly point that no one ethnic group is in a simple majority in 60A. (To be sure, in a previous quote from Tyler on this matter, the reader can clearly see that he says "most of its members are Negro and Puerto Rican." Suddenly, in an effort to fudge over the question we are introduced to Cubans, Irish, Jewish or Italian as though they represent a significant part of the membership of 60A.) Now, it is true that Negroes and Puerto Ricans constitute a separate group. But they are coupled in my discussion and in Mr. Tyler's—except when inconvenient to him—because they are both the victims of economic, political, ethnic and racial discrimination different in kind and degree from other ethnic groups which comprise less than 10 percent of 60A.

Tyler goes even further:

"... there is no reason to believe that the members of Local 60A would elect a manager on a racist rather than unionist basis. The proposal is socially vicious because to create a separate Local 60A *just to guarantee the election of a Negro or Puerto Rican manager* is to *create* a jim crow local—separate but equal. ILGWU members prefer integration: craft and color."

Most damaging here (aside from the "elected" managers) is Tyler's sophistry, that pseudo-liberal conception that for Negroes and Puerto Ricans to seek their own leadership is racism in reverse. Of course, I think that Negroes and Puerto Ricans would take special interest and justifiable pride in electing a Negro or Puerto Rican manager or joint board chairman or president of the international union.

I might ask Mr. Tyler whether he uses the same standards in judging political gerrymandering when it is done to deny Negroes representation in Congress. Does he then virtuously declare that it is "socially vicious" to speak of allowing Negroes to have Negro Congressmen? Or does he, good liberal that he is, protest this kind of gerrymandering—another form of "craft and color"—because it specifically denies Negroes their representational rights?

And look at what Mr. Tyler italicizes in the above passage. How vicious it is, he writes "to create a separate Local 60A *just* to guarantee the election of a Negro or Puerto Rican. . . ." However, Negroes and Puerto Ricans are already separate. Who is responsible for this? The NAACP or the ILGWU? They are separated, not as an independent local as are other crafts in the Dress Joint Board, but as an auxiliary of a skilled local. Thus, they are *separate and unequal.* It is also interesting to note that 60 and 60A have separate executive boards but one manager for both units.

The NAACP claims that when the boundary of separation is drawn at the point where *autonomy* begins, this is evidence that discrimination is a hard fact. As against this affiliated status, local autonomy would, indeed, be a step in the right direction. And not "just to" guarantee the

* The Bureau of Labor Management Reports of the U.S. Dept. of Labor recently investigated a complaint from an ILGWU member in New Bedford, Mass. The Bureau found improper election practices by the ILGWU and ordered a new election. This case has clear implications for the internal practices of the ILGWU nationally.

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election of a Negro or Puerto Rican, but as a means of better protecting the rights of both groups and offering the enormous educational and training advantage of self-leadership.

Tyler says as against local autonomy for 60A, "ILGWU members prefer integration: craft and color." Bravo! The NAACP looks forward to seeing Negro and Puerto Rican ILGWU members on the General Executive Board, as local union managers, given a more equitable share of the better-paying jobs and that the union conduct a vigorous union campaign against exploitation.

One final quotation from Tyler on 60A:

> . . . a majority of the combined members of Local 60 and Local 60A are Negro and Puerto Rican. Each member has an equal vote—whether 60 or 60A. If the present manager is not a Negro or Puerto Rican, it merely indicates that the members of this union prefer not to cast a "racial" vote. . . .

I am obliged for the third time to point out to the reader that whether the manager of Local 60 is or is not a Puerto Rican or a Negro has little to do with normal elections. The manager is actually selected by the General Executive Board and ritualistically confirmed at a local union meeting. Apart from this little detail what Tyler is suggesting is completely demagogic. Everyone knows that given the situation as I have described it—and as Tyler unwittingly confirms—the "equal vote" that he boasts of is nonexistent because of the lack of involvement of these minorities in the union. Their apathy and the refusal to use their "equal vote" is an indication of the controlled, undemocratic atmosphere in which they are treated with contempt as "things" to be manipulated by an arrogant bureaucracy.

AM I EXAGGERATING WHEN I SAY that the ILGWU is contemptuous of Negroes and Puerto Ricans? A comparison of the clauses in the same collective agreement concerning discharge of workers, first that covering members of Locals 10, 22, 60 and 89, then covering members of 60A, is in order.

> THIRTY-EIGHTH—DISCHARGE [of members of Locals 10, 22, 60 and 89—HH]
>
> (a) No member of the Association shall discharge a worker, except for misbehavior sufficient to justify a discharge, before a notice in writing is served on Joint Council of the reason for the intended discharge. In case of a discharge for alleged misbehavior, and it be determined that the worker be reinstated, he is entitled to receive pay for all the time he stayed out.
>
> (b) Joint Council shall investigate the notice of the intended discharge within forty-eight hours of the receipt of same. If Joint Council does not consent to the proposed discharge, the question shall be referred to the Impartial Chairman, whose decision shall be final. Pending such decision the employee shall continue working at full pay. Collective Agreement (1961–1964 —United Better Dress Manufacturers' Association, Inc., with International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and Dressmakers' Joint Council.)

> SEVENTY-FOUR [on discharge of members of 60A—H.H.]
>
> The employer may discharge regular employees for any just and reasonable cause including the following:
>
> Incompetence,
> Insubordination,
> Dishonesty,

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Intoxication,
Soldiering on the job,
Repeated lateness or absence,
Assault or attempted assault on the job,
Repeated breach of reasonable rules established by the employer.

In the event that the Union questions any discharge as not being for just and reasonable cause, it shall so inform the Association within five (5) days after the discharge. Representatives of the Union and the Association shall attempt to settle the grievance by negotiation. If no settlement can be reached, Joint Council may invoke the arbitration machinery provided in this agreement. (Collective Agreement 1961–64—United Better Dress Manufacturers' Association, Inc., with International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and Dressmakers' Joint Council.)

In the discharge of members of Locals 10, 22, 60 and 89, the burden is on the employer, not the worker.

In the discharge of a member of 60A, the burden is on the worker. It is significant that specific reasons for which a member of 60A can be discharged are set forth, while with respect to members of Locals 10, 22, 60 and 89, they are not.

What do Tyler, Fleischman and Muravchik have to say about these specifics contained in a contract negotiated by the ILGWU? Are "dishonesty," "intoxication," "soldiering on the job," "assault or attempted assault" on the job the characteristic habits of Negroes and Puerto Ricans? Or do they recognize in this listing the hallmark of the bigot enthusiastically perpetuating the sickening stereotypes of racial and national minorities? If Tyler does not understand this, his stint with the ILGWU has served to corrupt his sensibilities completely. Mr. Tyler and the other apologists for the ILGWU neglect to state that the "integrated" members of 60A are covered by a separate union agreement from that covering members of Locals 10, 22, 60, 89.

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION is documented in Tyler's own discussion of the ILGWU's Officer Qualification Course and the Union's Training Institute.

The Officer Qualification Course was set up in 1938 "to prepare candidates for elective office." A total of 832 applied. Of these 832, only "19 were Negro and 8 were Spanish-speaking—a total of 27 in 24 years." An annual average of *one* (and one-eighth)!

Tyler then tries to compensate for this failure with the reputed success of the union's Training Institute. We are told that in eleven years, thirty Negro and Puerto Ricans were graduated by the Institute. An excellent record. Certainly, it is better than the Officer Qualification Course showing. However, far from proving the ILGWU's concern with promoting Negro and Puerto Rican leadership, the greater success of the Institute reveals just the opposite when placed side-by-side with the failure in the Officer Qualification Course. The reason lies in the difference between the two programs which Tyler deliberately tries to gloss over. The failure was in recruiting trainees *within* the union for *officers* with the (theoretical) right to participate in formulating and influencing the *policies* of the union. On the other hand, where the ILGWU achieved some success, in the Institute, it has been with individuals who are *not* necessarily even members of the union, who are to become *em-*

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ployees and *not officials* of the union and who have *no voice* in determining union policy. Also, the ILGWU must employ some Negro and Spanish-speaking organizers given the changing racial and ethnic composition of the industry.

As an example of discrimination, I mentioned in my article the fact that two locals in Puerto Rico—locals 600 and 601—were placed under the managership of a official from New York, one Jerry Schoen. Here is how Tyler discusses my charge:

> HILL CHARGE: The two Puerto Rican locals are "denied Puerto Rican leadership."

Now, the words are mine, but the period after the quoted phrase belongs to Tyler. What I wrote was: "However, both these locals are denied Puerto Rican leadership *as they are managed by one Jerry Schoen,* a former business agent for Local 62, who was sent from New York City by the International union to manage these two Puerto Rican locals." (Emphasis added here.)

By trimming my sentence as he does, Tyler thinks that all he has to do is rattle off a list of Puerto Rican "officials" in these locals, although the point I am making, seen clearly in the omitted words, is that the two locals are denied self-leadership "as they are managed by one Jerry Schoen."

And as Tyler knows, as I know, as anyone who knows anything about the ILGWU knows, it is the manager who wields the power in ILGWU locals. It is Schoen who represents the International in Puerto Rico. His is the real power.

MORE THAN A YEAR AND A HALF AGO, officers of Local 10 claimed, before representatives of the New York State Commission for Human Rights investigating a complaint of racial discrimination, that there were 400 nonwhite members of this local of skilled, higher-paid workers. I offered to withdraw the complaint if this were proven. The figure was then reduced to 300 by the union representatives. Harry Fleischman later said that there are "250 Negro and Spanish-speaking cutters in Local 10." (*Let's Be Human,* October, 1962, Newsletter of the National Labor Service.) In Fleischman's other article "Is the ILGWU Biased?" he refers to "Negro ILGWU member Ernest Holmes" (page 1, 3rd Paragraph). *Holmes was never, at any time a member of the ILGWU.* This was precisely the charge of his highly publicized complaint, that he was refused admission into Local 10 of the ILGWU. This falsehood is typical of Fleischman's frequent distortions.

In Gus Tyler's article we are told that there 239 Negro and Spanish-speaking workers in Local 10—only slightly more than one-half of what the ILGWU originally claimed.

On the basis of these figures, either the ILGWU lied one and a half years ago, or it has dropped nearly 200 Negro and Spanish-speaking people from Local 10.

Of the 239 figure in Tyler's article, it would be interesting to know how many are Negro and Puerto Ricans, since his count embraces "Cubans, Panamanians, Colombians, Dominicans, Salvadorians, Mexicans, etc., as well as Puerto Ricans. . . ." I, of course, am not discussing "Cubans . . . etc.," but Negroes and Puerto Ricans, over 120,000 strong, with problems quite distinct from those presumably located by Tyler in his quest for as

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large a number as possible. It would also be interesting to know how many Negroes and Puerto Ricans have been brought into Local 10 in the past 18 months—i.e., since the NAACP focused national attention on the status of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the ILGWU.

Tyler says that when Hill claims in a television broadcast "that there are in the vicinity of 50 (Negro) cutters of Local 10 in the city" that he "still has no regard for the truth."

However, if one makes a modest deduction for "Cubans . . . etc.," from Tyler's strained-for 239 his number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans would no doubt go below 200. Since it is most likely that there are considerably more Puerto Ricans than Negroes in Local 10, I suggest that Tyler take out his slide rule and let the reader know how far off my estimated "vicinity of 50 (Negro) cutters" is from his "regard for the truth."

Now, even less than 200 skilled Negro and Puerto Rican workers would not be too bad in a local of one or two thousand craft workers. But, if Tyler wants to play the numbers game, why does he hide the most revealing figure, "239 Negroes, Puerto Ricans plus "Cubans . . . etc.," out of *7,531* members. Slightly more than 3%! This, Tyler tells us "is an impressive demonstration of integration." This figure that represents "integration" to Mr. Tyler is not much better than the "integration" of Negro children in the public schools of North Carolina.

The NAACP finds this impressive evidence of discrimination, especially when over one-half the New York membership of the ILGWU is composed of Negroes and Puerto Ricans.

Tyler tells us that what makes the over 200 figure such an impressive demonstration is that "there is very little 'turnover' of employment; the total number of jobs covered by Local 10 has fallen in the last decade." While this might explain a disproportionately fewer number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans, it cannot explain the excessiveness of that disproportion.

Though they tell us that Negroes and Puerto Ricans never had it so good, as in Local 10, ILGWU spokesmen usually feel compelled to explain that the union is not responsible for hiring cutters; it is all the employers' fault. This won't do. In the first place, if there is impressive integration no one is really at fault. In the second place, if it is only the employers who discriminate in hiring, it is the responsibility of the union to combat that policy. In the third place, the union *does* have considerable control in the hiring of cutters.

In the November 1, 1962, issue of JUSTICE, the official ILGWU publication, there is a news story which would seem not only to substantiate the Union's placement role, but to boast of it. The article states: "A total of 576 members of Local 10 have been placed on permanent jobs during the year since last October, Vice-President Moe Falikman, manager of the organization reported at its membership meeting on October 29. This was disclosed by a tabulation based on reports submitted by officers and business agents functioning in the various trades in which cutters are employed."

The report continues with reference to the Local's placement activity over a three-year period and says that placing its members in permanent jobs "is a major continuing activity."

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Thus, it is clear beyond doubt, despite the ILGWU's public denials, that Local 10 has considerable control in the placement of cutters in all branches of the women's garment industry in New York City.

On the total number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in all the skilled craft locals, Tyler makes a boast of what is actually a confession of moral bankruptcy. He writes that the number of Spanish-speaking and Negro members "runs into the *ten of thousands*"* and in the next breath he takes pride in his reference to "*hundreds* of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, plus other Latins, Japanese, etc.," [emphasis added] who are in the skilled craft locals.

A further analysis, employing the ILGWU's own figures, discloses the following: out of a total of approximately 14,500 members of Cutters' Local 10, Pressers' Locals 35 and 60 and the Pressers' branches of the two Italian Locals, 48 and 89, there are some 550 Negroes, Puerto Ricans and "Cubans . . . etc." This constitutes about 3.7% of the total membership of the locals controlling the highest-paying jobs in New York City. 96.3% white and 3.7% Negro, Puerto Rican, Cuban . . . etc., cannot be considered "an impressive demonstration of integration." I submit that the ILGWU figures are greatly inflated; 2% is closer to the truth.

WHY DOES THE NAACP single out the ILGWU? Aren't there unions with far worse records than this one? These questions are usually asked by those who will candidly acknowledge that the charges against Dubinsky's union are justified in large measure, but bridle at concentrating so much fire on a "progressive" union which passes fine resolutions on civil rights, and contributes to worthy causes.

I believe that this approach is unwarranted for the following reasons:

1. The ILGWU is the largest union in the largest manufacturing industry in New York City, the world's largest city. It affects the economic welfare and dignity of hundred of thousands of Negro and Puerto Rican men, women and children in New York. Is the NAACP supposed to refrain from presenting the truth about this union because it passes good resolutions on integration in Mississippi?

2. The "go-soft-on-Dubinsky" line has the disagreeable connotations of "Uncle Tomism": it is suggested that the liberal and Negro community should be appreciative of small favors and not attack its "benefactors" even if those friends aren't completely perfect. This is of course nonsense and is rejected by responsible and serious elements in the Negro community.

3. It implicitly fails to give credit to the NAACP for its work in combatting the anti-Negro practices of blatantly discriminatory unions, North and South. A part of my time for the past 16 years as a staff member of the NAACP has been devoted to exposing and combatting the vicious racial practices of the railroad unions, the building trades unions and other labor organizations where discriminatory practices are blatant and to open new job opportunities for Negro workers in the craft jurisdictions. Most of the major breakthroughs in the past decade made by Negro workers in the "old-line" AFL-controlled craft occupations as well as in

* That many of these tens of thousands are "relative newcomers," as he puts it, helps naught, since tens of thousands of the more than 120,000 have been in the industry for many years and are "newcomers" only "relative" to those who have been there for decades.

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industrial union jurisdictions are the direct result of NAACP exposure and pressure.

4. Those who say "Hill is really right but why make such a fuss over a "progressive union" substitute sentimentality for thought, myth for reality. Judging the ILGWU by its current practices and not by its past, the "progressive" label is a nostalgic hangover. The word suggests militancy, internal democracy and social vision. On none of these counts does the ILGWU qualify.

5. The ILGWU leadership is greatly concerned with presenting a progressive liberal public image, without critically examining the social consequences of its policies and practices. This is perhaps the most dismal factor in the entire situation, their incapacity to admit that anything at all is wrong. But they do care obsessively about their public image. The concern, I believe, increases the possibility that the pressures applied by the NAACP might have salutary effects. I think that as a result of the activity of the NAACP there may be more Negroes and Puerto Ricans in better-paid jobs, that the operational bar against Negroes and Puerto Rican local managers might be raised slightly; Dubinsky will perhaps allow a Negro or Puerto Rican to find his place on the General Board and the ILGWU might feel obliged to do something about the sub-standard wage levels in the industry which victimizes, primarily, the Negro and Puerto Rican worker. Already one notes perhaps a little less arrogance on the part of ILGWU officials in the daily treatment of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the shops and within the unions.

I now know that the above will produce anguished cries of "anti-Semite." The epithet has already been hurled at me (and at Paul Jacobs for his article on the ILGWU in *Harper's* Magazine, December, 1962).* The charge is too obscene, too rotten to permit dignified comment.

I ANTICIPATED THAT MY ANALYSIS of the ILGWU would be met with the fury with which any powerful and entrenched bureaucracy retaliates when challenged. The attacks upon me for telling the truth are characterized by a viciousness and hysteria that tells much about the institution defending itself. Among a variety of other personal attacks the ILGWU leadership has charged publicly and in corridors that I am a Jewish anti-Semite, a kind of McCarthyite, and in the camp of the Birchites.

No less incredible than the anti-Semitic smear was the abortive attempt to discredit me by Evelyn Dubrow, an ILGWU staff member who together with other union representatives went to several Congressmen and other public officials and "explained" that Hill was a Communist stirring up racial strife, an anti-Semite, etc.

If I am incensed at the anti-Semitic smear, the reader will surely understand. I am, after all, a "white Jew" as Tyler so delicately puts it in his *New Politics* article.

Had I committed a gross injustice in my charges, the Dubinsky lead-

* *The Jewish Daily Forward*, December 10, 1962. J. Fogel writes that ". . . Two Jewish young men, Hill and Jacobs, spread anti-Semitic poison against the ILGWU and against President Dubinsky." The frequent treatment of these matters in *The Jewish Daily Forward* is worthy of a separate study. The *Forward* regards all criticisms of the ILGWU as an act of anti-Semitism and while freely distorting the news, reports these events in a tone of hysteria and self-pity. Headline in the issue of August 22, 1962—"The Racist Assault on the ILGWU."

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ership's reaction would never take such grotesque forms. That it struck out so wildly, with such malevolence, is evidence that my criticism pierced a bureaucratic shell and pricked what there is of a sense of guilt among those who have led the ILGWU from what it was yesterday to what it has become today.

While Tyler does not make this charge—at least, not in his article—he must accept responsibility for it considering its source. I am not debating Tyler the individual, but Tyler the defense counsel for the ILGWU.

Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, responding to a Jewish Labor Committee attack on the Association, stated in a letter dated October 31, 1962, to Emanual Muravchik as follows:

> ... We assert with the greatest emphasis that nothing, absolutely nothing, in Mr. Hill's recent or more remote statements can be construed as anti-Semitic. This is a grave charge to make. It requires more substantiation than your flip reference in a part of a sentence. The charge is not only against Mr. Hill, but against the NAACP itself. We do not deign to defend ourselves against such a baseless allegation. Its inclusion in the resolution, as well as in the statements to the press by Mr. Zimmerman is unworthy of an organization like the Jewish Labor Committee which, in the very nature of things, must be conversant with the seriousness of such a charge and with the evidence required to give it substance. No such evidence has been submitted in this case beyond the citation of the use by Mr. Hill of one word, "ethnic," out of a total of 4,500 words in his testimony before the House subcommittee. The relevance of his comparison of the ethnic composition of the membership and the leadership of the ILGWU can hardly be questioned in this context. [Wilkins also said:] We reject the proposition that any segment of the labor movement is sacrosanct in the matter of practices and/or policies which restrict employment opportunities on racial or religious or nationality grounds. We reject the contention that bringing such charges constitutes a move to destroy 'unity' among civil rights groups unless it be admitted that this unity is a precarious thing, perched upon unilateral definition of discrimination by each member group. In such a situation, the 'unity' is of no basic value and its destruction may be regarded as not a calamity, but a blessed clearing of the air.
>
> In this connection, it is well to reiterate a facet of this discussion which appears to have escaped the attention of the various reviewers and resolution writers. It is that Herbert Hill, our Labor Secretary, has but one duty and that is to serve the interests of the Negro worker through the NAACP. Other groups, including trade unions, have powerful machinery to protect their principal interests. Mr. Hill is employed to maintain anti-discrimination work in the employment field as his top and only priority. He is not for trade unions first and Negro workers second. He has no divided loyalties.

IN THE YEARS TO COME the effective work of the NAACP in fighting for a decent, socially conscious labor movement that is sensitive to the needs of the Negro worker will be appreciated. If trade unions in the United States are to be more than just another "business enterprise," more than just organizations that negotiate terms under which labor is bought and sold, then the struggle today for an immediate end to anti-Negro practices within the unions will provide the social basis for defending the labor movement tomorrow.

HERBERT HILL *is National Labor Secretary of the NAACP*

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David McReynolds is a leading member of the Socialist Party and Field Director of the War Resisters League. His discussion of the peace movement will be circulated among activists in the peace movement for discussion that will appear in our next issue.—Editor

Toward An Effective Peace Movement

David McReynolds

IT WAS NOT UNTIL the late fifties that the increasingly obvious perils of the arms race laid the basis for a mass peace movement. In 1957, the pacifist leadership "opened a door" to the liberal community by running a full-page ad in *The New York Times* demanding a "sane nuclear policy." The ad was signed not only by veteran pacifist leaders, but by an impressive array of liberal and intellectual figures. Almost overnight, it touched off a mushrooming growth of local SANE committees and the peace movement was underway.

At the same time, the academic community, on both student and faculty levels, began to develop a sense of responsibility and, for the first time in years, involved itself in controversy. Erich Fromm, C. Wright Mills, David Riesman and other outstanding intellectuals risked their academic standing by speaking against the arms race and encouraging their colleagues to join with them. On the student level, the fairly militant Student Peace Union began to leapfrog from campus to campus, becoming the strongest student peace movement since the thirties.

More recently, we have seen the formation of Women's Strike for Peace, a kind of "non-organized" movement made up of thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of women, many of them ordinary housewives.

REGRETTABLY, THE PEACE MOVEMENT has thus far been singularly ineffective not only on such major issues as Cuba, but on such minor issues as forcing a test-ban agreement. The U. S. could, if it

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desired, sign a test-ban treaty without any provision for on-site inspection, and our security would not be impaired since technical developments have made on-site inspections unnecessary. Our failure to sign a treaty is proof that the U. S. is not really interested in moving toward disarmament. It also reflects the failure of the peace movement to achieve even this token victory. (The Russian position on inspection is also proof of the Russian disinterest in disarmament—but more on that later.)

Why has the peace movement failed, despite its massive demonstrations, its letter-writing campaigns and its political activity? The reason is obvious: it is operating in the context of a nation geared to the Cold War in psychological, political and economic terms. (A close analogy is the reason for so little public support for civil rights among white Southerners. The fact is that the climate of the *white* South is psychologically, politically and economically determined by the pattern of white domination.)

There are three general points of confusion that should be discussed which relate to the problem of politics on a domestic level, politics on an international level and morality in the nuclear age.

A PERMANENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT has been created consisting of tens of thousands of men whose enormous prestige and power are dependent on an arms economy. They have at their disposal some $50 billion a year—10% of the total national product. The economic power of this military-industrial complex is reflected in Congress where Northern Republicans and many Democrats are little more than its political agents.

Millions of workers tied to war production would be thrown out of work by disarmament. This fact, plus the threat of automation and continuing high unemployment, only reinforce organized labor's disinterest in disarmament. And Negroes, who have played so revolutionary a role in American life in recent years, do not concern themselves with the peace issue. They have enough trouble being Negroes without taking on the burden of being "subversive" Negroes; besides, the Cold War has speeded the process of integration.

Thus, not only industrialists and militarists are addicted to the arms race. We are all hooked.

The peace movement cannot be effective, therefore, if it simply confronts the public with the horrors of war, exhorting it to work for peace. The radical pacifist, too, whose fundamental position I basically share, does not always understand that a moral revulsion to the war system divorced from political alternatives is inadequate. For example, the non-violent attacks launched directly against government military bases, the sit-downs, sit-ins, and climbing on board submarines, have marked a good part of pacifist

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activity. These all have a value, which will be discussed, but they do not provide the public with any real alternative to the arms system. A worker at a military plant may not be terribly happy with his work and if you discuss the dangers of the arms race with him, he may agree that the whole thing is madness and should be terminated. But if the pacifist then says that the worker has a moral obligation to leave his job, that nothing else will really be significant, all communication ends. Even if a handful are persuaded to leave their jobs, no factory will be crippled, no military base forced to suspend operations.

As long as the radical pacifist limits himself to saying, "break with the system," he will be ineffective on a mass level. The pacifist must provide some role for the average man to play, some way in which he can identify with the peace movement. It is this failure of the pacifist movement, thus far, to provide any reasonable political program which is its major flaw. For example, one of the first peace walks organized by pacifists had an excellent leaflet for distribution along the line of march, presenting an effective and moving anti-war statement. Then, on the reverse side, it said "What You Can Do." And what was the average man in the streets of New York told he could do? He was advised that (1) he could refuse military service and choose prison instead, (2) he could refuse to pay his income tax, (3) he could quit any job related to the war effort and—to cap it off—(4) he could join a workers' community and share all things in common. Now these are pretty stiff suggestions to make even to a wild-eyed revolutionist, yet they were offered to the "man in the street" as the *only* suggestions for action.

In another project, attempting to be more responsible, the pacifists advised workers to walk off their jobs and offered to help them find other jobs. This might have been sound if the pacifists had other jobs to offer. They did not. All they had was a committee which would "help find" other jobs and had the occasion arisen for such consultation, it would undoubtedly have proven more hindrance than help.

The whole range of radical pacifist actions, from refusing military service through the various sea voyages into nuclear test areas, and including the long march to Moscow, were all fabulously successful in reaching millions of people who had never thought about the issue before, many of whom found themselves "disturbed" enough to go into peace work. These projects have made a favorable impact in most communities where they took place, and served more effectively than any other single device to *pose the questions* so necessary to the building of a movement. But when the radical pacifist believes that such direct assaults on the war system are *the answer,* and attempts to substitute these actions for political and

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economic alternatives to the system, his role becomes divisive, turning us away from the central question we cannot ignore—the fact that we are confronting an economic and social system which is committed to militarism.

Pacifism's error, here, is not its determination to pose the moral question but its belief that that is sufficient. There is a world of difference between a leaflet which says, "Your factory is producing weapons which threaten to destroy tens of millions of people. The work you are doing is immoral. The only moral choice open to you is to leave your job." and one which says, "Your factory is producing weapons which threaten to destroy tens of millions of people. Many workers throughout the country believe it is morally wrong to help manufacture such weapons and are refusing to work in war plants. You may want to consider such refusal yourself. If you are unable to leave your job, you can still help bring the arms race to a halt and create a society of full employment by urging your union leadership to demand that management seek out non-military contracts. This factory produces war goods and if a disarmament treaty is signed you will lose your job. If management shifts from war to peace production, your job will be safe."

The outline is sketchy, but it suggests both a moral question and a political or economic alternative.

THESE, I BELIEVE, are justified criticisms of the radical pacifist position. There are many unjust criticisms. There is something irritating about the newly involved middle class "peaceniks" who are so worried about respectability, so upset about someone on a picket line wearing a beard, so terrified that they may be mistaken for pacifists. I find these attitudes annoying because it was the radical pacifist actions which stimulated the peace movement as a whole. SANE, for example, (which is a bear for respectability) would not touch the first "mass" peace demonstration in New York City because the very idea of putting the peace movement on the street might make it look "too radical." When the first such demonstration in New York attracted 700 people (at that time considered quite a mass), SANE changed its position and has now taken over the annual New York Easter demonstration in which thousands take part. Or again, in the case of the first mass resistance to civil defense in New York in 1960, SANE stayed clear of the whole issue for fear that a direct attack on civil defense was too risky. When 1,000 showed up to break the law, SANE developed a sudden interest in the issue of civil defense and—to its credit—gave the pacifists some very effective help behind the scenes in preparing for the 1961 civil defense protest.

The liberal wing of the peace movement continues to suffer from the illusion that a flood of letters or telegrams to the Presi-

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dent or to Congress can alter the course of foreign policy, or that a friendly chat with a Congressman will impart to him all the sweetness and light with which we are filled. This indicates a lack of understanding of the fact that the political system reflects the existing power structure, and as long as that structure centers around an arms economy mentality, there will be no major shift in the political facade, no matter how often we speak with our Congressmen or stand with posters in front of the White House.

Where the pacifist addresses himself to the individual on the moral level—ignoring the need for confronting the political-economic question—the liberal has persisted in addressing himself to the existing power structure in the hope that moral suasion would produce political change. Now, this is fundamentally even less responsible than the pacifist approach.

We have finally, after years of struggle, gotten the U.S. to commit itself in writing to total disarmament as our primary objective. This victory, won with great effort, amounts to very little. In the basic area of cutting back the swollen war budget, there is no victory. We have a Congress which sometimes insists on appropriating more money for arms than the Administration has requested! Even such a minor step toward disarmament as a test-ban treaty cannot be wrung out of Congress or the Administration.

The liberals have begun, somewhat late in the day, to realize their mistake. The wave of "peace candidates" in 1962 (which will be repeated in '64) was an attempt to play some role in the political process so that Congressmen would realize their victory or defeat was, in part, due to the peace movement.

But there are two problems which the liberal peace movement has not yet resolved. The first is the tendency to accept as "peace candidates" men who are, in fact, not peace candidates at all. In the 1962 elections, SANE's leadership threw its support to a New York reform Democrat who favored a program of fall-out shelters and who felt we just have to hold on to Quemoy-Matsu.

But my real concern is not simply that peace candidates should be chosen more carefully; it is rather that the peace movement, alone, cannot elect any candidates except by accident. In Massachusetts, H. Stuart Hughes ran a good campaign and got only 2½% of the vote. If the peace movement is going to enter politics in a serious way, it must realize that while peace is the primary issue for one-issue organizations like SANE or Women's Strike for Peace, the electorate in any district is a "multi-issue" electorate. Obviously, any candidate who wants to win cannot simply be a "peace candidate." Peace is *not* the main issue to an old Jewish community, to Puerto Rican newcomers, to union members or to small businessmen. A genuine peace candidate might wage a great campaign

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but he would be soundly trounced by an old-line politician. The peace movement must think in terms of candidates who can coalesce varied elements and therefore be most effective as *peace* candidates.

One more word on this problem. The peace movement really has two jobs: one, to educate and agitate for the concept of peace —to keep that hard, raw issue before the public; the other, to seek allies in the trade union and civil rights movements, as well as among independent liberals. It is true that labor is now tied to the arms race. Yet, despite $50 billion a year in military pump priming, the economy is lax, the worker is threatened by automation and unemployment is high. The war system has *not solved* but postponed the problems of the American worker. If labor could see a more effective way of achieving full employment and a high wage level, we would find that the labor movement, George Meany and Jay Lovestone notwithstanding, was never really committed to the Garrison State.

In the case of the Negro—ten per cent of the population and the most explosive political factor in the country today—the Cold War has not solved his problems either. Harlem is still Harlem. The Negro worker is still on the bottom of the pile. The liberation of the Negro requires massive aid in the fields of housing, education, job training and job opportunities. Is the peace movement willing to see the Negro integrated? If we are, I believe we will find that the Negro, too, is not committed to the Cold War.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE IS THE SECOND AREA of confusion in the peace movement. Here, we find four conflicting views:

One view is that the horror of nuclear war is so great that America must work for disarmament. But Russia, according to this view, is to blame for the Cold War, and its dishonest, aggressive policies make it imperative that any disarmament be multilateral and under strict inspection and control.

A second view is as follows: Russia has certainly done many terrible things, but then, so have we. The main reason for the present tension is the reactionary nature of the West. Russia would like to disarm if only we would agree, but she does not dare to disarm unilaterally.

A third position maintains that Russia and the United States simply misunderstand each other. If both sides could meet more often and informally, the tension and suspicion created by the arms race would ease, and both sides could disarm multilaterally.

The fourth view, the radical pacifist approach, I will develop in criticizing the positions above.

Western Europe was prostrated after the war. But the devastation in Russia was even greater. To argue that Russia, with

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twenty million war dead, her industry largely destroyed, was a *military* threat, is preposterous. There were a series of national revolutions in Asia, Africa and the Middle East following the end of the war, when the European powers were so weak that the virtually unarmed colonial peoples were able to begin the task of liberating themselves. Moscow tried to step into that vacuum by offering moral and organizational leadership to these revolutionary movements.

The United States, powerful beyond words, armed with a strategic air force, possessing the nuclear bomb, was facing an exhausted Soviet government. The charge of Russian military aggression was not based on facts; the charge of ideological aggression was thoroughly justified, and is well documented. What was the response to Russia's political offensive? Military truculence! The Cold War grew out of the political conflict between the Soviet government and our own aims, but *the arms race began with the West.* Thus, in my opinion, those who argue that Russia was (politically) aggressive are right, but those who argue that the West was responsible for the arms race are also right. East and West were simply dealing in different currencies. It was certainly foolish for the West to give its support to Chiang, Rhee, Bao Dai, Farouk, etc. It was a mistake based in part on the gross misconception that these revolutionary currents all had their source in Moscow when, in reality, they flowed quite naturally from the world situation. This misconception was to Russia's advantage since she could fully identify with national and colonial revolutions largely directed against the West, an identification that the West obviously was not capable of making.

(To everyone's surprise, the evidence of recent years is that in the former colonial world, the power of nationalism, the revival of Islamic feeling, the growing pride of Africans in "Black Africa," have served to drive the West out of the Middle East, Africa and Asia without really permitting the Communists a single major victory apart from China—and Russia cannot take credit for the latter. The Algerians have outlawed the Communists, Nassar is shooting them, and African students are leaving East European universities in a fury over discrimination.)

WE HAVE ENTERED A NEW PHASE of the Cold War: America is on the defensive in Latin America where we have billions of dollars of investment; disarmament right now would leave us exposed there to the forces of social revolution which are beginning to move; and only the vast armaments program saves our sluggish economy from a depression.

Russia is also experiencing problems which few of us had anticipated ten years ago. The East European bloc is in ferment.

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Everyone who has been in Poland has remarked on the degree of freedom the Poles have somehow managed to achieve; Yugoslavia is independent; Albania has defected. East Germany is a powder keg in which any incident might touch off another Hungary. Furthermore, Russia has unexpected internal problems with continuing consumer pressure for more goods and a running fight with her intellectuals over the question of how much freedom there shall be.

Abstractly, then, Russia does not need an arms economy which diverts so much wealth and manpower from more constructive ends. Concretely, however, in a nation which feels threatened by unrest in East Europe, by China's hostility, by ferment within Russia itself, and where for more than forty years the ruling class has justified the extent of its power partly by pointing to external enemies, total disarmament is totally unacceptable to the Kremlin rulers.

The risks of disarmament are, therefore, very real for the ruling groups, East and West. It is this point which a large section of the peace movement does not understand. If Russia is so eager for disarmament, why doesn't she sign a test-ban treaty providing for seven or more on-site inspections? Surely the Soviet government does not really think seven or more inspections are going to undermine her military security. Of course, the inspections are not needed and, certainly, the American demand is an attempt to avoid reaching agreement. But why doesn't Russia call our bluff?

My point is simply that the governments of both blocs, while eager to avoid war, are also eager to avoid peace. They have a vested interest in the arms race. That is why the various appeals to Kennedy and Khrushchev are often wasteful and misleading expenditures of energy.

A PRO-SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENT would not only be wrong but would fail to make any positive impact on the American political structure. However, assuming that few readers of NEW POLITICS take a pro-Soviet position, I will not pursue at length my reasons for opposing that kind of peace movement.

However, there is a strong tendency in the peace movement to be pro-American, a tendency to apologize for America's actions in the Cold War while hoping for a more peaceful foreign policy. Such a peace movement is basically a tame peace movement, it is a captured movement, just as the Soviet peace movement is captured and exerts no independent influence on Soviet policy. Why should Kennedy (or his successor) modify or change policies if he knows that our attacks will always stop short of a real break with American policy? How can we hope to have *any* impact on those

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in the Soviet bloc if we attack only their arms policy and defend our own?

The primary job of the peace movement is to end the Cold War—not to win it. Within the context of the Cold War we cannot win, nor can we defeat Communism. Every nation that is "won to our side" increases the danger of war with Russia, just as every nation which moves from the neutral camp into the Soviet bloc gives greater power to the "hard" faction in our own country.

Our aim is not to win Africa, Asia and Latin America to our side by non-military means. It is rather to pursue a deliberate policy of encouraging colonial revolutions and reinforcing all efforts of the neutral bloc to remain neutral. To the degree that both the U.S. and Russia lose allies to the neutral bloc, the danger of war recedes.

The problem of liberating those suffering under totalitarian rule will not be solved soon or easily. It will not be solved at all if we attempt that liberation ourselves. The liberation of Russia is the task of the Russian people and it can be carried out—if at all—only in the context of a world situation free of an arms race, free of the Cold War, in which the social processes within Russia can develop without the artificial stability provided by the Cold War.

I WANT TO COMMENT BRIEFLY on the moral confusion within the peace movement centering around what attitude to take toward the deterrent and toward unilateral disarmament. The theory of the deterrent is a simple and awesome one. Each side hopes to prevent the other from attacking through the assurance that, in the event of such an attack, the country attacked would retain the power to deliver a counterstrike. The deterrent theory can operate only as long as each side is absolutely certain that in the event of an attack there would be retaliation by the other side. There is, of course, no defense at all—none against Soviet bombs. Our cities lie open to her missiles and it is only our ability to destroy Russia totally in the event of such an attack that can be called a "defense." By the same token, Russia hopes to prevent an attack by warning us that even if she is nearly destroyed, Russian missiles could still deliver a fatal counter-blow. If either side is unclear about its determination to use the deterrent, the deterrent will fail to deter.

While the balance of terror has kept the peace, it involves our willingness to agree in principle to the mass murder of the Russian people. I do not believe a great and democratic culture can survive this madness—and it is madness. If we accept the concept that such mass murder may be required of us, by what right do we condemn Hitler or Stalin?

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The savage implications of the deterrent theory reinforces the case for pacifism. I believe that all sections of the radical movement must declare themselves utterly opposed to all nuclear war, either offensive *or defensive*. We must make a decisive and unequivocal break with the deterrent theory which is utterly incompatible with socialist values. It does not follow that our political program must demand unilateral disarmament. Radicals have always known that there is a difference between our own ideals and the kind of political movement we seek to create to implement those beliefs. For example, radicals in the South understand that to advocate integration is to accept the *right* of Negro and white to intermarry. But it does not at all follow that the integration movement should subordinate the struggle for equality of education, housing and job opportunity, to an assault on laws forbidding miscegenation.

Similarly, the leaders of the peace movement must declare itself pacifist on the question of nuclear war and make clear that, personally, *they have already unilaterally disarmed*—that is, they will never press the button. On the political level, however, the peace leadership—including the pacifist leadership—must realize that no political movement can be built around the concept of unilateral disarmament in a country so pathologically committed to the arms race on so many levels of national life. Instead, we must say, in effect, "Yes, we are pacifists. We think that on the question of nuclear war you should be, too. But rather than debating the merits of such issues as unilateral disarmament, let us explore areas on which we can reach agreement, such as the neutralization of Central Europe, the withdrawal from Quemoy-Matsu and, above all else, establishing an economic and political order wherein disarmament will not mean economic disaster for the working people."

THE MASS CHARACTER OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT tends to make it more conservative. This is balanced by the radicalizing pressures of international and domestic political events. It becomes increasingly clear to the peace movement that good-will alone is no substitute for necessary basic social changes. The blatant dishonesty of both major blocs drives the peace movement toward an independent position vis-a-vis the two camps, and toward democratic socialism. And much as SANE leaders may deny it, the absolute immorality of nuclear war is also driving the whole peace movement steadily toward a pacifist rejection of violence as a method for resolving conflicts between nations.

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Julius Jacobson

The Politics of Incineration



THE MOST DISTRESSING circumstance surrounding the President's action on October 22, was the almost total lack of resistance to it. Among the thousands of America's elected representatives there was not to my knowledge a single dissent (other than sniping at the President's blockade as being too late and too soft). In the labor movement, not one nationally prominent figure had either the will or courage to naysay the President for his risk of a nuclear war which Kennedy later estimated would "result in hundreds of millions of casualties."* Instead, immediately after Kennedy's blockade speech, George Meany rushed from his television to his telephone to wire the President "the support of the entire American labor movement." While Meany is a conservative labor leader, there was no overt evidence that his enthusiasm was not shared by the more progressive Reuther-type labor leaders, men normally bursting with clichés about "social vision."

Among our intellectuals and liberal political personalities one might have expected some intellectual cogency in expressing what should have been an instinctive revulsion against Kennedy's "politics" of incineration. Tragically, only a handful of them tried to provide America with its conscience. For the most part, intellectuals, liberal writers, even some socialists, sang Kennedy's praises with Wagnerian enthusiasm. Statistical evidence of this loss of a liberal conscience can be found in the poor showing made by peace candidates in the national elections held two weeks after the President's blockade message. In the most striking instance, H. Stuart Hughes, running for the Senate in Massachusetts, was expected to get as much as 10 per cent of the vote but received only 2 per cent on election day. The moral is that many liberals are wild about peace candidates—except when peace becomes an immediate issue.

As the above makes clear, I do not think it was justified in

* In March, Defense Secretary McNamara estimated that there would be nearly 300,000,000 deaths in a full-scale nuclear war: 100 million in the United States, 100 million in Russia and 90 million in Europe.

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October even to hesitate in declaring one's opposition to a nuclear ultimatum that held history in the balance. But five months have now passed and in that time we have all gained the advantage of added knowledge and experience with which to apprise ourselves of the nature of Kennedy's action, what it was a response to, what risks were incurred by it and whether it accomplished worthy liberal objectives (or even objectives sought by our President which are not necessarily either liberal or worthy). This article is primarily concerned with such a review.

TO THOSE WHO RALLIED behind the President, the immediate post-blockade view of the world seemed to confirm the justice of their support. It appeared clear that: 1) Khrushchev sent missiles to Cuba sneakily (with camouflaged tarpaulins); 2) Kennedy countered heroically (he threatened to carbonize the Russians); 3) Khrushchev crumbled ignominiously (the bluffer took his missiles and bombers home). The consequences: Khrushchev's posture grew less warlike, peace more secure, the rift in the Communist world deepened and the American right wing had been thwarted by the moderate Kennedy. As good American pragmatists—the proof of the pudding is in the eating—many men of goodwill were further convinced by the Cuba-tested formula that should Khrushchev resort to similar provocations in any part of the world where "our vital interests are threatened" the best way to preserve our honor and the peace of the world, is to assert our readiness to deliver the first nuclear strike on Russia.

The force of the blockade's seeming success was enough to move Walter Lippmann from an initial critical response to the blockade for "suspend[ing] diplomacy" to a post-blockade eulogy of the President for having shown "the courage of a warrior" and the "wisdom of the statesman...." The liberal Catholic weekly, *Commonweal,* found that the turn of events proved that "the President's decision to risk a nuclear war with the Soviet Union was a brilliant and successful gamble." While it was the Protestant Niebuhr who "learns from the Cuban crisis" that "firmness, tempered by moderation, is the only way of safely sailing through the perilous tumults of the nuclear age." (Illogic apparently doesn't bother Niebuhr since in the same article, he inclines to accept the "mathematical probability of a nuclear catastrophe.") And Max Ascoli, editorializing in *The Reporter* shortly after Khrushchev's capitulation, gushes with praise since everything seems to have worked out so well: "Our President had looked straight at the prospect of a war that might grow into a nuclear war. He did it because of his responsibility to his country and to mankind." Ascoli acknowledges that he was "more than a bit scared" at the time of the ultimatum but the way things worked out proved that Kennedy acted with

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"wisdom," "prudence," "daring," and "decisiveness." (Choked with emotion Ascoli concludes with the benediction: "May God bless our President.")

There is little doubt that as a result of Kennedy's blockade there is (or was) a *superficial and temporary* lessening of world tensions. However, judging the blockade in terms of its seeming success, is as politically dangerous as it is methodologically wrong. There were complex and unknown factors at the time—unknown to the Administration, as well as to its liberal admirers—which might have operated to escalate Kennedy's nuclear threat into a nuclear disaster. If this is the case—and I believe it is—the fact that Kennedy's policy "worked" would not rescue it from the contumely that any policy and policy-maker deserves for running a plausible risk of world destruction.

ON THE BASIS OF KENNEDY'S "success" many analysts are now ready to pooh-pooh the idea that there ever really was a serious risk of war. It is good to remind ourselves of how great the risk was.

The President, himself, in his quarantine address, made little effort to hide the inherent and unknown dangers in his blockade: ". . . let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can see precisely what course it will take or what course or casualties will be incurred." More recently, at his March 6 press conference, arguing against Neanderthals pressing for military action against Castro, the President discussed the risks of a blockade—similar to the one ordered October 22—with atypical candor: "You should not be under any impression that a blockade is not *an act of war,* because when a ship refuses to stop, and then you sink the ship, there is usually a military response by the country involved." (Emphasis added.)

In a remarkable article by six leading analysts of *The New York Times,* we are informed that President Kennedy's specially selected committee of deep thinkers,—*the ExComm**—"sat with an over-all confidence in the nation's nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, but this was little comfort if the Russians chose to go to a war that neither side could win. The President gravely remarked that evening, that it seemed to him to be touch and go, that it could now go either way.' "

The New York Times began its October 28 lead editorial with: "the world teeters on the edge of thermonuclear war, which is a mere euphemism for thermonuclear annihilation, . . ."

This was echoed by Warren Rogers, Jr. of the *Herald Tribune*

* The ExComm is the abbreviation for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. The Committee, created shortly before the blockade was declared, included CIA chief John McCone, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary of Treasury Douglas Dillon, General Maxwell Taylor, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy, Theodore Sorenson (Kennedy's speechwriter), Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

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staff who began his column with, "The United States and Russia teetered on the brink of nuclear war for a week."

One Pentagon veteran admitted to James N. Wallace, the *Wall Street Journal*'s Washington analyst, a few days after Khrushchev retreated: "I've never been so scared as I was last week, and this time we had everything in our favor."

John Gunther, in the January 15 issue of *Look* magazine, reminisces that during the week of October 22, "the whole world, for all we know, was on the verge of being blown up, . . ."

Another feature article in the same publication, two weeks earlier, was headlined "Washington In Crisis: 154 Hours On the Brink of War." In this detailed account of the critical week, Washington correspondent Fletcher Knebel quotes that splendid thinker and top Presidential advisor, Robert Kennedy: "We may all be fighting for our lives in two weeks."

The most authoritative article on what the President and his "ExComm" were thinking and what was at stake in their decisions appeared in the December 8 issue of the *Saturday Evening Post*. It is the article by Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, two leading Washington analysts with an inside track, the latter a close personal friend of the President. The article (in finished form or major outlines it was probably cleared by the White House) became a *cause célèbre* for its attempt to ax Adlai Stevenson as a Munichеer. It is a pity that this sensational aspect of the Alsop-Bartlett story, important as it is, obscured the greater significance of their stark report of a world close to nuclear war in the opinion of those in a position to know. One ExComm member is quoted: "There wasn't one of us in that room who wasn't pretty sure that in a few hours we'd have to sink one of those Russian ships." (At the time of the blockade dozens of Russian freighters were on the high seas en route to Cuba.) Small wonder, then, the President and his advisers believed (apparently Alsop-Bartlett, too) that "Already the world was on a lower rung of the ladder that might lead to nuclear war." Alsop-Bartlett confirm the remark attributed to the President by *The New York Times* analysts that "now it could go either way." The ExComm had so little confidence that "either way" might not prove the disastrous way that when John McCone—CIA Chief and ExComm member—first heard that Khrushchev had actually accepted Kennedy's terms, he conceded, "I could hardly believe my ears." The mood of the ExComm —and a measure of its deepthink—was Robert Kennedy's statement: "We all agreed in the end that if the Russians were ready to go to nuclear war over Cuba, they were ready to go to nuclear war, and that was that. So we might as well have the showdown then as six months later." And this is one of the men deciding the fate of the world.

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The most memorable phrase was uttered by ExComm member, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who, upon learning that Khrushchev had agreed to withdraw Russian missiles on Kennedy's terms, commented (as a "casual aside" according to Alsop-Bartlett): "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked." Rusk's "eyeball to eyeball" aside found its anatomical counterpart in President Kennedy's statement at his February 8 news conference that "we may find ourselves *again* with the Soviet Union *toe to toe,* but we ought to know what we have in our hands before we bring the United States and ask our allies to come *to the brink with us again.*" (Emphasis added.)

"Eyeball to eyeball" and "toe to toe," "teetering on the edge of thermonuclear war" and on the "brink of nuclear war;" "the whole world on the verge of being blown up;" and "fighting for our lives in two weeks." These were not the estimates of hysterics but of sober top-level politicians and competent analysts. It might be argued—it has been—that Kennedy and family, and other top advisors, manufactured the danger of nuclear war out of ignorance or because some psychological mechanism impelled them to magnify the dangers of their actions beyond objective limits. But Kennedy and his "think tank" could not all have been so mistaken about the possible consequences of their decision; they certainly do not appear to be types whose intelligence could be so distorted by such a macabre need for self-dramatization.

Even if Kennedy et al. exaggerated the risks incurred by the blockade, the point is that the Administration has made clear that *it* is ready to counter the Russians with moves *it* thinks involve the risk of nuclear annihilation. The difficulty is that a risk can only be conclusively proven a poor one if the world is blown apart.

IRONICALLY ENOUGH, THIS TOE-AND-EYEBALL DANCE OF DEATH has enhanced the image of Kennedy as . . . a "moderate." Perhaps relative to some in the Republican Party (and others in the ExComm itself) who pressed for an immediate invasion of Cuba with all its greater political liabilities and nuclear risks, the Kennedy blockade was a "moderate" course, and the President a "moderate." By the same token one could characterize the late John Foster Dulles as a "moderate" compared to Kennedy since Dulles' threats of "massive retaliation" were never accompanied by explicit nuclear ultimatums. (And it could be well argued that during Dulles' tenure specific Communist threats to Berlin and the Middle East, and Communist victories in Indo-China and elsewhere represented as great a threat to American security as Russian missiles in Cuba.) The point is that "moderate" implies the *politics* of moderation and what Kennedy did was to subordinate politics to a nuclear gambit.

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The myth of Kennedy-the-moderate has nothing more to rest on than an overall shift to the right in America: the President simply adopted positions adjacent to those recently abandoned by Goldwater's expeditionary batallions now marching down a fork still further right to outposts permanently situated along the Brink. It was Henry A. Kissinger, one-time adviser to the Pentagon, who noted with satisfaction that even more rewarding than the withdrawal of Russian missiles from Cuba was that Kennedy's action "exploded the myth that in every situation the Soviets were prepared to run greater risks than we." That Kennedy can now claim the greater glory of running greater risks than Khrushchev is a measure of his temperateness.

This gentle image of Kennedy not only over-minimizes the nuclear risk he took but implicitly misinforms the public about the nature and magnitude of differences within the ExComm between the so-called "doves" and "war-hawks." The doves, i.e., the moderates, advocated a blockade, while the hawks opted for an airstrike to meet the Russian provocation. The moderates argued that a blockade might achieve the immediate objective with less risk of nuclear war and that an airstrike would alienate world opinion. Nevertheless, the objections of the doves to the hawks did not stem from any deep moral or political convictions. The differences were over priorities. All on the ExComm, plus the President, made it amply clear after a pro-dove consensus had been reached that if the Russians did not withdraw their missiles soon after the blockade, an airstrike would. And the President made it explicit on October 22, that even if Russian ships respected the naval blockade, "should these offensive military preparations continue . . . further action will be justified. I have directed the armed forces to prepare for any eventualities . . . " These eventualities, of course, were the preparations Kennedy had ordered for an airstrike and invasion. It was only a matter of days, perhaps hours, before the White House doves were to trigger off the "eventualities" when Khrushchev announced the Kremlin's acceptance of Kennedy's terms.

Actually, the invasion plan had already been a full year in the making, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Kennedy's order. The plan, "Operation X," called for 100,000 men, including initial assault waves by three divisions, one marine, one army infantry, one army paratroop. Masses of Airforce bombers and fighters, aircraft carriers and other naval craft were also called for. The plan was speeded up during the crisis and would have been ready for execution by the end of the month.

Castro's predictable refusal to permit on-site inspection in Cuba offered our President the convenient pretext for holding the no-invasion pledge in abeyance, a pledge, even if given, that Ken-

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nedy would never consider inviolable. As long he he finds, as he said at his February 7 news conference, that "Cuba [is] the most critical area in the world today," the Administration will have the rationale and the formula for resorting to blockades, airstrikes or invasions. As Kennedy put it in his press conference a month later, "... *at this time* we do not believe that war in the Caribbean is to the national advantage." (Emphasis added.)

ONE REASON THAT MEANINGFUL OPPOSITION was not manifested was fear. Even sophisticated radicals who know what is wrong with a purely nuclear response to the Kremlin's provocation, equivocated, sometimes collapsed, when confronted by photographs and propaganda about Russian missiles, 90 miles off our shores, soon to be zeroed in on 42 American targets. We were told that should the missile sites be completed, the Americas "as far north as Hudson's Bay, Canada and as far south as Lima, Peru" would be vulnerable to attack. The sites "constitute an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas..."

If the sites represented a prime military threat, then those who rallied behind the President would at least have a talking point—although I believe that the blockade was wrong in any event. But was it so? Was the presence of 42 Russian controlled missiles and 30 bombers in Cuba a clear and imminent threat to America's military security? Here, it is necessary to review very briefly some pertinent information about the respective nuclear capabilities of the two big powers and how their relationship was affected by missiles in Cuba.

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Kennedy made much of his suggestion that the United States was on the short end of the "missile gap." Eisenhower's denials were inept. But they were justified. Soon after Kennedy's inauguration, his missile gap alarms were heard no more. He no longer needed votes. Instead, in February, 1961, the new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, reported to the President (what he must have known all along) that there was a missile gap, but it was the Kremlin which had something to worry about.

In the two years since McNamara's "revelation" the spread has widened enormously. At the time the 42 short and medium range Russian missiles were supposedly threatening to upset, at least considerably narrow, our advantage, the United States had between 300–500 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with ranges from 2,000 to over 9,000 miles. The Russians had about 75. In addition, of a planned fleet of 40 Polaris nuclear submarines, 9 were to be in readiness by the end of October. In mid-March the 19th Polaris submarine was launched. Each Polaris submarine is equipped with sixteen 600 kiloton missiles (with a range of 1,380 miles) or a total

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of almost 10 megatons per vessel. What this means in fire power can be seen in the fact that the explosive power on each of these submarines is twice that of all the bombs dropped by all the warring countries in World War II, including the atomic weapons unleashed on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The "beauty" of these Polaris missiles is that they fall into the "hardened" category, as the argot goes, i.e., being mobile and fired from underwater positions they are practically invulnerable. By contrast, Russia's missile submarines have only short range weapons which must be fired from the surface.

Therefore, even if we assumed that the short and intermediate range Russian missiles 90 miles off our shore had the same capabilities as the Intercontinental missiles in Russia (which is actually not the case) that would still total approximately 117 missiles capable of striking the United States, compared to 300–500 Western ICBM, plus 144 Polaris missiles to which the Russians were exposed.

This is not all—not by a ballistic long shot. Where long-range bombers, with over a 5,000 mile range and nuclear strike capabilities are concerned, the West has a 3–1 advantage over the Communist world. The impression that this gap of 630 to 200 long range bombers was seriously reduced by the presence of 30 obsolete Russian IL-28 bombers in Cuba with a range of 1,500 miles is fantastic on the face of it. To this imbalance of forces must be added the U.S. flotilla of aircraft carriers with hundreds of bombers that can be lofted over Communist territory with nuclear bombs; the Russians have none. Furthermore, Russia has to contend with shorter range land based American missiles in Turkey (on the Russian border) and Italy. (Some of these bases may be withdrawn in favor of more effective Polaris submarines in Southern waters.)

America's vast superiority in numbers and quality of nuclear weaponry (a high proportion of ICBM's, secured in underground silos, have the same "hardened" advantage as shorter range Polaris submarine missiles) inspired the "counterforce" strategy, baptized by Defense Secretary McNamara in his now famous speech at Ann Arbor on June 16, of last year.

According to this new strategy, "principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military force, not of his civilian population."

Counterforce assumes that American nuclear strength is so vastly superior to the Russians' that even if a large number of ICBM's are used against Russian installations (instead of cities), what remains in land and sea-based hardened weapons will be so far superior to what is left of Russia's nuclear arsenal that she will not be in a position to retaliate since that would automatically trigger another American strike that would totally level Russia.

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Thus, Russian cities are spared for the sake of becoming nuclear hostages, and Russia, itself, must submit or be destroyed.

The credibility of counterforce power further exposes the fraud that 42 missiles and 30 obsolete bombers in Cuba posed an explicit, offensive military threat to the United States.

Indeed, given the extent of today's nuclear imbalance, it is difficult to see what military advantage Russia could have sought. These Russian controlled missiles were "soft" weapons, vulnerable to conventional attacks as contrasted to underground or submarine launched "hardened" missiles. Their only purpose could be for a first strike. But for the Russians to entertain a first strike now is to entertain suicide and everyone knows this. Thus, as "soft" bombs, they would have little deterrent value and their successful installation could only encourage America's strategists to put the counterforce theory to a practical test.

While all this adds an irrational note to Khrushchev's provocation as a *military* venture (though not as a political move) it also deprives Kennedy's brinkmanship of a *military* rationale (though not of a political motive).

In fact, just three weeks after Kennedy went toe-to-toe with Khrushchev because of the alleged military threat, our own Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, in an underpublicized interview, let it be known that "in my own mind the military equation was not altered, the military equation between the Soviets and the U.S., by bringing closer to our shores of these missiles..." In the event that Gilpatric's syntax is a bit confusing here, he is more lucid further on in his interview (over ABC Television Network, November 11): "I don't believe that we were under any greater threat from the Soviet Union's power taken in its totality after this than we were before. It was simply an element of flexibility introduced into the power equation that the Soviets had not heretofore possessed."

Gilpatric is still working for Kennedy.

A week before the Deputy Secretary's revelations, Hans J. Morgenthau, Director of the Center for the Study of United States Foreign and Military Policy at the University of Chicago, let it be known that: "What actually threatens the physical integrity of the United States are Russian missiles based on land and sea. *Missiles placed on Cuba add nothing to that material threat;* they would be wiped out in the first minutes of a war." (Emphasis added.) A week after Gilpatric's interview, Harvard's Kissinger made it clear that "The chief benefit the Soviets obtained from these bases was political, not military." And: "As we have seen, the bases were of only marginal military use in a defensive war. In an offensive war their effectiveness was reduced by the enormous difficulty, if not

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impossibility—of co-ordinating a first strike from the Soviet Union and Cuba."

That Kissinger tears into the military justification for the blockade is not to say that he repudiates it. On the contrary, the blockade was just what America needed. But he wants no bones made about its real political motivation. However, this was Kennedy's blockade, not Kissinger's and most of the liberals and socialists who rallied behind the President did so because they believed what the President said about the "explicit" military threat of "offensive" missiles. What do they say today, once the blockade is stripped of its military justification by facts, by logic, by commonsense, by Gilpatric, Morgenthau, Kissinger and others. And in this era of sociological *politesse,* when class struggles are group conflicts and imperialism is something confined to the East while America only followed a "tragic course" at the Bay of Pigs, what is the euphemistic equivalent for the use of sinister lies to panic a nation into support of ultra brinkmanship?



KENNEDY WAS OBLIGED TO GIVE some answer in advance to the inevitable and legitimate questioning of America's moral right to missile bases on Russian borders, when the Russians are denied similar privileges near our shores. One difference, according to the President, was that the Russians went about their installations in "sudden, clandestine" fashion while, by contrast, "Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloud of secrecy."

This was actually taken seriously and repeated by otherwise capable writers.

Let us say that the Russians did secretly in Cuba what we Americans did publicly in Turkey. It is hard to see how that gives Thor missiles in Turkey the moral advantage, or makes their potential use less destructive than Russian bombs in Cuba. Why are the Russians under any special moral obligation to declare their intentions in Cuba when this is part of a somewhat less than ethical nuclear game which requires both sides to exercise guile, deception, secrecy, spying, etc.? We, no less than they.

Would the Administration have approved of Russian missile sites in Cuba if Gromyko had only taken the American President into his confidence at one of their man-to-man talks? ("Gromyko

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told me in my office" things that were "false." Imagine that!) Were the Russians given advance notice of U-2 flights over Russian missile installations?

And if secrecy is the horrible nub of it all, what could be more clandestine than our missile-laden Polaris submarines cruising near Russian shores? If our President is so keen on fair play, should he not order these submarines to be above board as well as under water, and let the Russians know whenever they move out of Holy Loch for Russian shore duty? Now there are reports of American proposals to the British to give them Polaris missiles on surface vessels disguised as freighters.

What makes Kennedy's moralistic ploy so disingenuous is that he knew perfectly well—better than anyone else in this country—that the Russians made only the most feeble attempts to conceal their operation. Except for camouflaged tarpaulins en route, there was no secrecy about missiles installed without any serious effort to hide them from the hundreds of American reconnaissance flights. The installations were so obvious that they led to some interesting suggestions. *The New York Times* analyst Thomas J. Hamilton commented that "The failure of the Soviet technicians in Cuba to camouflage the initial construction of missile bases has led to the suspicion, in fact, that Mr. Khrushchev wanted the United States to discover his Cuba operations and is using them to force a summit meeting on Berlin, Turkey and the whole problem of Western bases on the periphery of the Iron Curtain." The same paper's Harry Schwartz speculated that the missiles in Cuba were intended as a "psychological probe" of American reactions since there was no effort made to hide them.

And just two days after the President's blockade talk, the *New York Post* let us know that "a high Defense Department official last night said categorically that the Russians could have hidden their building activity from aerial surveillance. But they seemed to be in such a hurry to finish, he said, that they made no efforts at concealment."

Where, then, was the "cloak of secrecy"?

There were two other reasons the President offered as moral justification for denying to the Russians the "right" to do on our borders what we have been doing for 17 years around theirs. The Russians, Kennedy said, violated the "traditions of this nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations and my own public warnings to the Soviets . . . " These are, indeed, many violations, if not very weighty ones. But, on the other hand, aren't Polaris submarines and land based missiles surrounding Russia, violations of Russian traditions? Aren't they also violations of Soviet resolutions and countless per-

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sonal warnings from Khrushchev? And what nuclear dispensation does the Charter of the United Nations give the Americans that is denied the Russians?

Kennedy further explained that their bombs are bad and our bombs are good because theirs in Cuba represented an "unjustified change in the status quo." The thought is as puerile as it is demagogic. What Kennedy means by his repeated exhumations of the Monroe Doctrine is that any change in the status quo that is bad for us is a bad one; but a change in the status quo that is bad for the Russians is a good change. (The purely military status quo, for example, has been changing all the time in America's favor. This is most moral.) Kennedy's concern is not with the sanctity of the status quo but with America's inability to match its military gains by political victories. If it could, it would.

THUS FAR, I HAVE DISCUSSED some of the circumstances and rationalizations for the blockade. But what are its consequences? Even a deleterious action might produce, indirectly or inadvertently, desirable results. Has the blockade strengthened the prospects for peace? Did it enhance the cause of freedom? Did it force the American Right to retreat? Did it reverse Castroism in South America and deprive totalitarian Communism of its ideological appeal?

The answers to these questions are of vital concern to all radicals. We will come to them. First, however, something that is of lesser moral-political concern to radicals (or should be): How did the blockade work out, from the Administration's point of view, in terms of its prestige as the leader of the world's free nations?

Consider:

France's rift with America since the blockade becomes a virtual schism. DeGaulle's *idée fixe* on French grandeur is such that he insists on the glory of France's very own nuclear *force de frappe* as he flirts with Spain and presses for an independent continental alliance under his spiritual leadership. (No less ominous for the West is DeGaulle's recurrent suggestion of a rapprochement with Russia.)

England, excluded from the Common Market thus far by France, is subjected to national humiliation at the Macmillan-Kennedy conference in Nassau when the President informs the lesser Prime Minister that America is scrapping her Skybolt missiles on which the expensive British defense program was modeled. Instead, Kennedy informs Macmillan, *we* are ready to give England Polaris missiles, under effective American control, for which England must pay. This hardly sits well with either Conservatives or Laborites.

Spain, charmed by DeGaulle's covetous glances, gets into the act and wants to raise the economic and diplomatic ante for Amer-

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ican military installations on Spanish soil; a little bit of blackmail among partners in the Free World.

West Germany, under Adenauer's leadership, suddenly ups and signs an agreement with DeGaulle, which places an evident, and understandable strain on relations between Bonn and Washington.

Canada is publicly criticized by the State Department for refusing to accept nuclear warheads. The result is that Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Conservative government receives a vote of no-confidence and the next government promises to go to the side that can best exploit anti-Americanism.

Relevant here is that this cleavage in the Western camp, inevitable in any case, developed more rapidly, and is perhaps now irrevocable, as a result of the totally unilateral character of Kennedy's blockade. Kennedy knew of Russian missiles in Cuba for at least a week before his ultimatum. Yet, there was no attempt to counter the provocation through the United Nations or to consult with the American people, and, more to the particular point, *no effort made to involve her European allies.* (The approval won from the Organization of American States was a modest victory for a decision already made.) The blockade was decided solely by the President plus his eight personally selected officials and elder statesmen. For all the kudos from Western leaders for Kennedy's show of force, his failure to consult them rankled, turning into visible hostility when Washington soon proved that this unilateral nuclear initiative inaugurated a new belligerent stance vis-a-vis her allies; a decide-it-alone and do-it-yourself policy which demands subordinating Europe to America's will. It was formulated as a policy by the President at an end of the year talk with newspapermen. According to Erwin Canham, editor of the *Christian Science Monitor,* Kennedy said, in effect, that: "the United States could not expect to please its allies all the time, that the nation was not engaged in a popularity contest, that it had been too anxious to please others in the past, and would have to speak now more firmly and bluntly in (the) future. In short, an 'independent' policy."*

IF EUROPE'S LEADERS LOVE us less after the blockade, do Latin Americans love us more? Russia was forced to admit that it used a Latin

* One new element in Kennedy's by-passing of allies and the United Nations is that the stage has been set for more personal confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev whenever a critical point is reached in Russian-American relations. There is even talk of a direct line between the White House and the Kremlin. Somehow or other, if two great statesmen do not have to clutter up their days in consultations with allies or maneuvering at the U. N., the possibility of war is supposedly reduced. However, any move which by-passes the restraining influence of other forces, above all the United Nations, exacerbates the danger of war. I have no illusions about the ultimate ability of the U. N. to achieve a decent, permanent solution to the Cold War; but there is little doubt that if debates and negotiations are channeled through the U. N., both powers have to show a concern for world public opinion which serves to inhibit their rawer instincts. In this way the U. N. acts as a shock absorber.

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American country as a pawn in the Cold War, and Castro appeared as Khrushchev's pliant tool or victim. Since it was Big Brother to the North with the Big Bomb who did the forcing, the sages in and around the Administration claimed this would undercut Castro and Communism in Latin America while America's political stock would soar.

But it didn't work out that way. Americans are still *Yanquis* to Latin Americans, and whether or not Castro's personal image has been damaged, one thing is certain (and there should never have been any doubt about it)—*Castroism* throughout Latin America remains as potent today as before the October crisis.

One analyst for the *Christian Science Monitor,* captioning his story "U.S. 'Victory' Found Fading in Latin America," begins his tale of woe: "The successful blockade of Cuba was a moment of glory for the United States in its own backyard. But only a moment." John Gunther reports, two months after the exposure of Russia's nuclear subversion in Latin America, that "A distinct possibility exists that Chile may *vote* itself Communist in 1964." The emphasis on *vote* is Gunther's. In late March, President Goulart gives permission for a pro-Castro hemispheric conclave in Brazil, much to Washington's chagrin. John Gerassi, a former Latin American editor for *Time,* writes in *The New Republic:*

> . . . while it is true that many Latin American Nationalists, who are leaders of whatever revolutions are forthcoming, publicly condemned Castro for allowing Cuba to become a Soviet base, they still believe he could not have done otherwise. Paradoxical as it may seem, the Nationalists are both anti-Castro and Castroite. If we fail to distinguish between man and idea, we have not begun to understand the true state of affairs in Latin America.

Those liberals and socialists who applauded the risk of nuclear war because it would have salutary political consequences in Latin America, "have not begun to understand the true state of affairs in Latin America."

IF THE BLOCKADE did not "work" in Europe and South America, was not Russian totalitarianism rolled back as an ideological force? Here, too, the judgment of normally perspicacious writers was overcome by their intoxication at Kennedy's "successful" show of nuclear guts. They forgot—those who ever understood—that Russian Communism is an historically unique ideological force with enormous political appeal to those who become its victims. It also has great recuperative powers, and most of Communism's political loss, following the revelation of its nuclear brinkmanship in Cuba, has already been recovered.

What appeared to many as a political disaster for the Kremlin is now being cleverly turned to its advantage. The impression

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created, and not without foundation in truth, is that Kennedy went to the brink and Khrushchev stepped back. Kennedy thereby becomes the threat to world peace, which he is, and Khrushchev becomes the Statesman and Savior, which he is not.

Evidence of this conception of Nikita Khrushchev as a responsible world leader is the following from an address by U Thant, General Secretary of the United Nations, delivered at Johns Hopkins on December 2:

> Mr. Khrushchev, who is now in control of the reins of government, belongs to a different category of leaders distinct from the ruthless Stalin, with a coherent philosophy of the world based on the thesis, not of the inevitability of war, but of the imperative of competitive co-existence. We may or may not agree with his philosophy or with his aims, but we have very good reasons to believe that he does not want war. The West does not seem to appreciate the full significance of this obvious change of political climate in the Soviet Union.

Thus, just six weeks after Khrushchev's nuclear provocation, the head of the United Nations, in a speech cluttered with trivialities and half truths appropriate for greetings to an American-Soviet Friendship Council, reprimands *the West* for failing to appreciate the Kremlin's peaceful intent in world affairs.

U Thant's talk, a major event in itself, is more significant as the prototype of the continued thinking of many, if not the majority, of leading political figures in the uncommitted world.

Further evidence of how much Khrushchev has gained from the blockade comes from the U.S. Information Agency. A USIA poll, reluctantly released on March 14, after reassuring us that Americans are still popular in most of Europe, cannot hide the sensational information that there has been a rise of pro-Russian sentiment in Europe because of "the avoidance of war over Cuba—which many in Europe attribute more to Soviet moderation than to U.S. strength." Also:

> The Soviet gains are most apparent . . . in the current extent of approval of recent Soviet politics. There is also very substantial improvement in the Soviet peace image, and some increase, except in West Germany, in the general level of esteem for the Soviet Union.

DOMESTICALLY, TOO, KENNEDY'S BRINKMANSHIP has proved harmful to those who sought a militant peace movement, free of hypocrisy and committed to a struggle against militarism East and West. Repelled by the President's threat of war, many peace activists lost their bearings and tumbled into that intellectual void of doublethink and doubletalk, a nether world of Stalinoid vagaries where to resist Kennedy's nuclear response somehow obliges one not to denounce Khrushchev's nuclear stimuli; and, conversely, to denounce Khrushchev's provocations and to expose Castro's liquida-

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tion of the Cuban revolution somehow makes one a lackey of Wall Street imperialism and an agent of the C.I.A.

But the blockade has not only nourished a new crop of Stalinoids; it has also produced its Americanoids, driving larger numbers of liberal non-conformists—as earlier noted in the Hughes campaign—from the peace movement and its periphery into a Kennedyized frame of mind. In this way the blockade virtually crippled one of the few decent things to have happened in America in the past decade.

But if one of the blockade's domestic effects has been crippling where the peace movement is concerned, that involves only a small fraction of the American people. What, then, have been the moral and political effects on the American people as a whole?

Alongside a commendable appreciation for democracy, there is deeply ingrained in the average American, a not-so-latent disregard for democracy, and a wide streak of intolerance, prejudice and xenophobia. Now, what facet of the Americans' psyche was favored by Kennedy's blockade? Did it serve to enlighten the people and advance their appreciation of democracy? Did it encourage tolerance? Did it serve to educate the masses to a more compassionate understanding of other peoples?

Can anyone fathom these as other than rhetorical questions? Is there any cause to doubt that in this area the blockade has contributed to the political and spiritual impoverishment of the American people?

KENNEDY'S ACTION HAS BEEN defended by many of his admirers on the theory that Russia has become a basically cautious society which will retreat when its provocative "bluffs" are challenged by a stronger and unblinking antagonist. This view usually rests on the assumption that because there is less terror under Khrushchev than under Stalin, the Kremlin is less imperialistic. The equation's illogic can be demonstrated historically by the example of England which was the world's most democratic, industrialized nation at a time that it also possessed ravenous imperialist appetites. (For a whole period, its democracy was dependent on its imperialism.) Similarly, in Russia, less terror does not imply a diminution of

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imperialist ambitions. On the contrary, Stalin's death released the Kremlin's potential of external imperialism from the limitations imposed by his greater concentration on building a national economic base for a newly formed totalitarian ruling class. Stalinist imperialism, before World War II, was almost exclusively of an internal nature—subordinating Ukrainian, Georgian and other nationalities to Moscow. When Stalin did acquire an Eastern empire it was with the generous assistance of Roosevelt and Churchill. But it was not until after Stalin's death—and less under Malenkov than Khrushchev—that Russia entered a new and "higher" stage of imperialism, economically coordinating her satellites and steadily increasing her global areas of operation. Stalin did not involve himself deeply in African affairs; Khrushchev has. Stalin did not become enmeshed in Latin American politics; Khrushchev has. It would be idle to speculate whether Stalin would have sent missiles to Cuba; Khrushchev did.

The purpose of these efforts at political penetration is, perhaps, economic in the long run; today, however, it is determined by the *ideological* needs of a new type ruling class whose collective economic and social power rests on its monopoly of political power. But power cannot be an end in itself. It must be motivated and this motivation is supplied by a combination of material personal benefits and ideological commitments. Ideology under capitalism bears a certain indecisive relationship to the system itself; but remove ideology from Communism and there is chaos. And an indivisible element of the Russian rulers' ideology, of their indispensable moral self-justification, is their commitment to "bury capitalism" throughout the world.

It is this fact of Russian life which make the equation of less terror therefore less imperialism not only a *non-sequitur* but, as an operational concept, a grave threat to peace because it erroneously assumes the feasibility of curbing deeply rooted imperialist impulses through nuclear ultimatums. Threats might work here and there, the first or second or third times. But eventually it will bring on a nuclear inferno. And this is the new course on which Kennedy embarked in October. He has already told us that what he chanced in October he is ready to risk again—in Cuba or Berlin or wherever the two imperialist paths cross at some vital juncture. This means an escalation of the Cold War for this cannot be a unilateral shift. The Russians must meet new nuclear pugnacity with pugnacity in kind and Khrushchev already proved this in a speech on February 27, when he warned:

> If, however, the imperialists violate the right of the peoples to choose the socio-political system they want, if they try to impose their will on the peoples, this will lead to a world thermonuclear war.... If an attack is made on Cuba or on the People's Republic of (Communist) China,

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which is being threatened from Taiwan (Formosa), if an attack is made on the Korean Democratic People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or the German Democratic Republic, or, indeed, any Socialist country, the Soviet Union will come to the assistance of its friends and strike a devastating blow at the aggressors.

Who is to assure us that these are the idle threats of a shoe-thumping bluffer?

EVERYTHING ABOUT KENNEDY'S BLOCKADE was wrong.* It was a military response to an essentially political threat that ran the realistic risk of a nuclear war. It was based on a manufactured imminent military menace and cloaks of secrecy where none existed. It revealed the Administration's readiness to invade Cuba at the right time. It promoted the worst features in American life. It has undercut the peace movement. It failed to stem incipient totalitarian movements in Latin America and provided Khrushchev with the opportunity to pose as a responsible statesman. Above all, it escalated the Cold War.

That is why if history survives Kennedy and Khrushchev, the week of October 22, will some day be recorded as the week of America's shame. Not only for what the Administration did, but also because so few resisted it.

* The pride Kennedy's followers take in the blockade for having furthered the rift in the Communist world is worth no more than a footnote in comment. The blockade did have the effect of furthering the division in the totalitarian world but it should be pointed out that it was China's hand that was strengthened in her rivalry with Russia. This should bring little cheer to anyone concerned with democracy and peace. In any case, deepening the rift hardly justifies the risk of a nuclear war any more than the India-China conflict finds any saving grace in the fact that it, too, served to widen the fissure in the Communist world.

JULIUS JACOBSON *is Editor of* NEW POLITICS.



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Joseph Clark was Foreign Editor of the Communist Party's Daily Worker and its correspondent in the Soviet Union from 1950-53. He broke with the paper and the Party in 1957.

Joseph Clark

Origins of the Cold War

PROFESSOR D. F. FLEMING has written a long and detailed history of the Cold War, *The Cold War and its Origins.* Significantly, Fleming chooses the Munich capitulation to Hitler as the first important event of the current Cold War. For Fleming this is the grand daddy of a thousand arguments to show that the Western powers, primarily the United States, were responsible for the Cold War. In many ways this 2-volume, 1,115-page work is one of the longest *non sequiturs* ever committed to paper.

The logic is something along the following lines. The betrayal at Munich left the Soviet Union no alternative but to make a pact with the Nazis which jointly partitioned Poland, divided up the Baltic countries and the Balkans and provided Hitler with sinews of war. The author shows that colonialism is not only bad but out of date and it was wrong for the U.S. to support colonialism. Also that McCarthyism is bad and we should not have instituted repressions in this country. That our failure to recognize and support the anti-feudal, anti-colonial revolution in China and the rest of Asia and throughout the colonial world was a sorry fault of American policy.

After presenting a convincing criticism of these wrong policies we are then asked to accept this conclusion: these bad American policies were responsible for Soviet behavior. Indeed the Cold War originated as a result of American policies and deeds, while the Soviet Union wanted only to be left alone (with its Eastern empire), to live in peace and to build huge consumer goods industries. And whenever a reader may entertain a doubt about this, Professor Fleming will quote the *Nashville Tennessean,* the *New York Times,* or Samuel Grafton, Walter Lippmann, James Reston, Dana Adams Schmidt, Drew Pearson or some other columnist to prove that this is so.

An accurate history of the Cold War would be a good guide for appraising the present relationship between the two decisive powers in world affairs—the United States and the Soviet Union.

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Such history should bring deeper understanding of the nature of Soviet society and it surely involves value judgments and comparisons of American and Soviet civilization. Such examination should help us to confront the issue of war or peace in the atomic age.

Fleming quite frankly eschews the kind of history which would record events *wie es eigentlich gewesen.* In his preface he tells us that he "sought at every stage to present the other side, how it it looks to 'the enemy,' in the belief that this is essential to the avoidance of the final grand smash." (p. XIII). And so to the record.

THOUGH THE NATURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY sometimes eludes Fleming he does understand the overwhelming catastrophe represented by Nazi totalitarianism. The latter was truly the greatest disaster of the 20th century. Fleming notes briefly how blind the Kremlin was when it encouraged the German Communists in their fratricidal war with the German Socialists to the ultimate benefit of Hitler; but he omits the years of Soviet directed struggle against "social fascism." The latter, of course was Social Democracy which the Communists considered an even greater danger than Nazism. "They are not antipodes, they are twins,"[1] Stalin said of the Nazis and the Social Democrats, which permitted the German Communists to support the Nazi-sponsored referendum against the Social Democratic government of Prussia. This cannot, however, absolve the German Social Democrats for their failures and illusions about Hitler which complemented the Communist betrayal.

Justly indignant about the appeasement of Hitler, culminating at Munich, Fleming is also utterly disdainful of the British commitment on March 31, 1939, to defend Poland, made belatedly, it is true, but made sincerely and carried out unhesitatingly when Hitler attacked. Fleming's dismissal of the British commitment misses the entire point—now the West would *have to fight.* Western appeasement was finished. Now the question was whether the Soviets would appease Hitler. The answer came soon enough and in a way which assured Hitler that he would fight under the best possible conditions for himself and to the detriment of the whole world—Russia included. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was not merely an act of appeasement. It involved a joint invasion of Poland. Oddly, considering his condemnation of appeasement, Fleming not only berates the British for their commitment to Poland but he says that the only way to have prevented the smashing of Poland was "to fly to Warsaw and bring the extremest pressure to bear upon the Polish Colonels, accept the partition of their country and save it from the terrible rain of death and devastation which could not otherwise be prevented." (p. 94)

According to Fleming the Soviets had no alternative but to make a deal with Hitler. He justifies the deal by citing four ad-

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vantages the Russians got out of it: 1) the Baltic states which the Allies had refused them; 2) freedom "to correct their boundary with Finland and reclaim Bessarabia from Rumania;" 3) the turning of Hitler upon the West instead of upon themselves; and 4) they acquired nearly two years to prepare for a German onslaught (pp. 96–7). Both morality and history must be cut and trimmed to fit these arguments. To criticize the Allies for refusing an effective guarantee of the Baltic states (and Poland) against Hitler's threat is praiseworthy; to reproach them for refusing to accede to Russian imperial conquest is most questionable. Then to use a euphemism "correcting their boundary" for the war against Finland is to do violence to language as well as to morality. And to cite these territorial conquests as strategic advantages for Russia is to ignore the speed with which they were later overrun by the Nazis, not to speak of the moral, military and political disadvantages which accrued to the Russians for having assumed the prerogatives of Czarism in alliance with Hitlerism. In offering his third justification of the Pact, that it turned the Germans upon the West instead of upon themselves, Fleming forgets that a bitter fruit of appeasement by both East and West was that it enabled Hitler to fight on a single front against each in turn. Fleming's fourth justification can be supported least of all. As it turned out, the Russians did not gain two years to prepare for the German onslaught; the Germans gained the entire continent for their onslaught against the Russians. Just who gained what advantages is told in the 22-month record of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

IT STARTED WITH A COMBINED INVASION, partition and subjugation of Poland. Stalin went far beyond appeasement when Soviet troops fought as allies with the Germans against the Poles. This alliance for conquest brought forth the sorriest words ever uttered by Stalin; they were in reply to Hitler's congratulations on Stalin's 60th birthday, shortly after the partition of Poland: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, cemented by blood, has every reason to be lasting and firm."[2] Furthermore, the Nazi and Soviet governments solemnly agreed to combine their efforts in suppressing Polish propaganda for independence.[3]

By an amazing trick of memory many Communists recall the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact as one when the Soviet Union was neutral toward Germany and the Western Allies. But, of course, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov told the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939: "Germany is in the position of a state which is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace, while Britain and France, which yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favor of continuing the war and are opposed to conclusion of peace."[4]

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Far more important than the Communist propaganda offensive in support of the Nazis and against the Allies was the economic aid given to Hitler's military machine by the Soviet Union. Not only did the Soviet Union supply Germany with oil, cotton, phosphates, chrome and manganese ore (the last two essential for making high grade steel), iron, platinum, timber and grain; equally important was the transit of goods across the USSR to Germany. The Nazi-Soviet Pact enabled the Germans to frustrate the British blockade. War-essential goods from the Far East, the Middle East and even from the Western hemisphere reached Germany via the Trans-Siberian railway. It is a startling fact that at the outbreak of the war in 1939 Germany had only a two-month supply of rubber, both synthetic and natural. German planes could not get off the ground without rubber and no matter how they expanded their synthetic rubber industry they still required quantities of natural rubber. This they got from the Far East overland across Russia. Up to a few hours before the Nazi invasion of Russia the Soviets provided special trains for transporting rubber to Germany.[5]

Ample evidence exists to show that Germany was ill-prepared for a war of long duration in 1939, but far better equipped for such a war in 1941. If anybody profited by the time gained as a result of the Nazi-Soviet pact it was Germany. True, Soviet-German trade went both ways and Germany also furnished arms and machines for Russia. But Fleming is less than candid when he says it was Russia which benefited most because: "The raw materials which Germany received were mostly perishable, while the arms and machines received by Russia remained when war came." (p. 117). Germany needed precisely those raw materials—oil, rubber, chrome and manganese—which Russia furnished or transshipped. Germany lacked them in the quantities required to wage large scale war for a considerable period when she invaded Poland in 1939. She stockpiled them with Russia's help, built up supplies of arms, raw materials and machines as a result of her conquests during the Pact, sufficient for the kind of war she started that fateful summer day of 1941.



IN HIS CAREFULLY DOCUMENTED STUDY of the German-Soviet alliance, *Germany and the Soviet Union 1939–1941,* Gerhard Weinberg also shows that the Soviet Union rendered effective naval assistance to the German war effort. Murmansk was used as a port by Ger-

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man naval ships warring against the British on the high seas. At Murmansk, Nazi auxiliary cruisers were equipped for attacks on British ships. Additionally, the Soviets established a German naval base on Soviet territory for the submarine campaign against Britain. The Soviets took the initiative in setting it up at Zapadnaya Litza Bay, 35 miles north of Murmansk, under the supervision of Admiral Raeder.[6] Admiral Doenitz stressed its value for the Nazi submarine war against Britain and it was used in the conquest of Norway. How gruesomely appropriate that the Comintern May Day Manifesto of 1940 defended the German invasion of Norway as a "reply" to the Allied powers for their "violation" of its neutrality.[7] The terrible irony of this eager Soviet initiative was that after the conquest of Norway and the Atlantic coast of France the Germans had no further use for Zapadnaya Litza Bay until they returned there and used it for the war against Russia.[8]

The Soviets even opened up the long icy Northeast passage around Siberia to the Pacific for the German war effort. Soviet icebreakers helped the Nazi cruiser "Komet" enter the Pacific, Sept. 5, 1940, by that route and it sank or captured 64,000 tons of Allied shipping.[9]

In another trick use of Communist memory the Finnish war and the Soviet moves in Rumania during the period of the Pact are recalled as measures taken in preparation for war against Germany. But Soviet territorial grabs in the Baltic countries, Finland, Rumania, etc. were carried out in strict conformity with and support of the Nazis. Perhaps nothing is more revealing in this respect than the efforts of Ribbentrop and Hitler to persuade Mussolini of the justice of Stalin's attack against Finland. On March 10–11, 1940, Ribbentrop was in Rome explaining to Italian Foreign Minister Ciano and to Mussolini that the Finnish war had been forced on Russia and there was no more danger from Russia because she had thrown the Jews out of office. As a result of these talks the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Italy, Leon Helfand, a holdover from the Litvinov period when Jews were still permitted in the Soviet foreign service, was ordered back to Moscow. With Ciano's help Helfand escaped to the West.[10]

As it turned out in the churn of history, Soviet territorial expansion on its northwest and southwest frontiers was converted by the Nazis to their own advantage. Both Finland in the north and Rumania in the south became eager allies in the German assault on Russia. Accurately and dryly Weinberg concludes: "It might therefore be said that the two flanks of the German attack on Soviet Russia were secured for Hitler by the foreign policy of Moscow."[11]

In the ten weeks before the Nazi invasion Soviet appeasement of Hitler attained pathological proportions. During the summer

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of 1940 the Nazis began planning and mobilizing for Operation Barbarossa—the invasion of the USSR. Toward the end of 1940 German moves in the Balkans had alarmed the Soviet leaders and a coolness seemed to develop in Nazi-Soviet relations. This culminated on April 5, 1941 with the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship. The Simovic government in Yugoslavia had been established by a revolt against the country's adherence to the Axis. Soviet recognition of this government and the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty were sadly short-lived. Hours after the Soviets signed with the Yugoslavs the Germans bombed Belgrade and all the fight went out of Stalin.

Economic deliveries to Germany which had declined during the winter months began to rise sharply again in March, and on April 12 the Russians signed a new oil delivery contract with the Germans. They also put on additional special trains for Far Eastern rubber deliveries. On April 15, the Soviets acceded entirely to German border claims on the Baltic. On May 9 the Soviet government revoked its recognition of the Belgian and Norwegian governments-in-exile. In withdrawing its recognition of the Yugoslav government the Soviets also expelled the ambassador. On June 3 the Russians broke relations with the Greek government-in-exile.[12] The Germans had not even asked for these concessions but Stalin was abjectly bent on this appeasement course especially after he assumed the Premiership on May 6. What is more, Stalin had received complete, definite and accurate warning from the British and the Americans and from other sources about the impending German attack, including the date and the time of the assault. But Stalin appeased Hitler up to the very moment when the German bombs were falling on Soviet cities.

Indeed, on June 21, Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov in Berlin was scurrying around trying to get to Ribbentrop to find out what the Nazis wanted from the Soviets. And on the evening of June 21—just a few hours before the invasion—Molotov summoned Count Schulenburg to tell him he could not understand all these rumors about war; after all, see how nicely the Yugoslav matter was cleared up! Why should there be any difficulties? What did the Germans want? Count Schulenburg could not answer, of course.[13]

These frantic efforts to get demands from the Germans to which the Russians would accede were as fruitless as the ignominious statement issued for the same purpose by the Soviet news agency Tass on June 14. That declaration branded as "false, nonsensical and provocative" all the warnings and rumors that the Germans or Russians were confronting each other at the border in order to fight. Britain's Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps was harshly condemned for his warning of an "impending Russo-German war."[14] Vehemently the Soviets denied that the Germans were

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making any economic or territorial demands. This denial was true! Molotov and Dekanozov were practically on all fours trying to get the Germans to make some demands![15]

FLEMING ALLOWS HIMSELF A BIT of understatement when he suggests that: "Moscow was not heroic after the fall of Yugoslavia." He also cites Sherwood's book, *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* to the effect that "Stalin himself continued to doubt that Hitler would strike." (p. 129) What is mysterious is that Fleming makes no effort to square these admissions with his argument that Stalin *had* to make the Pact with the Nazis and that he used the time to prepare for a German attack.

Some historians look askance at Khrushchev's charges, made in his "secret" speech at the 20th Congress on February 25, 1956, that Stalin was completely unprepared for the Nazi attack and prevented measures from being taken on the eve of the invasion to protect the Soviet Union. But Khrushchev's speech becomes credible in the light of the evidence cited above, especially the record of the frantic appeasement period from April to June, 1941.

In his February 25 speech, Khrushchev describes how the Soviet chief of the Kiev special Military District, Kirponos, wrote to Stalin before the German attack telling about the Nazi preparations for invasion at the Bug River. Kirponos proposed the evacuation of 300,000 civilians from the border areas and the organization of strong defenses including anti-tank ditches, trenches, etc. Moscow replied, Khrushchev went on, "with the assertion that this work would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, that the Germans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us." Beyond this, Khrushchev declared:

> When the Fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operations began, Moscow issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned. Why? It was because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.[16]

This was evidence of such ignominious behavior that that trick of memory which so many Communists employ in self-defense and self-deception went to work almost immediately. Khrushchev's speech was forgotten and for many it became a "State Department forgery" which the *New York Times* and the traitorous revisionists on the *Daily Worker* dared to reprint. But the top leadership of the Party here, as everywhere, knew that the Khrushchev text was authentic. They knew this because even before its publication they heard or read a detailed summary of the "Secret" speech whose text followed the later version released by the State Department in every detail. A handwritten copy of this summary was

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shown to various CP officials, including this writer, after it had been read at a meeting of the National Committee.

Hitler's tactical surprise on June 22 was complete. The grim consequences are reported in the Khrushchev speech:

> The result was that already in the first hours and days the enemy had destroyed in our border regions a large part of our air force, artillery and other military equipment; he annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military leadership; consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.[17]

In this light one should consider Fleming's failure to make anything but the barest reference to Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization speech in February 1956." He has not a word about the contents of the speech or its deadly admission that as an ally of Hitler, Stalin had weakened his country in the face of the impending attack and opened it to the horrible destruction that followed the invasion.

Before leaving the subject of Communist-Nazi collaboration during the life of the Pact one other particularly degrading type of action must be recorded. Stalin sent Communists, anti-fascists, Jews, back to Germany. They had sought refuge in the Soviet Union, but had fallen into Stalin's disfavor. Alexander Weissberg's, *The Accused,* is only one searing account of this kind of behavior.

WHEN DID THE COLD WAR START? To trace it back to Munich sheds little light on the origins of the actual Cold War which has continued ever since the guns of World War II became silent. There has been conflict between the Soviet Union and the West ever since the establishment of the Soviet Union. But the current Cold War had more specific origins in the conflicts between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies during World War II. In Fleming's view the Cold War blossomed only after Roosevelt died and Truman reversed FDR's policies by turning against the Russians. This happened, he says, because of our belief that we could make Eastern Europe and Asia over in our own image (p. 205). Fleming claims that "the basis for the Cold War was laid on April 23, 1945 in the scourging which Truman administered to Molotov, giving notice that in areas of the most crucial concern to Russia our wishes must be observed." (p. 205)

This happened less than two weeks after Roosevelt died in 1945. And an examination of what Fleming calls a "scourging" of this sensitive Soviet Foreign Minister does indeed shed light on the evolution of the Cold War. The meeting of Truman and Molotov had some highly revealing overtures. As the European war moved toward the final rout of the Nazis in March 1945, German General Karl Wolff informed the Allies that he wanted to discuss surrender of the German forces in Italy. The U.S. and British leaders prompt-

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ly informed the Russians and assured them we would go to Bern, Switzerland, just to hear what the Germans were offering. Molotov immediately fired a charge at Averell Harriman, then our ambassador in Moscow, that we were negotiating with the Germans "behind the backs of the Soviet Union." Roosevelt then wrote to Stalin explaining that nothing of the kind was intended or was happening. On April 3 Stalin replied to Roosevelt charging in effect that Allied treachery was permitting the Germans to move against the Russians so that the Allies could "advance into the heart of Germany almost without resistance on the part of the Germans."

President Roosevelt's restort on April 5 was crisp and unmistakable in tone. FDR told Stalin he had "received with astonishment" his message of April 3 "containing an allegation that arrangements" were made by the Allies permitting Anglo-American troops to advance to the east and the "Anglo-Americans promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms." Roosevelt concluded his note with a prophetic caution:

> Finally I would say this: it would be one of the greatest tragedies of history if at the very moment of the victory now within our grasp such distrust, such lack of faith, should prejudice the entire undertaking after the colossal losses of life, material, and treasure involved.
>
> Frankly, I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates.

Stalin's answer on April 7 denied that he impugned the integrity of the Allies. But he defended his informants as "extremely honest and modest people," and repeated his charge that German actions were "more than curious and unintelligible."[18]

The Bern talks never really got under way and Roosevelt closed the incident with a message to Stalin expressing hope that such mistrust would not arise in the future. This was the first event which set the tone for Molotov's visit to Truman on April 22–23. The second involved Poland and the Yalta agreements. In February, 1945 Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt had agreed at Yalta to broaden the Soviet-sponsored Lublin government of Poland to include representatives of the London government-in-exile and of the Polish underground fighters against Hitler. The conference also agreed on "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." Stalin interpreted the former to mean that he could, through the Lublin Poles, exercise a veto over representation from the London and Fighting Poles.

Fleming argues that Truman's reversal of Roosevelt's position brought on the Cold War on this and other issues. But the dispute over the formation of the Polish government started between Roosevelt and Stalin. Indeed Roosevelt told Stalin he would be "ada-

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mant" in rejecting Stalin's effort to reverse the Yalta agreement on this very question. On April 1, 1945 Roosevelt wrote to Stalin recalling that at Yalta the compromise on Poland had given the Russians an advantage in using the Lublin group to form a Polish government. Then Roosevelt added: "It by no means follows, however, and on this we must be adamant, that because of this advantage the Lublin group can in any way arrogate to itself the right to determine what Poles from the other two groups are to be brought in for consultation."[19]

Stalin bent not an inch on this issue either before or after Roosevelt died. For a time Stalin justified his refusal even to allow consultation with Mikolajczyk on the grounds that the Polish leader rejected the Yalta agreements. So Mikolajczyk made a public declaration accepting Yalta in toto. The problem, of course, was that Stalin was not accepting Yalta. When Stalin finally decided to send Molotov to the founding meeting of United Nations at San Francisco the U.S. asked the Soviet Union to hold off on their pending mutual assistance treaty with the Lublin, now the Warsaw, government, until the Truman-Molotov meeting. Stalin disdained the request and signed the treaty.

This was the setting for the Truman-Molotov meeting which in Fleming's opinion marked the decisive reversal of the Roosevelt policy by Truman. Now as to the "scourging" of Molotov whereby Truman was supposed to have launched the Cold War. On April 22 Truman assured Molotov that he would continue President Roosevelt's policies and Molotov expressed pleasure that the policy of friendship would be maintained. Both Truman and Molotov said they adhered to the Yalta agreements. Then, later in the day, in talks with the State Department, Molotov made it clear he was insisting on nothing but a Lublin government and a Lublin veto and that was that.

When the Truman-Molotov talks resumed next day old iron-pants was still adamant even through Truman based his arguments on the Roosevelt message of April 1. Time and again Molotov refused even to reply to or comment on the contention that the Yalta agreement imposed an obligation to broaden the Polish government by consultation with the London Poles and the others in Poland. Then Truman "expressed once more the desire of the United States for friendship with Russia," but he "wanted it clearly understood that this could be only on a basis of the mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one-way street." This was the "scourging!" To this Molotov replied: "I have never been talked to like that in my life."[20] It is this exchange which caused Fleming to write:

> There are some who think the Cold War did not begin until around 1947, but it is clear from this episode that President Truman was ready to begin it

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before he had been in office two weeks. The years of labor by Roosevelt and Hull to build a basis of understanding with the Soviet leaders which would last through the peace making were cancelled out on April 23, 1945 (p. 268).

The Roosevelt Fleming is talking about is the man who told Stalin he would be adamant about the issue of broadening the Polish government. The Hull Fleming mentions is the man whose protests to the Russians about their high-handed actions in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria "washed against the Kremlin walls like the autumn rains."[21] Long before the Truman-Molotov encounter, Secretary of State Hull, worried about the Russian actions which reversed the foreign ministers' conference decisions on the liberated territories, asked Ambassador Harriman whether this meant the Soviets were going back on the Moscow and Teheran agreements.[22] Hull's memoirs are instructive about another aspect of Soviet-American relations during the war. He points out that our military leaders went much farther than the civilian leaders in concessions aimed at securing Soviet cooperation. For example, on the dispute with Stalin about an absolute veto in UN, even as to what could be discussed, both Harriman and George F. Kennan suggested that we might get along better with the Russians if we treated them a bit like they treated us. Roosevelt thought this was sound advice and rejected Stalin's veto proposition flatly. Hull's memoirs note that both he and Roosevelt were opposed to Stalin's stand on the veto, but our "military advisers were willing to go farther than the politicians in agreeing to Russia's position that the veto be applied without exception."[23]

SIGNIFICANT FROM THE VIEWPOINT of assessing Truman's course after Roosevelt died was his strict adherence to the agreements on keeping demarcation lines in Europe between the American and Soviet armies and on bringing Russia into the war with Japan with pledges of territorial concessions to Russia as agreed upon at Yalta. As Hull emphasizes, U.S. military leaders were pressing more strongly for concessions to the Russians than the civilians in the Roosevelt administration. Generals Marshall, Eisenhower and Bradley were deaf to Churchill's urging about taking up positions as far as possible to the east in Europe. And General MacArthur was as anxious as anyone to assure Russia's participation in the war against Japan.[24]

Of the essence, however, is the question, what posture were the Russians assuming for the post-war world. Fleming urges us to take Stalin's word that all they wanted was security, friendship with the Western Allies and peaceful reconstruction. This leads him to a most extraordinary analysis of a document which does quite explicity reveal Soviet intentions. We refer to the article by Jacques Duclos in the April, 1945 issue of *Cahiers du Communisme,*

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theoretical organ of the French Communist Party. There was not a Communist leader anywhere in the world who did not recognize this article as gospel from the Kremlin. Fleming, who has a strange aversion to primary sources in history, quotes a phrase from the Duclos article as it appeared in the *New York Herald-Tribune.* Fleming says the article made it plain "that Moscow was considering the revival of the American Communist Party." But what was Moscow's real attitude toward the post-war world? Fleming found that in a commentary by Will Lissner of the *New York Times* on a Soviet article in a magazine, *The Foundations of Marxism,* which says the Soviet leaders are revising Marxist economic dogmas. And Fleming concludes: "At the end of the Roosevelt period preparations were apparently being made in Russia for a live and let live policy, so far as doctrine was concerned." (p. 286)

Had Fleming bothered to read the Duclos article he would have found that Earl Browder was taken to task primarily because he "declared, in effect, that at Teheran capitalism and socialism had begun to find the means of peaceful co-existence and collaboration in the framework of one and the same world . . ." Browder was flayed for his failure to see that "the Teheran declaration of the Allied governments" is a "document of a diplomatic character" and not "a political platform of class peace in the United States in the postwar period."[25] Communists knew that the Duclos article, not the Teheran declaration, was the basis of action "so far as doctrine was concerned." It was a line and a harbinger of things to come.

Fleming says again and again that Western insistence on free elections in Eastern Europe antagonized Russia and aggravated East-West relations. Where free elections were held, in Austria, for example, and even in Hungary on October 23, 1945, the people voted overwhelmingly against the Communists. Fleming poses this "dilemma": Yalta provided for free elections, but also for governments that were friendly to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Since it was "impossible," Fleming writes, "to have a government friendly to the Soviet Union by free elections in which everybody voted" (p. 311) the Western powers were miscreants for attempting to force such elections. The truth is that the U.S. even under Truman was not "adamant" on the issue as FDR had urged in his April 1 letter. The Yalta pledge was not carried out. Russia colonized Eastern Europe. And where relatively free elections were allowed at first, as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the salami tactics, backed by the presence of Soviet troops, and carried out by one Ministry above all which the Communists took over from the beginning in Eastern Europe—Interior or Secret Police—soon set up terroristic puppet regimes. Nor was Russia achieving security for itself by imposing brooding, poverty-ridden, tortured regimes on

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its borders, as the revolts in Berlin, Poznan, Hungary and Poland later revealed. There was far greater security for Russia in allowing decent, popularly elected regimes, as in Austria and Finland, than in the colonized East European countries.

Fleming offers as another source of East-West conflict the abrupt halting of lend-lease aid to the Soviet after V-E Day. But Hopkins patiently explained to Stalin that the order halting ships at sea on the way to Russia after the European victory was an error and was revoked within 24 hours.[26] Between V-E Day and V-J Day enormous quantities of U.S. lend-lease materials were sent by the Truman Administration to help the Soviets fight Japan.

BUT OF COURSE THERE WAS the atom bomb. The United States used it for mass slaughter at Hiroshima and Nagasaki though Szilard and other scientists had wisely pleaded for its use as a warning demonstration on some uninhabited target. We used it though Japan was already beaten. In this respect there was an ugly similarity between Stalin's disinterest in Japan's surrender offers, made through him, because he wanted to get in on the war, and the United States decision to bomb inhabited cities though the Japanese were practically defeated. It is ironic that when at Potsdam, on July 24, 1945, Truman "casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force," the Soviet premier "showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese.' "[27]

The nuclear armament race soon became the most menacing aspect of the Cold War. Did it start as an outright decision of the U.S. to maintain an atomic monopoly and keep forging ahead of the Soviets in atomic power? There were American military spokesmen who did have such purblind views and aims. But as Fleming indicates, U.S. policy was proclaimed in the Three Nation Declaration (U.S., Britain, Canada) on November 15, 1945 which warned that "there can be no adequate defense" against atomic bombs and that "no single nation can in fact have a monopoly." The three atomic powers proposed a United Nations Commission to achieve effective international control of atomic energy. The first steps to be taken by this Commission would be "the wide exchange of scientists and scientific information." (p. 325)

Thus the first basic declaration of U.S. and Allied atomic policy called for sharing atomic information and atomic controls with the Soviet Union. The astounding argument which Fleming makes in extenuation of the Soviet rejection of this proposal is that the Soviets would have to open up details and information about their own science, and this they could not be asked to do! Fleming writes:

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This would require the Soviets to make a dent in their most deeply held complex—fear that foreigners would acquire vital security information—and it would point toward the eventual opening of their entire realm to UN inspectors. In turn this would mean that the world would acquire intimate knowledge about: (a) Russia's great post-war weaknesses; (b) her industrial and military strength; (c) Soviet police methods; and (d) the far lower standard of living than that enjoyed by the West.

These two probabilities raised two crucial questions for the Soviets. They believed they had survived the German onslaught because they had successfully veiled their real strength from the Germans. Could they now trust the other Western nations with full security information? The other issue concerned their entire system of government and production. Could they trust their people to remain loyal to both, if exposed to widening knowledge of the freer and more prosperous conditions in the West? The leaders might believe that this gap would be closed in a generation or two, but would their people remain convinced? (p. 325).

Fleming mocks Truman's feeling of rectitude based on the Allied proposal to share atomic information with the Soviets and to establish a United Nations system of controls. If the professor's words have any meaning they imply that we would have avoided the atomic race by conspiring with Stalin to withhold from the Russian people knowledge that there are societies where people live free from police terror and have adequate food to eat, clothes to wear and homes to live in. In return for Stalin's refusal to carry out his Yalta pledges we should have given him the atomic bomb in 1945 without conditions so the Soviet people would remain "loyal" to a regime which was based on concealment, terror, mass poverty and the elevation of the lie to the highest level of state policy! It's plain to see why Fleming was so disturbed by Churchill's proclamation to the world that the Russians had lowered an Iron Curtain on their Eastern empire. It is not that he doubts the fact of the iron curtain or the evils they are trying to conceal. He questions the wisdom of stating these facts for all to hear!

In passing, Fleming admits that "we generously released a great deal of atomic information, far more than the Russians would have." (p. 331) Then, carrying the three-power declaration of November 15 for international control of atomic energy a step further, came the Acheson-Lilienthal report issued on March 17, 1946. This provided for an international Atomic Development Authority which would own or control all supplies of uranium and thorium and all plants for the production of fissionable materials. Fleming does not disparage the work of the Lilienthal board. On the contrary he shows that it produced a plan "which, if accepted by the U.S.S.R. would: (a) free the world from the greatest threat which has ever hung over it; and (b) also launch it upon a course of world cooperation which would quite probably enable the United Nations to evolve fairly rapidly into an effective world govern-

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ment." Fleming emphasizes that the American plan was "bold and imaginative" and also "technically practical and workable." (p. 365)

Then what went wrong? Fleming says that the authors had failed to consult with experts on Russia. Such experts would have known, Fleming adds, that the Soviet Union would not admit foreigners to free residence and travel in the USSR; that the Soviets were fearful that if foreigners circulated freely, "the police state side of its activities, including data on its forced labor system, would become widely known in detail abroad;" and "that information about the much higher standards of living in the Western world, already dangerously prevalent because of the travels of Russian troops, would become still more widespread in the Soviet Union;" and even more of a peril, "that knowledge of the civil liberties and personal freedoms enjoyed in the West would become disseminated" thus adding to the discontents caused by the material contrasts; that the Soviets would reject international ownership and management of atomic energy plants because of their state-owned enterprises; that Soviet planners would attach more importance to atomic energy as a source of power; and finally that it offended Russian national pride and sovereignty (pp. 366–7). Again Fleming reminds us that our lack of sensitivity to the Soviet need for an Iron Curtain is responsible for the Cold War.

After the Lilienthal report, Bernard Baruch presented the American plan to the UN Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946 in a speech in which he pointed to the alternatives before the world, "a choice between the quick and the dead." The Russian rejection was foregone in view of the American insistence that there be no right to veto collective action in the event of atomic violations.

Thus, long *before* Truman proclaimed his "Doctrine" to contain Communism and specifically calling for aid to Greece and Turkey, in his March 12, 1947 message to Congress, the Cold War had been launched on its evil way. Was it the network of bases established by Truman in Turkey, Greece and elsewhere which created Soviet intransigence and barred East-West settlements? In the spring of 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris. This was before we had established our network of military bases around the world. At this conference, Secretary of State Byrnes proposed removal of all foreign troops "from countries other than Germany and Japan at the earliest possible moment." Fleming concedes that "Molotov was adamant" on the troop withdrawal issue. "He was evidently determined," Fleming writes, "to delay the withdrawal of his occupation armies." (p. 357–8)

Was it the desire for security in the face of a future German danger that made Molotov so unyielding at Paris? Fleming notes that Byrnes offered the U.S. plan for a twenty-five year treaty to

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keep Germany disarmed. Nevertheless, Fleming blandly justifies Soviet rejection of mutual troops withdrawal and mutual agreement to keep Germany disarmed by reference to "President Truman sitting on the platform at Fulton applauding Churchill" when he made his famous Iron Curtain speech. (p. 358).

IT IS NOW QUITE GENERALLY agreed that the Marshall Plan, announced shortly after the Truman Doctrine, played a decisive part in rebuilding the shattered economies of Europe. This American economic aid, Marshall said in his famous Harvard speech, March 5, 1947, was "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." The Communist countries were invited to partake of it. Indeed, the decision of the Soviet Union to participate in the Paris talks of the Marshall Plan, June 26, 1947, caused some remarkable somersaults in Communist editorial offices everywhere. For a brief period, right after Pravda had attacked the initial announcement of the plan, a worldwide campaign against it had been inaugurated by the Communists. And then abruptly it was called off, for a little while. After all, Molotov had taken 89 aides along with him to Paris so perhaps it was not all an imperialist plot to enslave Europe. Even after Molotov and his 89 assistants left Paris the Communist-led Czech government indicated its desire to participate in the Marshall Plan. But soon all doubt was removed about the Marshall Plan at *l'Humanité* and the *Daily Worker,* or in the sad old city of Prague. Gottwald and Masaryk were called to Moscow and the marching orders were clear: Down With the Marshall Plan!

Shortly thereafter the Cominform was established, in part as the Soviet reply to the Marshall Plan. Fleming casts a kindly gaze at the Cominform and its predecessor, the Comintern. "In both cases," Fleming finds, "the basic purpose of the organization was defensive . . ." (p. 482) This will come as a surprise to Tito, in the case of the Cominform, and to the socialists, vis-a-vis the Comintern.

Fleming is perspicacious enough to realize that a decisive move which aggravated East-West tensions was the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, in February, 1948. It was sparked with the arrival in Prague of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. A. Zorin. Though Czechoslovakia had been run under Communist leadership before the coup it still permitted certain freedoms and even allowed a Socialist Party to function. Fleming is under no illusions and he readily admits that "Red terrorism" and rude provocations were used to eliminate the last vestiges of democracy and to destroy the Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia. Then, just as readily, he offers the extenuation that: "the stage in the Cold War had been reached

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where it was essential to Russian policy that Czechoslovakia should cease to be a bridge between the West and the East." (p. 496)

GERMANY, SOURCE OF THE GREATEST HORRORS of our time, now divided between East and West, has been the cockpit of Cold War conflicts. It provides a laboratory for examining relative responsibility for creating, aggravating or alleviating the antagonism. Surely the record will show that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union bear all responsibility for the conflict. But how on earth is it possible to escape placing major responsibility on the Soviet Union for its blockade of Berlin in the spring of 1948? That action was so irresponsible, so dangerous, so cruel and so unilateral in application that it would be difficult to find anyone to defend that Soviet action. And the U.S. airlift became a symbol of courageous and also responsible reaction to a Soviet provocation. Perhaps the greatest significance of the blockade and the airlift was that they showed neither the United States nor the Soviet Union desired large scale war.

The Berlin crisis also showed that the Soviets were capable of turning conflicts on or off at will in power moves which had no reference to either security or defensive needs. This has continued long after Stalin, the author of the 1948–49 blockade, had been in and out of various final resting places. Some sort of record for cynicism was set when Khrushchev calmly informed Walter Lippmann, more than a decade after the first Berlin crisis, that a new one was going to start. Shortly after Lippmann wrote his series the new crisis came on schedule; now it simmers waiting a word from Krushchev to turn it up or down. To Fleming, however, goes the honor of describing the Berlin crises as a continuing story of Soviet striving for security and most particularly to bar the installation of nuclear weapons in West Germany. Exactly how stirring up the kind of crises we have lived through since 1948 achieves that aim is never explained.

Hundreds of pages of the Fleming volumes are devoted to American responsibility for the Cold War in the Far East. The author can easily show, often effectively, that American support for tyrants like Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee have lost us support throughout the world. But, again, the matter at hand is the origin and development of the Cold War. Here, Fleming is oblivious to a paradox he presents. The record shows that Truman sent Marshall to China not to suppress the Chinese revolution but to get the Kuomintang to accept the Communists in the government! Marshall's attempts to force Chiang to establish a coalition government went on through 1945 and into 1946. While this was going on the corresponding action of the Soviet Union was a thoroughgoing looting of Chinese industry in Manchuria which led

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to one of the most bizarre industrial migrations—first from China to Russia and then—magnanimously—back from Russia to China after the Communist victory. An added touch of irony: Truman and Marshall were trying to promote a Communist-Kuomintang regime in China; but Stalin had opposed the Communist Chinese revolution.

By January 1947, it was announced that American troops, never present in large numbers, would be removed from China. As late as August 10, 1947 Truman was chiding Chiang Kai-shek for resorting "to force, military or secret police rather than democratic processes to settle major social issues." (p. 581.) We cite this not to suggest that America pursued a consistent policy in support of a democratic revolution in China. But it does indicate how unreal is the picture which Fleming paints of American armed intervention against the Chinese revolution and of American responsibility for starting the Far Eastern phase of the Cold War.

Who was to blame for the hot and bloody Korean interlude of the Cold War? On some pages Fleming is content with a factual record. Far from any U.S. responsibility for starting the Korean war Fleming states: "In January 1950, also, our Government had informed Seoul that if it attacked North Korea all aid from United States would immediately be terminated." (p. 600) And if that's not clear enough Fleming points to the fact that we had given the South Koreans only defensive weapons, no tanks and no airplanes. By contrast, he notes that the Russians had trained 24 North Korean divisions, supplied them with 500 excellent tanks and also furnished 150 fighting and bombing planes. The record as it unfolds reveals it was the North Korean army which "plunged across the 38th parallel," on that early summer day of 1950 (p. 601). He also describes Truman's decision "to repel the invasion." (p. 601)

After presenting evidence of North Korean aggression Fleming catches himself and begins a new dissertation containing "grave doubts about Rhee's part in the origins of the Korean war." He concedes: "We do not know that Rhee began the war, but we do know that he had ample reason to do so..." And as the reader digests that he can attempt to chew on the conclusion: "He (Rhee) has fully demonstrated that if he did not begin the Korean war it was only because the Reds beat him to it." (p. 655) Whatever the evidence, Fleming reproaches the U.S. for failing to consider "the possibility of accepting the military loss of the South Korean peninsula." (p. 606) Then he berates the United States for failing to appreciate that the "fiercely fighting North Korean troops . . . might be driven by a conviction that they had something to fight for, and to carry to the rest of their country..." (p. 609). Only a few pages later Fleming admits that the great majority of these "fiercely fighting" North Koreans refused repatriation to North

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Korea during the truce talks, just as a majority of the Chinese prisoners refused to go back to their country.

ALTOGETHER FLEMING MANAGES a most original treatment of the Stalin phenomenon. In his references to the tyrant when he was alive Fleming stresses his singleminded search for security and peace and his desire to elevate Soviet living standards. Then when Stalin is dead we learn that after all it was he who was responsible for militarizing Eastern Europe. Fleming quickly adds that the new rulers of Russia are pursuing a new policy of peace. It's a bit breathtaking since the old Stalin policy of peace had come under little scrutiny and less criticism.

Unquestionably what happened at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party fits very poorly into the Fleming narrative.

Stuck with a story of a benevolent, peace seeking Stalin, Fleming is understandably reticent about even discussing the 20th Congress. Then came the 22nd Congress in 1961 which presented further evidence that the Soviet leadership which, in Fleming's account was constantly searching for peace, had been creating dangerous deadlocks in international relations under Stalin and Molotov. The head of the Russian Soviet Federation, Dmitry S. Polyansky, declared at the 22nd Congress that Molotov, "resisted the efforts of the Central Committee to abolish deadlocks in foreign policy which had been formed by that time as a result of the subjective approach of Stalin to many international matters."

HOW DATED A RECENT BOOK can become. This is accentuated by Fleming's treatment of the Castro revolution. Was Communism making a dent in Castro's Cuba? Fleming's record goes well into 1960, but the authorities he cites find Castro and his lieutenants quoting Papal encyclicals, never Marx and the inspiration of Castro's politics are "Christian and reformist." (p. 1,030)

It was the crisis created by the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba which compelled a re-examination of the problems of appeasement and resistance to aggression in the nuclear age. Such examination must go into many questions that cannot be discussed here. But one consideration is absolutely essential—relative value judgments about Soviet and American civilization.

In this reviewer's mind the faults and injustices of our society are both numerous and profound. They are revealed in every report of racism from Mississippi U. to the ghettos of New York. They are apparent in the poverty that afflicts at least 40 million Americans in this the richest country of the world. They appear in the great division between the have and the have-not nations of the world and the painfully slow and inadequate steps we have

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taken to alleviate the hunger of the underdeveloped world. They are evident also in the laws and practices that have restricted American freedom through the Smith Act, the McCarran Act, the imprisonment of Junius Scales, the arrests of Freedom Riders, curbs on trade unions and anything else that harms the civil liberties written into our Bill of Rights.

A glaring shortcoming of American policy has been the myopic manner in which the struggle against Communism has been conducted. Certainly the history of our century shows that a crusade against poverty and social injustice is the only sure way of barring the road to Communism in Asia, Africa, Latin America. The terrible tribute we have paid to totalitarianism by imitating some of its methods during the era of McCarthyism has helped Communism rather than hindered it. Our willingness to enlist right wing totalitarianism in the struggle against Communist totalitarianism through alliance with Franco and other dictators has certainly obstructed the fight for democracy. The failure to remove Nazis from all positions of power and influence in West Germany remains a painful thorn in the body of American foreign policy.

After all this has been said it would be terribly untrue to equate the evils of American and Soviet civilization. A contrast of post-war occupation history comes to mind. American forces occupied Japan and Italy. Soviet forces occupied Hungary and Poland. The last thing we would call Douglas MacArthur is a libertarian. Yet he was in charge of Japanese occupation after the war and out of this came—a constitution which bars militarism and war; land reform; free press and assemblage; a free trade union movement; a powerful socialist movement in a pluralistic society in which left, right and center contend for power. A similar story can be told for Italy.

But the story of Hungary and Poland is one of brutal colonization and the stifling of human dignity. Out of this came the glorious if desperate Hungarian revolution of 1956. That the Polish uprising did not take the course of the Hungarian is due to the compromise which the leaders of the Polish October made to survive.

With all its faults American society has attained a level of freedom which is completely alien to the closed, totalitarian societies of Communism. Our 18th Century revolution expanded the horizons of human freedom far more than was attempted in practice by the socialist revolution in 20th Century Russia. True, many promises of our revolution are still unfulfilled. But the Communist revolutions, which promised to combine social, economic and political freedom, have been betrayed. Consequently, the prospects for democratic socialism are brighter in the Western societies than in the Communist world.

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It is not this reviwer's belief that Communist societies are unchanging. On the contrary the significance of the new tensions and even transformations in the Communist world that came after Stalin died and the public revelations about his totalitarian "cult" have not been fully appreciated. Furthermore, the conflict between the Soviet Union and China can yet impel the Soviet Union to far closer ties with the West.

Though Communism creates a closed society it is subject to erosion from within and the striving of men for the promise of the original revolution continues. There is a chance for liberalization and progress in the Communist world; that chance is greater because of the kind of stand that Kennedy took during the Cuban crisis. The combination of strength and firmness on the one hand with flexibility and quick readiness to negotiate on the others, offers hope for settlement of conflicts. Ending the nuclear arms race would go a long way toward that "mellowing" of the Communist regimes which Kennan foresaw as a possibility arising from the containment policy.

An objective history of the Cold War would show faults and failures on both sides from the very beginning. But to deny the fundamental distinctions between Soviet and American civilization, as revealed by the record of the Cold War, is to abdicate from all responsibility.

FOOTNOTES

1 J. Stalin, *Collected Works*. Vol. VI. p. 204.
2 *Pravda*, 25 Dec. 1939; quoted in Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin*, p. 445.
3 *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941. Documents From the Archives of the German Foreign Office*. Wash., D.C. 1948. p. 108.
4 Quoted in Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929–1941*. Vol. II. p. 291.
5 Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union 1939–1941*. Leiden, 1954. p. 73.
6 *Ibid* p. 80.
7 Beloff, op. cit., p. 289.
8 Weinberg *op. cit.* p. 82.
9 *Ibid* p. 83.
10 *Ibid* pp. 93–96.
11 *Ibid* p. 104.
12 *Ibid* pp. 162–163.
13 Max Beloff *op cit.;* also *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, op. cit. pp. 353–356.
14 *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, op. cit. pp. 345–346.
15 Deutscher, p. cit., p. 455.
16 Khrushchev's Secret Speech, in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*. Columbia University Press. pp. 47–48.
17 Khrushchev's Secret Speech, *op cit.* p. 48.
18 Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War. Triumph and Tragedy*. Vol. VI. pp. 440–454; also Herbert Feis, *Churchill Roosevelt Stalin—The War the Waged and the Peace They Sought*. p. 593.
19 Feis *op. cit.* pp. 574–575.
20 *Ibid* pp. 376, 379; pp. 574–575; also *Memoirs* by Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions. Vol. I pp. 75–82.
21 Feis *op. cit.* p. 415.
22 *Ibid* pp. 434–435.
23 *Ibid* p. 426.
24 See: Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe;* Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story;* Feis, *op. cit.*; Feis, *Japan Subdued;* Feis, *Between War and Peace.*
25 "On the Dissolution of the Communist Party of the U.S.A." by Jacques Duclos; reprinted in *Marxism-Leninism Vs. Revisionism*. New Century. Feb., 1946.
26 *Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 539.
27 Truman, *op. cit.* p. 416.

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Irving Louis Horowitz

Another View From Our Left

> All events are linked up in this best of all possible worlds; for, if you had not been expelled from the noble castle by hard kicks in your backside for love of Mademoiselle Cunegonde, if you had not been clamped into the Inquisition, if you had not wandered about America on foot, if you had not stuck your sword into the Baron, if you had not lost all your sheep from the land of Eldorado, you would not be eating candied citrons and pistachios here.—(Pangloss' concluding remark to Candide)

OURS IS AN AGE OF PESSIMISM. Camus, in fact, once declared that the only properly twentieth-century posture is cynicism. And indeed any survey of the century which takes into account the totalitarianisms of Hitlerism and Stalinism (and let us not forget the lesser tyranny of McCarthyism), the savage bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the slaughter of twenty million innocents in gas chambers, and the constant threat of all-out thermonuclear warfare, cannot lightly dismiss Camus' sentiment. After all, this cynicism is not simply an anticipation of what may occur, but is based in good measure on what has happened. The Freudian "destruction phantasy" has become externalized as part of the real world. Phantasy has become reality, dreams have become nightmares, and utopias have turned sour.

Of course, there is a way to escape—simply by avoiding newspapers, that is, by withdrawal as the psychologists say, and by privatization as the sociologists say. But such a means is unbecoming to intellectual prophets. They must resort to Orwellian doublethink. Only in the case of our sociological Leibnizians, so supremely represented by Seymour Martin Lipset (see his "My View from Our Left," *Columbia University Forum*. Vol. 5, No. 4, Fall 1962),* Right must become Left, fear must become morality, and confusion must become democracy.

It would be uncharitable to take off after Mr. Lipset by making references to other of his writings which offer a less Panglossian view of American life and values. But it does seem that he is going all out to make amends for any past transgressions on Establishmentarian toes. How does our "leftist" go about proving that the "leftist reviewers" of *Political Man* were operating under grave misapprehensions when they accused him of a "conservative bias"? This is really quite simple: take the current liberal rhetoric and combine with the writings of such great American Marxists as

* A condensed version of the introduction to the paperback (Doubleday–Anchor) edition of *Political Man*.

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Herbert Hoover, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and you turn up the only conclusion possible—to wit, that the values of socialism and Americanism are similar. Now the troubled may rest content in the knowledge that our support for Spanish dictators, Korean militarists and Brazilian latifundists is in the best tradition of left-wing socialism (or in the pithy though impenetrable phrase used by Lipset—"non-ideological welfare democracy"). To soothe the intellectuals there is special advice: to accept a special mission of keeping democracy representative, linking socialism with sociology, leftism and Americanism. And the price of this? None beyond that of remaining watchdogs over what we have—providing one is not too touchy over the general moral descent in the nation's political and cultural apparatus.

This is all poppycock of course. Verbal debris arranged to prove that not only flowers can put us in a state of euphoria. Let us focus a little more closely on this view from the left (or dead-center).

> *"While differences in the distribution of status, income and power stratification are inherent in the nature of any complex social system, such inequality is punitive and unfair. . . . I feel that inequality, though inevitable, is* immoral, *I support all measures which would serve to reduce its extent, or which would bring the utopian 'equality of status and opportunity' closer to realization."*

A decade ago, there was a raging debate in sociological circles on this question of stratification *versus* equalization. In the form presented by Kingsley Davis and Melvin Tumin (among others) this was a legitimate debate. But as Lipset has done for everything from De Tocqueville and Marx to conflict and consensus, he sees only global resolutions which recognize inequality as inevitable and yet morally reprehensible. Why should one work for the reduction of what is "inherent in the nature of any complex social system"? How can equality be declared "utopian" and yet something which can be brought to fructification? What kind of morality is it which pre-ordains the defeat of what is being fought for? While the Marxists undoubtedly exaggerated the extent to which ethics is anti-historically bound; and the Nietzschians have likewise exaggerated the extent to which ethics is anti-historical—neither would be so ingenuous as to suggest that it is the height of being a "political man" to struggle to gain an end declared to be impossible. Indeed, if Lipset were more forthright he could uphold the honor of morality *against* polity— as many European socialists have come to do. But since politics is declared to be the Elephantine resting place of leftism in America, this our author cannot do. Who would be left to utilize his moral expertise if not politicians?

> *" . . . ruling strata under* all *economic and social systems will try to institutionalize their superiority so that their kin may inherit it. This*

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tendency is as true for the Soviet Union as it is for the United States, as strong in China as in France or Japan."

This statement is quite true. But why has Lipset nothing to say about reducing differences in this area? Does he say with Marx (with whom he abstractly identifies) that the family, based as it is on private gain, ought to be eliminated? Does he urge that "the bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education" be replaced by the intervention of society to equalize matters? Not at all. The socialism of Andrew Carnegie has its limits. It is simpler to talk of counter-power as a potential "restraint" on the power of the dominant class. *Is it not the case that the extension of class stratification and differentiation in the Soviet bloc defines how far the Russians are from socialism and not how close the Americans are to socialism?*

"The fact that the dominant political ideology of the United States is a Leftist one stems, of course, from the history of the United States as a former colony which made a successful revolution against its imperial master. And few foreigners realize how thorough this revolution was. The values of liberty and equality became institutionalized within America to a greater extent than in any other nation. . . . It does not, of course, severely limit income or power differences."

Here again we find ourselves in the best of all possible worlds.[3] In the first place, values of liberty and equality are quite different. And it is precisely on the differences of such values that the American nation was formed. The federalist papers, the writings of Madison, Hamilton and Jay, are indeed concerned with liberty—but the traditional definition of liberty was explicit throughout their writings—namely liberty for those whose knowledge makes possible the exercise of free choice. The "leveling tendencies" implicit in the more radical figures of the American Revolutionary movement were everywhere outflanked and outvoted. It does not require a Beardian view of the American Revolution to recognize the simple fact that the Constitution is a conservative document, more fearful of surrendering traditionalist parochial values than in ensuring progressive national values. The amendments to the Constitution, one through ten and thirteen through fifteen, bear strong witness to the fact that the simple colonial status of the revolutionary period did not ensure a "leftist" America. One might just as well argue that the Magna Carta so ingrained the idea of liberty in Englishmen that it was unthinkable that they should spend the next centuries as a colonial power. Did the fact that the Bolsheviks made a thorough revolution against an unpopular and despotic Czarist regime "institutionalize" the values of liberty in Russians? Of course not. The most damaging remark to Lipset's thesis of a Leftist United States is the assertion (really, from the "socialist" viewpoint, an admission), that this faith in the values

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of liberty and equality does *not* severely limit income or power differences. If socialism is not to be viewed as an absurd hoax, just how and in what sense can America be said to be Leftist and at the same time intensify social stratification? Is it possible that Lipset, in his anxiety to identify the going course of American history with the strange course of one man's strange Leftism, has simply attributed to the nation qualities which he possesses as an individual? Strange as it is to attribute such an egomania to Lipset, he himself confesses as much when early in his essay he notes that "now the fact is, I consider myself a man of the Left. But confusing or not, I must add that I think of the United States as a nation in which *Leftist values* predominate." It must be exhilarating to identify with nation and *patria* and at the same time uphold oneself as a man of science and a man of morality. It would seem that there is nothing left to do but rally 'round the flag, sing the *Internationale,* and in good clenched-fist style, curse those who dare to speak of our socialist fatherland in terms of power elites.

> *"That the concern for opportunity and education is basic to America, and not simply a reflection of great wealth, may be seen in the fact that the United States' two former colonies, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, are the second and third leading nations in the proportions of their populations attending university."*

It has always been the classic liberal notion that education and opportunity are one and the same. In fact, they are quite distinct. High educational achievements do not necessarily lead to high opportunity. Indeed, the key to revolutionary sentiment among the youth of South America, Asia and parts of Africa, is not so much the lack of education, but the lack of opportunity following education. The great worry is what to do with an education once acquired. This is common knowledge to even a casual visitor to these "underdeveloped" areas. In fact, the dichotemization of education and opportunity is a good part of what is meant by underdevelopment. (This and the concomitant factor of miseducation, i.e., 1,000 lawyers for every agronomist in Brazil.) Then again it must be frankly noted that a concern for education is the common property of all industrially advanced societies—whether capitalist or socialist, right-wing, centrist, or left-wing. It can hardly be employed to show that the United States is a democracy, any more than the fact that there are more students in schools of higher learning in the Soviet Union than in England necessarily demonstrates that the former is more democratic than the latter. In addition to this faulty logical reasoning, Lipset's examples are particularly inappropriate. The Philippines remains a poor country, a debtor nation on the world market, still badly bound to its export of raw materials for any wealth it has. Puerto Rico might be a better case to use, if the United States could extend its democratic

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generosity so far as to allow and encourage the children to learn the course work in their native Spanish rather than in English. Leftist values, if they have any general meaning, are linked to planned economic rationalization, technological advancement and stressing of criticism of the *status quo*. Attendance at universities remains a neutral fact until related to these qualities as aims or reflect leftist values.

> *"Perhaps the most interesting explanation of the absence of a socialist tradition in America . . . is that the* values of socialism and Americanism are similar. . . . *Putting economic systems apart, they (conservative American politicians and Marx, Engels and Lenin) advocated the same set of social relations among men."*

Even Mr. Lipset must have his bad moments reflecting on this canard—preferring as he does to share this opinion with "the socialist writer Leon Samson." Now there is always something especially appealing about crackpot formulations such as this one. It does indeed prevent an author from being a "bore to his readers" as Lipset mentions at the outset. Unless the statement, Andrew Carnegie and Vladimir Lenin are both men, and both men of power, and therefore share in certain attributes common to the species *homo sapiens* is meant, I can see no other meaning to the Lipset-Samson assertion. Private enterprise is not public ownership is a logical truism without originality. And what else could this assertion mean, once Lipset himself adds the qualifying phrase, "putting economic systems aside." What else is left of any sound definition of either capitalism or communism once the economic system is laid aside? To talk about "values" and to identify Americanism with socialism by consciously ruling out economic difference is simply not serious either as science or as general commentary. And given Lipset's overweaning desire to identify intellectual achievement with originality—rather than with the more prosaic identification of intellect with integrity (and in all likelihood the more boring identification) one can only suggest that he return to the "classics" of capitalist and socialist economics for a refutation of such amateurish nonsense.

And before moving on to the next point let us not ignore a plain mistake in fact. The fact is that America has a long-standing socialist tradition. The reasons for its present weakness do not have to be sought in any exotic theory of socialism as Americanism. In the first place, capitalism has done very well in this country. One cannot expect the social protest activities of the socialist movement to flourish in a state of relative affluence. In the second place, socialism in America has been schismatic and factional; dissipating whatever vigor it had in factional battles and debates between the years 1900 and 1920 reflecting the rift between the "foreign" and "indigenous" varieties of socialist thinking; and after that

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between "right" socialism and "left" socialism. In the third place the inertia bred by two-party politics has made third-force politics very difficult, especially so for socialist candidates subject to repression. What Lipset clearly can't stand is the idea that socialism is a minority idea, in a country which has made majority acquiescence and political victory as the only principle.

> *"Now one cannot deny that American conservatives and business men oppose communism and socialism because they see these as threats to their interests. . . . But I would argue that such power would be ineffective were it not for the fact that Communism appears as an evil also to the American left, to unions, intellectuals, and others, because it is an expanding totalitarian imperialism."*

The problem here is that Lipset has now shifted his terms to a considerable degree. For here we are presented with a "classic" model of left and right—with business men contrasted with union men. Now, concern on the part of all sectors for welfare and prosperity is understandably a neutral value until there occurs a rift over questions of the sources of injustice and the remedial measures needed to overcome them. It is in this rift that left and right values are separated out. Furthermore, a context is the only basis for making the discussion meaningful. Except for a right-wing fascism gone utterly mad it is as conceivable for left and right to embrace notions of governmental responsibility for mass welfare, the former on "social contract" and the latter on élitist grounds. The debate rages over how, to what degree, determinations to be made by whom, the margin allowed for criticism. America is as conservative in its addiction to the values of the small business man of early Protestantism as it is leftist in its growing tolerance of collectivist-bureaucratic organization. They both texture American life and questions of right and left do not separate political loyalty sufficiently to operate as a criterion. Therefore action on the basis of interest must serve to delineate. Here we see that the business community has behaved well within the limits of its "class interests." It is the business community which acts for itself and not the labor unions. It is true that all power sectors in American life see communism as an evil; but it is no less true that they have joined in a chorus of anti-socialist values as such. The sharp decline in an independent socialist movement rests squarely on the abandonment of leftist principles on the part of unions and intellectuals. It is precisely the sought-after solutions to injustice and economic irrationality of a left character from which they have become disabused and disenchanted and not general opposition to totalitarian imperialism.

> *"The stability of Italian democracy is more important to those who hold office in the United States than the issue of who owns industry."*

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This statement is made in the context of showing that the United States supports democracy around the world, and further proof of this statement is federal support for aid to Yugoslavia and Poland. Now it is quite true that the United States has a flexible aid policy in relation not only to the regimes mentioned but to others as well, e.g., the MNR movement in Bolivia. But aside from the obvious fact that the United States has often thrown its support against democratic movements when such a policy was feasible, there is the added fact that in a total world-wide struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, one employs weapons not always of one's own choosing. Thus, it was no sign of Soviet love of Egyptian nationalism that led it to support the Aswan dam project—simply good politics (following the United States' rejection of this same project). Likewise, the potential "loss" of Bolivia to communism were we not to support the radical socialists, or the loss of Italy were there not an "opening" to the Nenni left socialists, outweighs the congenital dislike for openly socialist regimes. The aid to Yugoslavia and Poland likewise makes good sense in the effort to neutralize the outer perimeter of the Warsaw Pact nations. It does not require any exaggerated theories of a socialist-oriented America to lead one to see the wisdom in such a flexible policy. Would Lipset consider the United States fascistic because it supports the Franco regime? Of course not. Neither should it be termed leftist or socialist because of its foreign-aid programs.

"It should never be forgotten that during the period in which the United States was the only power in the world possessing atom bombs it rejected the advice of men like Bertrand Russell and Winston Churchill, who urged that it use its bomb monopoly to force the Soviet Union to accept controls over its nuclear arms potential."

Several elements entered into the decision not to act in a bellicose fashion. One, the United States and the Soviet Union were still not "enemies" in the sense that they were to become so during the fifties. Two, as P. M. S. Blackett noted in 1948, in *Fear, War and the Bomb,* the atomic bomb was not considered an "ultimate weapon" either by the United States or the Soviet Union. The Russians had an overwhelming superiority in conventional weaponry at the time, which then may have proven more than adequate compensation for the lack of atomic weapons. Three, while the Soviets did not have atomic weapons they did have bacteriological and chemical weapons which might have been used to answer an atomic strike. Four, is the moral climate of the time. The fact is that the United States was the first and is still the only power to have used atomic weapons, and it was not only the Japanese who had this in the forefront of their collective conscience. The common sense of the situation in 1948, as in 1962, was not to "cross the atomic line." And if Lipset wanted to defend U. S. rationality he

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would be on firm ground, but to argue for its leftist values is an "outrageous hypothesis" in the bad sense of the term.

> *"The underlying desire to avoid war which characterizes democratic regimes, and which contributed to the appeasement policy of the Western powers in dealing with Nazi Germany, continued even under the conservative administration of Eisenhower."*

Even if we grant that the avoidance of warfare is a democratic trait, a thesis that is highly dubious given the present fear of thermonuclear weaponry as reason enough in any political context, Lipset's statement is more imaginary than imaginative. Any reading of Walter Millis' *Road to War* will reveal that alternating currents of militarism and pacifism have existed throughout the twentieth-century U. S. policy-making. Indeed, the martial spirit of the U. S. is nowhere better revealed than in its continued demands for "unconditional surrender" in both World Wars—a policy with no military necessity but based on "morality." Then again, a good deal of the anti-military posture in American history, as I have tried to show in my work on *The War Game,* is characteristic of right-wing, conservative, isolationist elements. Indeed, the isolationist movement prior to World War II drew its strength from a paranoic anti-communism and anti-socialism, which held with Hitler that the struggle against Russian Bolshevism was worth any price—even that of freedom and democracy in the West. Hence Lipset's equation of pacifism and democracy is, however well-intentioned, mechanical, and violates basic facts of American history.

> *"Castro's rise was made possible by American help and sympathy.... It is the fact that the plans to assist Cuban refugees to overthrow Castro began only after Castro had indicated his sympathies with the Soviet Union and after many democratic Leftist leaders of his revolution had defected and fled to the United States.... In spite of its conviction that Cuba was in the hands of a Communist regime, the United States did not organize a foreign invasion, rather it assisted an extremely stupid and ill-planned effort by exiles to begin an uprising in their country. ... Until the Russians placed atomic missiles on Cuba, the United States had not attempted a serious effort to overthrow Fidel Castro by force largely because the American political tradition finds such behavior repugnant."*

To deal with the Cuban problem in so brief a space as Lipset does is only to offer in effect counter-statements. But whatever the facts of the Cuban situation are, they have nothing in common with Lipset's myth-making about how the United States' attitudes were in a state of suspended animation until the "democratic left" deserted Castro. The facts are, of course, that the United States first tried 30 years of paternalism with the infamous Platt Amendment which made of Cuba a virtual U. S. colony in domestic matters and an absolute colony in regard to world trade and world

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politics. We sent Harry F. Guggenheim to Cuba as ambassador to ride horses while the infamous Machado regime ran roughshod over the peasants. And as for the Fulgencio Batista regime, which we supported to the last, we can only mention Hubert Herring's characterization of that regime as being "marked by growing repression, terrorism by the police, and violent reprisals from angry citizens." As for Lipset's alleged evidence for American support of the Castro regime in the early period, we need only recall these events: May, 1959; drilling by Cuban counter-revolutionaries protected by local Florida authorities. Air raids by planes from Florida against Cuba. July 25, 1959; Capture of plane proceeding from Florida, with Rafael del Pino, wanted by the Cuban police. July 26, 1959; Incendiary bombs dropped on sugar fields in Pinar del Rio. October 18, 1959; Aerial attack on Camaguey. October 21, 1959; Bombs over Havana from two planes based in the U. S. October 28, 1959; Second bombing of central Niagra region. Based in Southern Florida.

Throughout 1960, relations between the United States and Cuba deteriorated badly. Castro was indeed guilty of kangaroo trials, undervaluation of its technical and middle-class intelligentsia, too rapid agrarian reform, unreceptiveness and unwarranted fear of U. S. offers of economic aid, and other such errors. The United States for its part remained only half-hearted in its attempts to negotiate differences. The explanation offered of the "stupid" invasion attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, cannot be attributed to American morality so much as to American ambivalence—of which, to be sure, morality was a part.

It is therefore a long-standing crisis in conscience as well as policy that accounts for the ambivalence of the United States toward Cuban affairs. The removal of the Soviet offensive missile weapons only accentuates the fact that that the main struggle was, and continues to be, one between the United States and Cuba, and not between the United States and the Soviet Union. Of course, there were desertions from Castro's ranks; and of course such desertions are highest in number among the intelligentsia which has a traditional animus for revolutions whose blueprint is marred by realities. But to hold that United States policies in any way reflect our *leftism* is simply to replace the long history of United States'



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policy iniquities toward Latin America with cheap political sentiment.

As for why we continue to "tolerate" a Communist Cuba, there are any number of sound policy reasons for this (and our "socialist" leanings is not among them). (a) There is the fear that an invasion attempt employing conventional military weaponry would mean heavy costs in human life on both sides. (b) Such an invasion would not have the support of the Latin American states, and it would open up other violations of international law. (c) Such an invasion might well cost us a decade of political violence and anti-American revolutions throughout the rest of Latin America. (d) There is a growing feeling that Castro—both as *el maximo lider* and as an ideology—can best be overcome through the intrinsic economic and political shortcomings of the Cuban regime. (e) Lastly, it must be kept in mind that the dangers of total nuclear annihilation have not been obviated by the removal of offensive Soviet missiles. The backdown of the Soviets on this issue does not necessarily lessen the chance of its intervention in the events of an all-out United States attack upon the Cuban mainland. And prudence dictates that we do not try to win a skirmish that may result in complete destruction.

All of this indicates that whatever the actual status of American-Cuban-Soviet relations, the policy decisions taken or contemplated have little to do with America being socialist. Indeed, the degree of secrecy in United States military decisions with respect to Cuban affairs would indicate how little concerned our new civilian militarists are with even liberal sentiments, much less the imaginary strength of the American left. Indeed, where did the labor unions and the intellectuals stand on the Cuban situation? How many were willing to criticize United States policy during the Batista regime (how many even knew or cared)? And how many were willing to decry the Bay of Pigs landing on any "moral" grounds. The only thing liberals seemed irked about was the way the CIA "bungled" the job, and lost "face" for the United States. Few and far between were those who denounced the invasion on anything even approximating legalist, much less socialist, grounds. Lipset's position is thus as cowardly as it is ingenuous. Unwilling to support socialism elsewhere, he instead uses the Cuban situation for a denunciation of a socialist regime—in the name of socialism no less! What is at stake is not the ethics of American-Cuban relations, but the lack of ethics of a person who uses the pretext of socialist defectors to justify American foreign policy. Conservatives and liberals may have mis-evaluated the Cuban scene, but at least they are not guilty of rank hypocrisy.

"Perhaps the one 'have' group which is sensitive to the injustices of stratification, and which retains the means to whip up opposition to

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them, is the intellectuals. Since many of these remain motivated to be 'political men' even after the 'end of ideology,' they bear a heavy responsibility to keep democracy representative as well as free."

Apparently, to the note of ingenuity is to be added a motif of piety. It is one thing to make a general platitudinous call for intellectuals to keep democracy representative and free, it is quite another to say one word on how this is to be achieved. Does Lipset see the intellectual as a watchdog over what we already have, or as a force battling for what we do not have and ought to? If the former, how does the intellectual differ in his task from any other sector of society, and if the latter, just what does he have in mind? Indeed, the only concrete thing set forth is the traditionalist notion that "state intervention" may be "incompatible with the goal of freedom." But surely, everyone from Lord Acton to Irving Babbitt has made similar proposals. It is utterly ludicrous to claim that those who take this view are "legitimate heirs of democratic and socialist revolutionaries of the last century.

The plain truth is that Mr. Lipset, despite his socialist camouflage and leftist phraseology, is indeed, as his English critics have already noted, a tried and tested (or is it tired and testy) conservative. Now there is nothing horrible in being a conservative. There is something wrong with hypocritical cant which attempts to pose as radical, while at the same time going down the line for the Establishment. Lipset is correct to note the "heavy responsibility" shouldered by the intellectuals. It is just about time that he began pointing the way. Perhaps as a starter he should start by overthrowing the ballast of weasel words and conscience-soothing phraseology. After that, he might go on to indicate where he stands on the vital issues of the present: thermonuclear war, disarmament and deterrence, U.S.-Soviet relations, American attitude toward our hemispheric neighbors. One clear breeze would do much to dispel the widespread fear that intellectuals make treacherous "political men"—precisely because they have neither ideology nor morality, neither a sense of commitment nor the courage to be.

Lipset offers us a surrealistic dialectic, brought to an abrupt halt in the final synthesis of the "non-ideological" Welfare State shimmering in the radiance of a non-commited scientism. Lipset offers us neither sociology nor morality, but a philosophy of history.

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And like most philosophies of history, his celebrates the present. The present becomes the touchstone for measuring the past as well as the future. Instead of the better being the critic of the good, we are assured that the good is already here. Iron out the kinks in leftist America—such is the proper mission of the intellectual as Lipset sees him. To this we need only a single line reply. In the words of Marx: "Impotence expresses itself in a single proposition —the maintenance of the *status quo.*"

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We are particularly anxious to carry material in New Politics on the question of the relevance of socialism to American life. We hope that Mr. Horowitz's article will stimulate readers to send in their comments on his views or submit independent articles on the subject.—The Editors.

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Reminiscences

Theorist and Terrorist

IN SEPTEMBER, 1911, the news of the assassination of Russia's Prime Minister Stolypin flashed around the world. He had been the most cruel of all Czarist super-hangmen, and all previous attempts on his life made by revolutionary terrorists had been unsuccessful. Such an event called for a celebration. So I took a stroll on the Boulevard Saint Michel, the heart of the Latin Quarter of Paris. I was sure to meet on that promenade some Russians or Poles with whom I could discuss the possible consequences of that momentous event. It was the finest possible present for my thirtieth birthday (September 15, 1911) when I felt quite dejected, brooding over the fact that with my third decade my youth, hence my life, had come to an end.

The first man I stumbled upon was a brilliant Russian anarchist philosopher by the name of Judah Grossman, who was better known under his pseudonym of Roshchyn. I had met him on various occasions in Zurich, Geneva and Paris between 1905 and 1911. He was two years older than I, but at least twenty or thirty years wiser. In the first place, he had chosen to be born to the family of a very rich businessman who, apparently anxious to avoid trouble, granted his son a generous allowance that permitted him to spend most of his time in Switzerland. There he developed an anarchist philosophy of his own—a mixture of Bakunin, Marx, Machajski and Roshchyn. It was a far more radical philosophy than the orthodox or "official" communist anarchism of Kropotkin or the syndicalist variety of anarchism espoused by a large number of radical French trade unionists. In matters of tactics it introduced two new concepts: the idea of seizing an industrial city, large or small, and of holding it for a few days at least, during which the rebels would expropriate the rich for the benefit of the poor. This, he believed, would stimulate uprisings in other localities until the whole country, or the whole world, would be aflame, and all government authority would be abolished once and for all. In the meantime the bourgeoisie should be constantly harassed by terrorist acts—not merely acts of retaliation against heartless exploiters or despotic office-holders, i. e., because of a *special* motive—but acts directed against the bourgeoisie *as such* for the sole crime of constituting a class hostile to the workers. Therefore, his term, "unmotivated terror."

Bombs thrown into theatres (in Europe the poor could not afford to patronize them), or swanky restaurants and cafes—not to speak of the random stabbing or shooting of any prosperous-looking person—would be the practical day-to-day application of this tactic. The individual tyranny of the despots of the past, he would explain, has been replaced by the collective tyranny of the bourgeoisie—hence, the justification of indiscriminate mass retaliation on the part of the underdog against an enemy for whom murder is the alpha

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and omega, the chief instrument, of power. That idea of Roshchyn's had been anticipated and epitomized ten years earlier (in 1893 or 1894) by Leauthier, an obscure French anarchist, who declared in court "I'll kill no innocent if I kill the first bourgeois I meet." He had killed a Balkan diplomat who accidentally crossed his path on one of the boulevards of Paris.

The group Roshchyn founded was called *Chornoye Znamya* (The Black Flag) after the title of the single issue of a periodical he had published in 1905. Some of its members actually proceeded to apply "unmotivated terrorism" by throwing bombs into elegant restaurants in Warsaw and Yekaterinoslav.

THE ALLOWANCE ROSHCHYN was getting from his wealthy father was never sufficient for his needs, for never having earned any wages by his own exertions he would squander his money or give it away as soon as he got it. So he was forced to "borrow" money right and left, with a frankness and an ingenuity which formed the subject of amused conversations among his friends and enemies.

I always fell for his pleas, not because I was such an easy "touch" but because late in 1905 I was usually ready to part with as much cash as I could afford in return for a satisfactory answer in my search for theoretical truth. Bombarded by ultra-leftist heretics who had criticized traditional anarchism and syndicalism as unduly moderate and bourgeois, I had become shaky in my convictions. Yet I abhorred the idea of giving up anarchism; its label had become a fetish with me; I simply could not part with it—just as many a Christian, having lost his faith, still clings to Christ or at least to His Virgin Mother. It was from Roshchyn that I hoped to get some new formulas that would enable me to shed my former views and remain an anarchist. During my truth-seeking visits to the young philosopher, Roshchyn would swamp me with a torrent of phrases that would set my mind at rest, like a shot of dope, for a day or two—until I realized again that they were nothing but fireworks. Once he told me of the great progress his group was making in Russia, adding that among his recent converts was a young engineer who was going to inherit thirteen million rubles, which of course he was going to give to the cause. Roshchyn wound up that story by asking me to lend him two hundred francs. (I had naively told him that I had just returned from a successful saccharin smuggling expedition.)

Once, on a secret visit home, Roshchyn had succeeded in inveigling his father into giving him a considerable amount of money. On their way to the station at the end of his visit, Roshchyn noticed that a pickpocket on the streetcar was relieving his father of his big gold watch. True to his anarchist creed, he did not warn his father; after all, the thief was merely a victim of society who had the right to live at the expense of the rich. And he chuckled when his father, trying to check the time, discovered that he had been robbed. Roshchyn's chuckles vanished a few minutes later when he realized that his own purse—and the money he had wangled—was gone as well.

On the day after Stolypin's assassination, when I accosted Roshchyn on the Boulevard St. Michel, I noticed that he was greatly perturbed by the deed, despite the satisfaction he derived from such a successful terrorist act. The assassin, Bogrov, who had succeeded where so many other terrorists had failed, was a close friend and follower of his who had often risked his neck in various daring enterprises. But this last and greatest exploit, though objectively on a par with the killing of the Minister of the Interior Von Plehve in 1904 and of Grand Duke Sergey in 1905, was subjectively nothing to boast of. For Bogrov had succeeded only because, having previously betrayed some of his comrades to save his own life, he had recently become an agent of the secret police, which enabled him to get close enough to shoot the well-guarded tyrant at a

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distance of only one yard. He had committed that act—and died heroically for it—as an atonement for his betrayal, which had made life unbearable to him. Roshchyn had been in Russia at the time of Bogrov's betrayal. The traitor—and subsequent hero—could have sent Roshchyn to the gallows, too; but the young man had balked at betraying his teacher. One can imagine how Roshchyn felt about being spared under such circumstances.

I READ ABOUT ROSHCHYN again more than twenty years later. Like so many other anarchists whose hatred of the capitalists made them forget their aversion to authority, he had joined the Bolsheviks after the 1917 Revolution.

I assume—paradoxical as it may appear—that Roshchyn's aversion to Marxism was the bridge over which he was able, without much heartache and self-contempt, to make the crossing to his philosophical antipodes. He had been opposed to Marxism because of its fatalism, its economic determinism and its dialectical materialism. But now Lenin, for all his professions of Marxist orthodoxy, had made hash of Marx's main philosophical and sociological tenets, by demonstrating that the *will* of an energetic minority could overcome the limitations imposed by economic underdevelopment. Thus, ironically, Roshchyn apparently could accept Lenin because of the latter's anti-Marxism—which certainly must have been galling to the official Bolshevik theologians who insisted that Lenin's was the only true Marxism.

Another point of contact that Roshchyn apparently had with the Communists was their callousness where the lives of individual persons were concerned. The man who preached the "unmotivated terror" could not balk at similar bestialities perpetrated by the men who were now in power. These bestialities were, after all, only the "scum on the wave of the future"—Mrs. Lindbergh will forgive my borrowing the phrase with which she pleaded extenuating circumstances for Fascist totalitarianism. A "future" which, after a short interval of dictatorship, would surely land mankind's boat safely and happily on the blessed shores of the classless and "stateless" society that was the ideal of anarchism.

In the end though, Roshchyn managed to play a nasty trick on Stalin. He seems to have died a natural death shortly before the dictator initiated the great purges.

The Ex-Tolstoyan

ROSHCHYN'S "BLACK FLAG" group was not the only school of Russian anarchism that was critical of Peter Kropotkin's "regular," or shall I say "classical," communist anarchism. Representatives of the various schools of anarchism used to discuss their divergencies in a Paris club to which I had access both because of my past and because the members still considered me an anarchist, though of a queer sort, in spite of my rejection of that political label. Furthermore, they knew that Machajski's group considered itself farther to the left than all the various anarchist schools.

I used to attend their debates in order to meet acquaintances from Zurich and Geneva whom I hoped to convert to my own unorthodox brand of ultra-radicalism. Moreover, I was interested in the various schisms occurring continuously within the Russian branch of a movement that was the world's ultra-red bogey before the western spread of Bolshevism. It was the most interesting branch of anarchism because, unlike their German, French, Spanish and Italian brethren, who were mostly semi-educated manual workers, the Russian anarchists attracted a large number of intellectuals; and even the workers who were members were as a rule well-read. Moreover, all of them had worked in the underground. They were men and women of action, unlike the dreamers and babblers of the western variety of anarchism, whose romance of dynamite was already a matter of the past.

One evening I entered the clubroom when a lively discussion was already in

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full swing. The principal speaker was an anarchist who was known at the time under the alias of "Tolstoy." He had been slated for the priesthood—just like Stalin at about the same time—and, like the Georgian cobbler's son, he had found no satisfaction in the theology of the Orthodox Church. But, instead of turning to Marx, his mind turned to the teachings of Leo Tolstoy with their emphasis on "non-resistance." His enthusiasm for the new gospel earned him the nickname that stuck to him to the end of his days.

The realities of life soon cured the former theology student of his infatuation with non-violence. As is so often the case, he swung over to the very antithesis of his previous enthusiasm. He could only be satisfied with the most violent of all possible radical sects, and he found it in the anarchist group called *Beznachalye* ("Without Authority"). To be sure, there was at that time in underground Russia a strong following of Lenin. But, to the ultra-radicals, Bolshevism was merely a more rabid branch of democratic socialism which was never considered as really revolutionary by the impatient.

The gospel of the *Beznachaltzi* was simplicity itself. The masses, though asleep for the moment, were at bottom revolutionary. It was necessary to arouse them, not against various concrete abuses, but against the social system itself. Once on their feet, they would tear down all the institutions of the old world and establish forthwith the terrestrial heaven of libertarian communism that would dispense with all organized government. And the best way to arouse the masses was to appeal to their desire for vengeance and to set them an example by killing and robbing indiscriminately all the beneficiaries of the present system of privilege. It was, in short, a gospel for the ultra-lunatic fringe of the radical movement. It differed from Roshchyn's group in that the latter approved of mass struggles for immediate improvements, while *Beznachalye* had only contempt for wage strikes.

The originator of the *Beznachalye* group to which "Tolstoy" belonged was a young Armenian intellectual whose brilliantly written pamphlets were signed Bydbey, but whose real name had an extraordinarily un-Armenian sound—it was Nikolai Romanov. He actually owed his fame to this name—long before he became the founder of a new school of anarchism. In 1902 he was enrolled at the University of St. Petersburg. That was a year marked by many turbulent student demonstrations and, as a result, the Minister of Education issued a circular enjoining all students from participating in political demonstrations and requiring them to sign a document as proof of their acceptance of his decree. The young Armenian signed it, as did all the other students. Since his real name, Nikolai Romanov, happened to be identical with that of the Czar, the young student added to his signature the phrase *prochol S udovolstviem* ("I read it with pleasure"), the famous phrase which the Emperor was in the habit of writing over his signature on every document submitted to him. For this prank the young Armenian was expelled from the University; but, as compensation, he won—for a while—considerable popularity in the capital.

Bydbey-Romanov had just left Geneva when I arrived there. After he had written all he had to say, in a series of brilliant pamphlets, the young Armenian returned to his native Caucasus and was arrested there while in possession of a suitcase filled with explosives. The mocking defiance with which he faced his judges was widely noted and admired in 1905–1906. He refused to rise from his seat when his name was called or to answer any questions, on the ground that he "never talked to persons with whom [he] was not personally acquainted." His defiant silence seems to have impressed his judges, for instead of having him shot, they sentenced him to fifteen years of hard labor—a sentence which, as far as I know, he did not survive. I personally owe Bydbey a

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great debt of gratitude. For the recital of his Russian translation of a revolutionary poem by Jean Richepin which he had used as the motto for one of his pamphlets, was to play a great role in my life—nearly two decades later. It won me the heart of my future wife.

BUT TO RETURN to the anarchist club in Paris where I first met Bydbey-Romanov's disciple "Tolstoy," who was speaking when I entered the room.... "Tolstoy" never had a chance to finish his argument that evening, for suddenly the door opened, and a young man, accompanied by two well-known leaders of another anarchist group, entered the room. The former theology student was visibly perturbed by their appearance and he quickly finished his last remark and left almost immediately.

The new arrival, Arsenyev by name, was a devoted member of the "regular" anarchist-communist school whose founder was Prince Peter Kropotkin, for many decades the generally recognized spiritual head of the international anarchist movement. But to "Tolstoy" that disciple of Kropotkin was not merely the member of a competing sect. Having lost early faith in his fellow men, the namesake of the great Russian novelist now saw himself surrounded by a world of traitors and stool-pigeons. This usually mild form of insanity which temporarily or intermittently attacks every one active in any underground movement, was to become a permanent obsession with "Tolstoy." Once, when we were walking together in the Latin Quarter, I called his attention to the fact that we were being followed by a "dick." "Pay no attention to them," he answered with an air of worldly wisdom, "the dicks aren't dangerous. It's your very best friend, to whom you tell everything, who'll sell you out."

I don't think Arsenyev had been "Tolstoy's" best friend when they were both active in Russia, but at any rate, his behavior at that time seemed suspicious to his fellow anarchist. And, as with any paranoid a suspicion immediately becomes a certainty, it did not take long before young Arsenyev was found half-dead in a deserted street with several bullets in his body. Questioned by the police, he maintained that he had no idea who had attacked him. But his assailant, as far as I know, never changed his opinion about his victim.

"Tolstoy" was busy publishing Russian leaflets and pamphlets preaching his gospel. One of the pamphlets was concerned exclusively with how to make bombs and with the various explosives needed for the purpose. It was written and proofread so carelessly that the other Russian anarchists immediately warned their comrades against consulting it. For any amateur chemist following its instructions would blow himself to bits before he had a chance of harming anybody else.

Eventually "Tolstoy's" resources gave out. Money was needed to publish the pamphlets; money was needed to keep their author alive. He would not live on the bounty of his brother, his sweetheart and his few admirers. So he temporarily shifted operations to Montreaux in Switzerland, where he thought it would be easy to hold up a bank and thus solve his financial problems.

But here he made the greatest and the last mistake of his life. He did not know that Swiss bank tellers took their duties far more seriously than their Russian colleagues; that they valued their depositors' money higher than their own lives, and that they would not "stick 'em up" when ordered to do so. Faced with a flat refusal, "Tolstoy" shot and killed the teller, but was set upon immediately by the other clerks who were not afraid of the giant Mauser pistol which two years before I often had occasion to admire in his modest abode. He fled the bank, followed by a growing crowd of pursuers. He apparently had not reckoned with this possibility either. In Czarist Russia a man with a gun was usually assumed to be a political enemy of the government; hence the city crowds were not interested in chasing him.

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Again and again the former "non-resister" turned his gun against the crowd, but he was unable to stop it. He was captured and nearly lynched by the infuriated Swiss citizens.

Sentenced to life imprisonment, the luckless apostle of revolt had no one to cheer him up in his misery. Even the active anarchists of Western Europe considered him a raving maniac who had discredited their cause at a time when they were trying to establish contact with the labor movement.

One day his brother—a thoughtless cad without even any more or less redeeming ideology—came from Paris to pay him a visit in his Swiss prison. Quite naturally, the prisoner inquired about his sweetheart. He was told that she was married now and was going to have a baby. Soon afterwards "Tolstoy" set himself aflame with the kerosene lamp in his cell, and in a few moments the former humanitarian "non-resister" was a charred corpse.

The Gentle Hater

I KNEW ONLY one other disciple of the fiery and brilliant founder of the *Beznachalye* group. Like Bydbey, this young man was undersized and unprepossessing in appearance and like both his Armenian teacher and his Russian fellow-disciple, he nourished an unquenchable hatred for all beneficiaries of the existing system. However, he had neither the brilliance and the culture of the Armenian nor the ruthless determination of the former non-resister turned bank robber and killer. Modest and unassuming, Engelson knew that his lack of education doomed him to a minor role as a revolutionary "technician," and he courageously undertook the most dangerous tasks that fell under this designation. He had been arrested in the secret printing plant of an anarchist group in Lithuania while he was setting up the group's leaflets. This alone carried what was practically a life sentence. But it was nothing as compared with the fact that the same apartment was also a depository for guns and explosives. Slated for the rope, it was only due to the help of his pretty sweetheart that he managed to give the hangman the slip. I met them both in Paris where he worked as a printer.

Engelson was the most kind-hearted of all the men I knew, always ready to help anybody in need and always tolerant of other revolutionists, even those most harsh in criticizing the anarchists. Yet, *in theory*, he subscribed to ideas so incredibly bloodthirsty that they resembled those of medieval Christians who found it possible to combine the Sermon on the Mount with the complete extermination of all heretics and non-believers. He had actually suggested that the struggle for the extermination of the bourgeoisie should be started at the very root—by throwing bombs at the private schools which were patronized by the children of the well-to-do.

Both the young anarchist and his mistress met with a tragic end. The pretty girl, whose devotion to her physically unprepossessing friend was most likely an act of revolutionary self-sacrifice, eventually left him after having fallen in love with another comrade. His personal happiness gone, Engelson decided to die.

He went back to Russia where he probably intended to commit a heroic "indirect" suicide by throwing a bomb into one of the places patronized by the rich. Threatened with arrest shortly after his arrival—most likely betrayed by the famous spy, Chizhik, who was later found out and killed—he offered resistance and was gravely wounded by his own bomb. He recovered from these wounds—only to be sentenced to death. His girl and her new friend tried unsuccessfully to rescue him from prison. Engelson's girl committed suicide after his execution in a Czarist prison.

The cruelty with which the gentle Engelson was ready to massacre the children of the bourgeoisie makes me shudder now whenever I think of it. Not because I have become a bourgeois myself, for my standard of living is still somewhat below that of a skilled manual worker. Not because I am con-

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cerned about the moral obtuseness of that poor fanatic, for it was only a "theory" to him, which I am sure he would have never translated into action. No, I shudder now because I realize more and more that this kind of thinking, feeling and acting is part of the general pattern of human life —individual and collective, past and present.

Didn't the Old Testament, the source of what is called the Judeo-Christian ethic, justify the mass murder of all men, children and women—except virgins—of those populations which opposed the conquest of the Promised Land? And isn't that bestiality supposed to have been inspired by God? Didn't the Crusaders commit the most outrageous massacres of *unarmed* Moslems, Jews and Oriental Christians, when they took possession of Jerusalem for the sake of the Gospel of Love? Didn't the colonial authorities of Massachusetts pay a flat rate for every Indian scalp—whether taken from the corpse of man, woman or *child*? Didn't the early Australian settlers, at the beginning of the 19th century, organize man hunts against the inoffensive aborigines—merely to use their flesh as meat for their dogs? And the Nazi crematoria, the Soviet slave-labor camps, the Hiroshimas and the Algerian torture chambers? What of these?

Doesn't it all add up to Goethe's comforting thought that "men have tormented and murdered each other since the beginning of time, and they will keep on doing so until the end of time."

For, as a now-forgotten French poet wrote at the turn of the century:

Jeune homme au coeur fier, ou
vieillard aux yeux doux,
Vierge dont le front pur a des
reflets d'opale,
Petit enfant rieux jouant sur nos
genoux—
Tout être humain en lui renferme
le cannibale.

MAX NOMAD, *a native of Austria, now 81, was active, prior to World War I, in revolutionary underground movements in Western and Eastern Europe. For several years a lecturer in politics and history at New York University and the New School for Social Research, he is the author of* Rebels and Renegades, Apostles of Revolution, A Skeptic's Political Dictionary, Aspects of Revolt, *and* Political Heretics—From Plato to Mao (Spring, 1963).



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Douglas Jay, M.P.

Aspects of Contemporary Socialism: 1

The Future of British Socialism



PRESENT-DAY SOCIALISTS IN GREAT BRITAIN face the prospect of immediate power, as the Macmillan Government is completely discredited—particularly by its ridiculous antics in trying to join the so-called "European Common Market"—and a General Election is quite probable during the course of the year. Therefore British Socialists are thinking in very practical and immediate terms, and I believe it is more useful to discuss social-democratic policies in this light.

I have never thought that long words such as "revisionism," "collectivism," "capitalism," "reformism" and all the rest of this sort of jargon meant very much or did much more than muddle already confused minds. Therefore, I shall omit such verbiage, and seek to explain in plain English what British Socialists mean to do.

We start, first, with the basic belief that laissez-faire economic policies produce a bad apportionment of any country's national income. Theoretical economics would lead one to expect this, because the uncontrolled price mechanism does not compare to the real needs or sacrifices of different individuals at all. More important, practical experience shows that this always happens. Whether you look at the apportionment of incomes in nineteenth century Britain or America, or in largely unplanned laissez-faire countries today like Japan, Brazil, Argentina, Persia, Spain, or Italy, you see the same result—luxury and affluence on the one hand, and a great deal of extreme poverty on the other. Laissez-faire means inequality. And the richer a country becomes, the greater will be the inequality within it, in laissez-faire conditions; and the greater will be the inequality between the richer and poorer nations. Only purposive control of economic life, and sharing out of the nation's income, can avoid this.

That, I regard, as the unassailable truth at the root of socialist policies, though it has been confused in the past by much Marxist nonsense, reactionary propaganda, general confusion of

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mind. The fact is that private economic enterprise is reasonably successful in producing goods, but is a hopeless failure in distributing fairly the resulting national income. Attempts to distribute the national income by laissez-faire methods produce the grotesque inequalities I have already mentioned, which you will find in South America, the Mediterranean countries, and non-Communist Asian countries today. On the other hand, the attempt to abolish all private trade and production, particularly in agriculture, has been a failure in the Communist countries. If only the Communists would have the sense to admit it, surpluses of food in Western countries, and the continued food shortages in China and Russia show that, particularly in agriculture, private greed is an effective way of getting goods produced.

Secondly, modern experience has proved that although governments are not always very efficient at producing goods, they are highly efficient at redistributing income and wealth. Since the time of the Roosevelt New Deal in the U. S., and the 1945–51 Labor Government in Britain, substantial progress has been made through the powerful instruments of taxation and social service benefits toward re-distributing the national income far more justly. During the subsequent Conservative Government in Britain, and the Eisenhower period in the U.S., there has no doubt been some relapse toward inequality in both countries. Bad housing and poor old-age pensions are still a major injustice to an underprivileged minority in Britain. The absence of a proper National Health Service is, in British eyes, a major scandal in U.S. society. But this simply means that there is a very great deal more to be done by the effective methods which we have already discovered. It does not mean that the job is impossible.

Meanwhile, a better understanding in the social-democratic countries of the economic forces at work, I believe, enables the old problems of unemployment and cyclical depression to be largely overcome, if only the new methods of control are intelligently and energetically used. A modern democratic community, by controlling the flow of money incomes, can insure—within a not too great margin of error—that its resources are fully employed. It can do this by adjusting taxation and social expenditure in such a way that incomes flow at the optimum rate. The British Labor Government, by these means and by credit policy, maintained almost complete full employment and steadily rising production from the years 1945 to 1951. President Kennedy during the last two years has at least tried to do the same thing, though in my view he has been too timid in increasing Federal social expenditure. Even so, he has kept production on a rising curve, even if unemployment by British standards remains deplorably high. The British public nowadays would never stand for unemployment of over 2½ per cent.

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But the very success of full employment and growth policy in the modern social-democratic State, paradoxically sets in motion a new tendency toward inequality. If production and incomes are steadily rising, and a section of industry is in private hands, then the holders of equity shares will tend to receive continuing windfall capital gains, as well as gradually rising dividend incomes. Their incomes do not necessarily rise, nor the value of their shares go up, *every year*. But over any long period of years they will almost certainly show a gain. In Britain a group of equity shares bought in 1920 would today be worth eightfold its original value, and one bought in 1945 four or fivefold. Dividends would have risen every year since 1945 without any reinvestment of income.

This tendency is basically due to the well-established practice among well-managed firms of reinvesting a major part of their profits year by year. Inevitably, this means, in most cases, rising income and so rising share values. It matters little that these are partly offset by falling values of money; because this tendency affects all other incomes, and in any case cancels only part of the gain. Therefore, without any positive public intervention, the lucky few who hold equity shares will gain relatively to the rest of the community. Relatively, the rich will get richer and the poor poorer. Inequality in property, even if not in income, will grow, even though general living standards are rising.

This basic truth affords the clue to one main line of advance of socialist policy in the future. No doubt the basic battle for equality will have to be sought through the proven successful weapons of taxation in social services, including taxation on personal capital fortunes through inheritance and other taxes. But, in addition, while leaving a good deal of freedom for actual trade and manufacture to the energies of the ablest private managers, the social-democratic State should, I believe, pursue as a future long term strategy the aim of steadily purchasing equity shares in private business for public ownership. This, without direct interference in production, will bring increasingly into public hands, *as an investment,* a growing share of the unearned income accruing by way of interest and dividends. Future capital gains will also benefit the community instead of private persons.

There are many ways in which this major aim could be achieved; and they will no doubt vary from one country to another. In Britain, the easiest way to start would be to invest a proportion of the investments held by the National Insurance fund in equity shares instead of Government securities. Like the Federal security scheme in the U.S., the British Insurance fund holds billions of pounds worth of Government bonds. With much greater advantage to all, a portion of these could be invested in industrial shares. This, however, is only one example of the manner in which the

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community might acquire ownership, as it were "painlessly"—i.e. without compulsory purchase of a widening range of industrial property.

Public ownership would thus advance on two fronts simultaneously. As an investment, and with a view mainly to *ownership rather than control,* industrial shares would be steadily acquired. They would be bought, as an insurance company invests, for the sake of income and capital appreciation rather than control over individual firms or so-called "industries." Secondly, where a specific economic or industrial argument applied, such as the need for large-scale economies or protection against monopoly, a certain firm or group of firms, would be brought specifically into public ownership if necessary by compulsory purchase—e.g., utilities, electricity, natural monopolies, city transport, etc. Here the need would be for *control,* and the case would have to be made out ad hoc. Not very much reliance would be placed on the argument that "power" had to be secured by the State over industry. A lot of fashionable nonsense seems to me to be talked about "power." If high taxation is levied on profits, if monopolies are curbed, if trade unions are strong, if full employment is maintained, if company law is vigorous, and if the State has a big part share in industry, then the so-called "power" in the hands of industrial managers is pretty effectively hedged around.

These aims would provide enormous scope for an active and progressive social-democratic government such as I would like to see in Britain and the U.S. It would be actively seeking full employment and growth by expanding purchasing power. It would be extending the share of the public services in the national income by stepping up essential expenditure on housing, education, pensions, health, and the rest. It would be redistributing drastically through taxation and social spending the incomes thrown up by private enterprise. It would also be steadily steering over the long period a growing slice of industrial property into public hands; so that public authorities would enjoy an expanding flow of investment income, which would enable them to increase social benefits without raising personal taxation.

This strategy is, I believe, the true line of socialist advance for the future. It would certainly give quite enough to do to any radical government in Britain, the U.S., the Commonwealth or Scandinavia for the next ten years; since any such government is also likely to be struggling with the problems of controlling its own balance of payments and easing the Cold War at the same time. But I believe we ought to make the effort, if we are going to prove that democratic government can really operate powerfully in the modern world for the benefit of the ordinary man.

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Hal Draper

Aspects of Contemporary Socialism: 2

New Social-Democratic Reformism

THE THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE is that the ideology of the dominant wing of the European social-democracy has, since the end of World War II, visibly become something different from the traditional reformism of the Second International; it has entered a new stage and demands a new analysis, a tentative sketch of which is offered here.

"New" is always relative, of course; there is no doubt that the new ideology is an organic outgrowth of the old, as it claims to be; but it continues so far along the lines implicit in the old that a qualitative change must be registered.

By traditional reformism I mean the political ideology which assumed clearest self-consciousness in the form of Fabianism in England and Bernstein's "revisionism" in Germany. It looked to the gradual transformation, or metamorphosis, of capitalism into socialism by an inherent process working out through patchwork changes, however minute but cumulative in effect, which would eventually mean that capitalism itself grows into socialism, without any visible break in the continuum of change. Capitalism would not be "abolished," let alone "overthrown;" it would *become* socialism. The movement toward socialism was simply the sum of collectivist tendencies imanent in the present system. Reformism's perspective was the inevitable collectivization of capitalism itself, its self-socialization from above, rather than its change by action from below.

Hence the reformists' equation was: *collectivized capitalism equals socialism.* To the extent that statification was one important form of such collectivization, though not the only one, they had a second equation: *statification equals socialism.* (There is a generation of socialists today who associate this formula only with the Stalinist ideology: this deprives the old reformists of their proper historical credit.) The reformists, both Fabian and Bern-

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stein varieties, left little room for the idea that workers' democracy, in the sense of some type of democratic control of production from below, was a *sine qua non* of socialism.

Before 1914 the lively conflict in the Second International between the revisionists and the "orthodox Marxists" was in large part fought out over ideology; in practice, it is notorious that there was considerable agreement on what to do from day to day (except in crises). Ignoring what this reflected about the "orthodox," I point out only that today, on the contrary, what has been conspicuously new about the new reformists has in many cases been their *practice,* above all.

THE MOST SPECTACULAR CASE has been the practice of the Socialist Party of France under Guy Mollet, undoubtedly one of the blackest chapters in the history of the international socialist movement. On August 4, 1914 the German Social-Democrats made history by voting for the Kaiser's war credits; and the Second International collapsed. That was traditional reformism. But let us imagine that instead of simply going along with the patriotic current, a Social-Democratic government had been in charge of the famous "rape of Belgium," and moreover had modernized it with concentration camps, torture of prisoners, organized massacres... This gets nearer the difference between Philip Scheidemann, who was an old-fashioned type, and the modern Guy Mollet, who as Premier of France and leader of the French Socialists, stubbornly carried on the "dirty war" against Algerian liberation, by a regime and by methods which revolted even half-decent French liberals, not to speak of Senator John F. Kennedy.

The Molletist regime organized—not tolerated; it *organized*—a brutal fascist-like repression in Algeria, not under the personal direction of some reactionary assigned to do the dirty job while the government held its nose and pretended not to look, but under the personal direction of a close "socialist comrade" of Mollet's, acting as his political righthand man and obdurately defended by him. This social-democratic regime organized McCarthy-like crackdowns on dissidents within France; the leading McCarthyite was Mollet himself. Naturally it also brought about a whole series of expulsions from the SP itself. The most noted expulsion was not of a left-winger but of an old-line reformist, André Philip; and the most vicious expulsions and persecutions were directed against the young socialists and student socialists.

This led to a rather unusual type of split in the Party, precipitated not only by the Algerian policy but more immediately by Mollet's role in bringing de Gaulle into power.

The break was not a left-right split, though of course all left-

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ish elements went along with the new Party formed (Parti Socialiste Autonome, now merged into the present Parti Socialiste Unifié). What characterized the leaders of the minority that split, such as Depreux and Mayer, was that they were largely *traditional* reformists, who could not live with Molletism.

Finally, the Mollet party produced another startling phenomenon: a proto-fascist wing, around the figures of Lacoste and Lejeune—a wing so seen not simply by Mollet's opponents in the party but even by *Le Monde*.

Nothing like the Mollet phenomenon can be ascribed to the practice of the reborn German Social-Democracy; here we point first to an ideological development. After the death of Kurt Schumacher and with growing Cold War prosperity in Germany, the German party moved simply to dump *socialism* from its program. Now I do not want to get this statement involved in a terminological dispute over the word, for of course the new reformists maintain stoutly that what they propose is still "socialism." What is important for present purposes is the safe statement that what was dumped from the new reformist program was that which the *traditional* reformists would have accepted as elementary socialism. They eliminate all connection between socialism and *any* conception of advance toward the social ownership of the means of production; they make protection of private enterprise one of the key features of the new reformism's economic policy on the same grounds as they make allowance for any state interference with private enterprise.[1]

Since the formalization of its new politics in the Bad Godesberg program of 1959, the German party under the practical leadership of Willy Brandt, has deliberately set out to become as indistinguishable in political program as possible from Adenauer's Christian Democrats, on the model of the American two-party bipartisan system. Only incidental to this has been its throttling of elements in the party aspiring to anti-war action or its suppression of the socialist student organization.

The change in Germany has been the most noteworthy but not the only one, nor the first, among the Western European social-democracies. The Austrian Socialist Party disembarrassed itself of socialism in its new program in 1958. This party has been in a permanent government-sharing coalition with the Catholic party (People's Party) since 1945: a whole generation has never seen a wholly independent action by its socialist party. Here, in a sense which the old social-democracy never knew, the social-democrats have integrated their whole party existence with the state structure.

1 For an explanation of why the new reformists have become so tender about private enterprise, see the end of my article *"Neo-Corporatists and Neo-Reformists"* in *New Politics*, Fall 1961, where C. A. R. Crosland is briefly touched on.

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It probably also has, incidentally, the most bureaucratized and monolithic party structure in the International.[2]

Here and there, another question about these parties forces itself on the attention: unusual social composition. The traditional social-democracy was not only indisputably a workers' party, but also (what is not always the same thing) *the* party of the working class in the country. It still is in West Germany, Austria, and other countries as far as mass membership is concerned. But in the two countries where the Communist Party has mass workers' support and membership, France and Italy, where therefore the social-democratic leadership is relatively freed of the social weight of the working class, and where those workers who do stay with it in spite of all tend to be a self-selected kind, visible internal social changes have taken place.

It has been reported that one quarter of the membership of Mollet's SP are state employees (petty functionaries in nationalized industry, government bureaus, municipal offices, etc.).[3] Shortly before he died Marceau Pivert described to me how the Mollet party leadership had finally succeeded in winning a majority in the traditionally left-wing Paris region of the party: he detailed it in terms of the mobilization of the functionaries concentrated in Paris, who were or became members of the SP, as against the traditional working-class population of the party region who were predominantly "Pivertists." (In Italy, Saragat's Social-Democratic Party is notoriously lacking in working-class support. Virtually the entire working class of the country is divided between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party led by Nenni (the latter also containing the *traditional*-reformist wing of the movement) with a more conservative labor wing adhering to the Christian Democrats.[4])

This aspect of Mollet's French party, combined with its extreme political record, has more than once caused a big question mark to be placed over its basic character. It was put perhaps most directly by Maurice Dufour in Pivert's *Correspondence Socialiste International* (March 1958—i.e., at the lowest depth of Molletism):

> Certain passages of Djilas's book [*The New Class*] give food for thought. Let us put the question brutally: has not the French Socialist Party become the nursery of this new class? The French nationalizations supply a valuable example: the heads of the nationalized enterprises, many of whom hold a party card, behave like the old bosses: same attitudes, the same reactions. Perhaps there is this difference: the new bosses claim to be of the proletariat! So, the French SP has not colonized the bourgeois state; the other way round is nearer the truth.

2. For a rollcall on the new programs of other social-democracies in Western Europe, see Crosland's article in *Encounter*, March, 1960.
3. *Socialist Call*, Nov.-Dec., 1958, article by Leila Seigel.
4. Although the Saragat party is in my opinion one of the most extreme examples of reformism, I have not discussed it here because, frankly, I do not know how it can be documented. My own view was formed in the course of considerable discussion in Italy in 1957–58 with both Saragatists and others.

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Along with the other statifications desired by the reformists, the reformist party itself gets statified....

All of this is intended to raise the same question about the new European social-democratic reformism which I have already raised in *New Politics* about certain currents in American liberalism: viz., relationship to the burgeoning of various types of *bureaucratic-collectivist ideologies.* To repeat briefly: "By 'bureaucratic-collectivist' I mean in this connection the ideological reflection or anticipation of a new social order . . . which is based on the control of both economy and government by an elite bureaucracy—forming a new exploitive ruling class—which runs the fused economic-political structure not for the private-profit gains of any individual or groups, but for its own collective aggrandizement in power, prestige and revenue, by administrative planning-from-above." This entails the view that the particular type of totalitarian statified economy developed under Stalinism in Russia, and now elsewhere, is only *one* form of bureaucratic collectivism. We are concerned with others.

I have reviewed some phenomena of the post-war social-democracy only in order to indicate, inconclusively at this point, how the question of the *bureaucratic-collectivization of social-democratic reformism* is posed not only by the writings of certain reformist theoreticians, but also in life, in the political arena. For the rest of this article will be devoted to analyzing, from this standpoint, the theoretical formulations of the new reformism by its leading ideologue, who otherwise might too easily be written off.

C. A. R. Crosland, the British Labor Party M.P. has systematically set out to formulate the ideology of the new reformism (which he calls "revisionism"); in doing it, he has set himself forth as the theoretical champion of the continental social-democracies, which he counterposes to the "extremist" British; and the continental social-democrats, insofar as they are interested in theoretics, perforce look upon him in this light. It is interesting that when an International Socialist Conference of reformist theoreticians, mainly from the Low Countries, met in Holland in early 1960 to discuss the new social-democratic programs, Crosland was the only Briton present; and, in his introduction to its published papers, J. M. den Uyl (of the Netherlands) could think of only two books which "might be regarded as a renewing of socialist theory"—Crosland's *Future of Socialism* and Jules Moch's *Confrontations.*[5]

5. Moch's book is pretty much a standard rehearsal of reformist tunes with Gallic bravura; it has about as much relation to Moch's actual hatchet-wielding operations as Mollet's Minister of Interior as the Declaration of Independence has to the activities of the D.A.R.—The papers presented in this conference, including Crosland's on "Economic Backgrounds," were published in a little pamphlet entitled *Orientation—Socialism Today and Tomorrow,* Part 1, (Amsterdam, 1959); and a report of the conference, including two interventions by Crosland, was published under the same title, Part 2 (Amsterdam, 1960).

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Crosland has this further distinction, as compared with his "revisionist" friends and co-thinkers like (say) Douglas Jay or Roy Jenkins: he has gone farthest in putting the new politics bluntly, frankly and uninhibitedly. For all these reasons, it is from him that we can best learn what is happening.

Nothing in the following discussion is intended to refute Crosland's views; the sole aim is to exhibit their internal logic.

THE FIRST DISTINCTIVE FEATURE of Crosland's "revisionism" is its enthusiastic satisfaction with the social system which others call Western capitalism. He was of course delighted with the Labor Party's Gaitskellite statement in 1958 that "under increasingly professional managements, large firms are as a whole serving the nation well." In the essay which he contributed to *The Corporation in Modern Society* (ed. E. S. Mason) he used this for all it was worth as his peroration. But this is mild. For as lyrical and uncritical an account of the operation of the present economic system as one can find anywhere left of Nelson Rockefeller, one must read Crosland's paper at the Dutch conference, keeping in mind that he is presumably not writing only about Britain:

There is no shadow over permanent full employment; "even Right-Wing governments" will maintain it without question; there is "a general feeling of contentment;" standard of living has risen gratifyingly especially for the poorer; the benefits of the system are distributed "more equally and more justly;" there is no "suffering from oppression or capitalist exploitation;" the employers have in good part assumed "the social responsibilities of industry;" "feelings of social justice" are now a big problem only among "socialist idealists," not the people. And:

> Aggressive individualism gives way to a suave and sophisticated sociability; and the traditional capitalist ruthlessness is replaced by a belief in modern, enlightened methods of personnel management. Large-scale industry has become humanised . . .

Much more of this, and *that's all; there is no other side; there are no other aspects to the economic picture.*

A comparison with the Bernsteinians, such as Crosland insists on, would be entirely beside the point. The traditional "revisionists" were mild, pinkish, tepid *critics* of the system; Crosland is one of the most eulogistic defenders of the system known to economic science today. It gives pause.

One of the more unusual aspects of Crosland's lack of inhibition about justifying virtually everything about the economic status quo is his insistence on fiercely defending even the advertising industry, as it exists not only in Britain but also in the U.S., against

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the kind of far-from-basic strictures made by (say) Vance Packard's books. He counterposes the hoary myth of "consumer sovereignty." The present setup permits the consumer "libertarian judgments" because the individual decides for himself what he wants and registers his opinion by buying it . . ."[6]

I am trying to underline that there is something new here. All previous differences among socialists have been over differing degrees and forms of *hostility* to the economic system. Crosland is the first socialist theoretician in history, as far as I know, to take his stand on *complete identification with the going system.* Insofar as this is accepted as socialism at all, there could scarcely be any more finished exemplar of a socialism-from-above.

IT SHOULD NOT BE SUPPOSED that Crosland's contentment with the economic system is simply founded on the character of the British situation, where the Labor movement and Labor governments have had a special impact. Another one of Crosland's sides that brings one up sharp is his insistence on specifically extending his eulogies to the U.S. He sometimes verges on representing the United States as being the country nearest the socialist ideal, with the possible exception of Sweden. "In the U.S.A. the Trade Unions have invaded the prerogatives of management in such a way that we might almost speak of industrial democracy there," he said in Holland. After claiming that in Britain the trade unions "remain effective masters of the industrial scene" even under the Tories, he has the amazing fortitude to add the note: "This is increasingly true in the U.S. also." The leaders of the AFL-CIO will be glad to learn about their mastery over "the citadels of capitalist power."[7] But then they will be happy to know, also, that Crosland considers the American labor movement a model in another respect:

> Workers who take managerial posts are not condemned as traitors to their class. Trade Union leaders are not thought to be in danger of contamination if they have large cars, and smoke cigars, and draw huge salaries. The Unions are not thought guilty of treachery if they co-operate with management to boost sales or raise productivity, or even accept a wage-cut to save a firm from bankruptcy . . . [FS, p. 250.]

Lucky American workers to have such modern-type leaders! Crosland should explain why these American paragons, shored up by their huge salaries and rejoicing in mastery over the citadels of capitalist power, have not been able to get even a feeble Medicare program, let alone socialized medicine.

It is inevitable that Crosland should enthuse also over the "convergence of political attitudes" of the contending parties both

6. *The Conservative Enemy* (London, 1962), p. 67. Hereafter abbreviated CE.
7. *The Future of Socialism* (London, 1956), p. 94. Hereafter abbreviated FS.

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in the U.S. and England; i.e., in the U.S., the absence of political differences between the Democrats and Republicans. He specifically compliments the "mature, educated voter" in the U.S. for making his choice in the 1960 election "on the basis of such issues as . . . simply the complacency of the existing [Eisenhower] regime."

We, not the Tories, have the right to claim American society for our own, says Crosland:

> It is in fact a complete illusion that British Conservatives really want a mobile equal-opportunity society on the American pattern . . . Their true ideology is poles apart from the restless, egalitarian ideology of contemporary America. This indeed comes much closer, though this is not always understood in England, to the egalitarian ideas of the Left than to the more static, conservative instincts of the Right. [FS, p. 219.]

Crosland, of course, would be a heartfelt charter-member of the club which is now raising a banner with a strange device paraphrased from Earl Browder's old slogan: "Americanism Is Twentieth-Century Socialism!" In the United States, he finds, "there is little trace of an élite psychology," a claim which can be understood—not accepted but just understood—if we assume that Crosland is thinking only of the peculiar British forms of institutionalized status symbols such as the "public" schools and accent-snobbery.

Crosland not only identifies himself with the going economic system, but also strives heroically to identify himself as completely as possible with all of American bourgeois society—viz., the only society left on earth where capitalism is still entirely self-confident and feels the bloom of health. There are, of course, far more numerous elements in British society with which one *can* identify, and in that country various positive features can be ascribed to the impact of the socialist movement; but in the United States this interpretation is impossible. Crosland draws the inevitable conclusion: he would *not* be a socialist in the United States; or, in other words, there is no need for a socialist movement in this blessed land—not even a "revisionist" one. This seems to me the plain sense of his rather tortuous statement that in the U.S.

> a Leftist, who was a socialist in Britain, would be much less concerned to promote more social equality or material welfare, of which plenty exists already, than with reforms lying outside the field of socialist-capitalist controversy . . . [PS, p. 521.]

At this point we get a peculiar inversion of the Bernsteinian "revisionism" of which Crosland thinks he is merely the continuator. Bernstein became notorious for saying, "The movement is everything, the goal nothing." Crosland now envisions the full transformation of the U.S. into a socialist society, apparently, without any socialists at work, without any socialist *movement* at all. As far as I know, he is (another record) the first socialist theoretician

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in history to have stared this thought in the face. What it sets down without any equivocation is, for one thing, the perspective of socialization-from-above in fullblown form. The system is going to have to socialize itself, for sure.

For another thing, this makes it *very* difficult for Crosland to have American disciples, since their first duty on agreeing with him fully is to commit hari-kari (politically speaking). As a matter of fact, this is more or less what has happened periodically in the later history of American socialism: there has been little or no room for reformist socialism to take root, and rightwing developments have tended to propel themselves, in the course of finding self-awareness, outside the socialist movement.

HOWEVER, THE SYSTEM WITH WHICH CROSLAND identifies himself is no longer to be called "capitalism," naturally; it is a new and better one. At his most definite, he dates this after the Second World War; when—he is a little more vague, it is something that is in process of happening, or is "almost" true. It would be unprofitable to make anything of his varying formulations, for the underlying thought is both clear enough and inevitable for him: capitalism effectively no longer exists.

Now it is very important to understand that he is not and cannot be merely talking about "Socialist Britain." He must apply this just as much not only to the U.S., as we have seen, but also to Western Europe, since it is the theoretical basis of his prescriptions for the new "revisionism," and since it is the continental social-democracies that have taken up this new "revisionism" most favorably. Croslandism, therefore, must literally claim that Adenauer's Germany and de Gaulle's France have also left capitalism behind in their ascent to the new progressive order, but I am not aware that Crosland has ever specifically faced this picture.

The theoretical dilemma is deepgoing: the German Social-Democratic Party is perhaps his favorite party and there is no question about his admiration for its "post-capitalist" politics; but if post-war Germany abolished capitalism, this happy event actually took place *under the aegis of a right-wing government, which was being roundly denounced by the Social-Democracy all the time the "revolution" was going on.* If, in the U.S., he looks forward to the full blossoming of a "socialism" without any socialist movement,

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in Germany he implicitly sees the abolition of capitalism by a right-wing government with the socialists in opposition.[8]

It is no part of this article's restricted task to discuss the way in which he "abolishes" capitalism from today's world. It has to do with a demonstration that there is no special connection between capitalism and profit (production for profit, profit system, or what-have-you), nor anything to do with the ownership of the means of production. His simplest approach was in his contribution to *New Fabian Essays*,[9] where it was done by *defining* capitalism as laisser-faire, right through the '30s. [NFE, pp. 33, 36, 41, 55.] I do not myself comprehend how he could do this without being hooted out of at least the Fabian Society; but at any rate it is clear that if capitalism means laisser-faire, then it certainly was abolished, if it ever existed at all. But then this happened long before Attlee and Gaitskell's ministrations, and so even in England we find Crosland's theory (but not Crosland) detaching the demise of capitalism from the device of socialism.[10]

Even in the same book, his latest, in which he has most thoroughly "abolished" capitalism, statements like this keep creeping in: "Post-war full employment appeared to demonstrate that capitalism had solved its inner contradictions." [CE, p. 114.] Now it is very difficult for a system which has been abolished to solve contradictions; but Crosland does not mind admitting the existence of capitalism if he can say something nice about it. His way of being nice to the system involves being very contemptuous of the men whom the old-fashioned leftists, in their deplorable dogmatism, consider to be the business rulers. Referring to the very summits of business power in both the U.S. and Britain, Crosland scorns them as *"impotent"* where yesterday's Morgans and Rockefellers used to have overweening power. Directly referring to the "organization men of Shell and I.C.I. [the British chemical trust]" Crosland informs us that they are only "jelly-fish where their predecessors were masterful . . . slaves to their public relations departments, constantly nervous . . . Suburban . . . Apologetic . . ." [CE, p. 55.]

8. In passing I want to point out the close analogy between Crosland's theoretical dilemma and that of the "orthodox Trotskyists" after the war. If Russia is a "workers' state" because its economy is nationalized (statified), then the new East European states must have also become workers' states as statification became complete. Now this "social revolution" must have taken place, at the time, behind the backs of the Trotskyists, who registered the fact of the "revolution" only some time later, after a good deal of puzzlement. They thus invented the category of a social revolution which creates a workers' state not only without a visible revolution but without a revolutionary party and without the support or even the participation of the working class. In fact, the current theory of neo-Trotskyism is entirely based on this theory of the bureaucratic revolution-from-above, which is no easier to swallow than Adenauer's revolution-from above.

9. Edited by R. H. S. Crossman (London, 1952). Hereafter abbreviated NFE.

10. Douglas Jay's bid for recognition as a revisionist theoretician, *Socialism and the New Society* (London, 1962), also, in passing, defines capitalism as laisser-faire at one point, p. 58. (Hereafter abbreviated SNS.)

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At any rate this system, which seems to superficial people to be run on the economic side by the impotent jellyfish slaves, is not the old capitalism; and Crosland does not label it socialism as yet. It is merely a new, progressive social order in which all our economic problems have been essentially solved. Crosland once played with the problem of giving it a name: shall it be "the Welfare State, the Mixed Economy, the Managerial State, Progressive Capitalism, Fair Dealism, State Capitalism, the First Stage of Socialism," he asked? "Differences of opinion about the right nomenclature will partly reflect merely ideological differences," he mused. To show how true this is, he chose a name which reflected uninhibitedly the nature of his ideological inclination: *Statism*. [NFE, p. 43.]

He was not unaware of the tactical embarrassment:

> The name is ugly, and has too unfavourable a ring. But the most fundamental change from capitalism is the change from laisser-faire to state control, and it is well to have a name which spotlights this crucial change.

GIVEN THE TRIUMPH OF THE NEW progressive social order Statism (if we may continue to use the label properly understood), what is left of the socialist program, and why is something to be called "socialism" still to be pursued at all?

Crosland admits that Statism already puts into effect "a very large part of [socialism's] traditional programme" and himself asks "what (if anything) there is of socialism which statism does not already give." Of the 1951 Frankfurt programmatic declaration of the re-established Socialist International, he says, "Now what is significant about this declaration is that socialism, as here defined, already largely obtains under statism." [NFE, p. 57–60.] In five different writings from this date (1952) on, Crosland has listed what is left of socialism in his view. The five different formulations pretty much add up to the same thing,[11] though there is difference in detail. For convenience only, I take up his briefest version, from an article in *Confluence* (Summer 1958). It has four items:

(1) ". . . altering, not the structure of society in our own country, but the balance of wealth and privilege between advanced and backward countries."—There is no indication why this is so specifically socialistic, in his opinion, that Statism cannot do it handily, particularly the U.S. variety. In any case the crux is the negative clause.

(2) More welfare, to take care of "residual social distress," by

11. The main exception is the point in his earliest version (NFE, pp. 65–66) emphasizing the need "to give the worker a sense of participation" to change "the general tone and atmosphere in industry." True, this came to things like "joint consultation schemes" even then, but the question itself ceased to have any importance in his later versions. Completely lacking in all versions is any recognition of peace and an anti-war foreign policy as a socialist issue at all. This points to a whole sector of the new reformists' ideology which this article does not discuss.

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which he means (he explains) "the misfortunes of small or exceptional groups" like backward children rather than "large categories," no problems existing about the latter. There is no indication why the wonderfully progressive society of Statism would not be sufficient to clean up these corners. (Besides, in his 1960 pamphlet *Can Labour Win?* Crosland rendered the judgment that "full employment and the Welfare State" are now obsolete as issues.)

(3) Getting rid of the special British "obvious social stratifications," especially the elite educational system peculiar to the island.—This is so far from being a distinctively socialist issue that, as Crosland often stresses quite rightly, it does not even exist in other countries.

(4) "A number of socio-cultural reforms" such as an amelioration of divorce laws, abortion laws, sex-perversion laws, urban sprawl, censorship, amount of art patronage, and the like.

"It is therefore an illusion to suppose, so far as Great Britain is concerned, that the advent of the full-employment Welfare State has denuded the Left of causes to fight for," concludes Crosland. No doubt: after Crosland's list is exhausted, there will also be the struggle for Mental Health, an international language, anti-smog laws, more bird sanctuaries, and other worthy causes the value of which I would not derogate. But the puzzling question is this: why would Crosland insist on bringing about another "social revolution" and transforming society all over again, from its present gratifying progressive and advancing New Social Order, to still another one which he calls socialism?

Or to put it another way: if Crosland were not already saddled for purely historical reasons with a party and movement whose members insist on calling it "socialist" and advocating a society called "socialism," would it ever occur to him that the amiable objectives he now sets forth need still another new social system, and have to be advocated by a sectarianly separate party which arouses antagonism by calling itself "Labor" or "socialist," and has the unpleasant habit of singing *The Red Flag*? If he could get rid of the old rubbish any other way, he would not have to bother to write long rationalizations, directed to these historically pointless nuisances, designed to prove that they ought to act as if it were all a mistake to begin with. In this case, why should he ever dream of *creating* a socialist movement in Britain any more than he sees any need for a socialist movement in America?

There is another aspect to this, which Crosland brought out quite unawares in his first book, *Britain's Economic Problem* (1953). He has a chapter of "Conclusions" presenting economic policies to be pursued by a Labor government to solve Britain's trade difficul-

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ties. As always he starts by averring that the issue of "public or private ownership" of economic wealth is irrelevant. Why then is a *Labor* government needed? Not for any socialist aims, he answers categorically.

> But the social reform and egalitarian aspects of Labour's programme are directly relevant to the plan. It is vital to its success that the confidence and co-operation of the workers should be won; they are asked to surrender many deeply-ingrained attitudes and practices, which they will naturally decline to do, and so frustrate the re-deployment of resources, if they feel that the privileged classes are strengthening their position in the period of national strain. It is therefore of the first importance, quite apart from any considerations of socialist principle, that the economic programme should be accompanied by a programme of radical reform . . .

"It is for these reasons that the leadership must come from the Left," he continues. No substantial increase in standard of living can be expected for five years. "There can thus be no loosening of belts," since "total consumption . . . must be rigidly restrained if the necessary home and foreign investment is to be secured."

The whole program of the new reformism would, then, follow for Crosland even if there were no question of socialism—even if he were not a socialist—since only such a policy could persuade the workers to accept the rigid restraints contemplated. It should be stressed that Crosland wants to *persuade* them; he is an English democrat, not a totalitarian. If this were not true, we would be dealing with a different variety of bureaucratic-statist mentality; but with this not unimportant difference, we have above another member of that family of ideologies in which a kind of anti-capitalism is assigned the role of reconciling a working class to a regime of rigid restraint.

THE PROGRAM LEFT FOR SOCIALISM, which we have already discussed, will not (he concedes) "arouse the same emotions, or evoke the same degree of devoted and militant mass support" as before; this is inevitable. "Some people view this decline in political passion [note the word!] with concern." But Crosland makes clear he is not one of these; he is unperturbed by the prospect that the people should be even more uninvolved than before in their own destinies, that fewer should participate in politics as subjects rather than mere objects. The main danger which he does see in this development underlines the point: this danger is simply that the situation may lead to lack of "a sufficient cadre of active recruits of high quality to man all the necessary full-time and part-time positions in national and local government and the party organizations." That is, *the* danger is lack of competent functionaries.

"Nor is there any sign of a dangerous degree of apathy amongst the electorate as a whole," he claims. All that has happened has "merely diminished the degree of mass emotional excitement [note

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the words!] attaching to the political struggle and reduced the numbers, though not necessarily the quality, of the minority of political activists and intellectuals." The first is a healthy sign, he asserts. And he now has worked himself to the following:

> The second also, in my view, is not an unhealthy development, though many politically-minded intellectuals find it so. Looking back on the nineteen-thirties, the extent to which the intelligentsia then concentrated on and was obsessed by political as opposed to artistic or cultural goals, although entirely natural and proper in the context of the time, was greater that would normally be desirable. *We do not necessarily want a busy, bustling society in which everyone is politically active* and suspends his evenings in group discussion and feels responsible for all the burdens of the world. [Emphasis added.]

No, the cadre of high functionaries will take care of these things for us... *Back the apathy!*

Some other remarks in Crosland become less odd. He goes distinctly out of his way to deny that socialists should be concerned as such with the problem of *bureaucratism:*

> . . . the issue of managerial and bureaucratic power . . . has little to do either with socialism, which historically has been concerned only with the economic power of private business, or with capitalism. [FS, p. 521])

Now it is true that historically socialism did not use to be concerned with the issue by and large; *hinc illae lacrimae.* One would imagine, however, that more recent history has made it impossible for the question to be fobbed off. Three pages later comes this after discussing the Webbs:

> Permeation has more than done its job. Today we are all incipient bureaucrats and practical administrators. We have all, so to speak, been trained at the L.S.E., are familiar with Blue Books and White Papers, and know our way around Whitehall.

He has a program for the cadre of functionaries and incipient bureaucrats—some modest proposals for the further bureaucratization of the Labor Party apparatus:

(1) Direct representation on the party National Committee for the parliamentary party—the MPs, who already have too much autonomous power. (It is this group, for example, that now elects the Party Leader, not the party.)

(2) "More staff at much higher salaries" at party headquarters.

(3) This point requires attention: Crosland has been complaining that the Labor Party's image is *too* working- class; it should reflect an all-class People's Party. The MPs too should be even more representative of "all social classes" than now. Hence, to implement this, "we need first more young Trade Union MPs, drawn partly from the newer industries and occupations and *representing the emergent social groups discussed above...*" At first blush there appears to be a contradiction when he complains of an overly work-

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ing-class composition and then proposes "young Trade Union MPs" to remedy the imbalance. We must understand that he does *not* mean working-class candidates. By "young Trade Union MPs" he means new rising union functionaries, aspiring bureaucrats, the professional-manager types for which he frequently calls in other places; and he looks on these as representing a New Class, or New Class elements.

Then there is a point calling for public-relations experts to be hired by the party; and more attention to youth, since youth give "a more classless air." (He does not mention that the party leadership regularly expels young socialist leaders and whole organizations, even periodically dissolving the youth affiliate, since the youth tend to be too left.)

THE DEMAND FOR PUTTING the movement into the hands of professional managers—the accent is on "professional"—is one of the most frequent notes in Crosland's proposals. He denounces "the snobbish anti-professionalism which permeates so much of our national life." His remedy for the ills of the Co-operative Movement is: higher salaries for the managers; more university personnel; less "interference with management by elected lay boards," and a stronger, more professional national leadership—a platform which has the indubitable characteristic of being single-minded—and he attacks the Movement's "supposed interests" of "equality and democracy" which stand in the way of these changes.

Although he tends to lean heavily on "equality" when putting together definitions of socialism that will exclude social ownership, he cannot be accused of being passionate on the subject of equality of reward. He is in fact a loud advocate of bigger and better rewards for managers, in the interest of "efficiency." He attacks the New Left because they want to bear hard on "those [inequalities] which derive from personal effort," referring to the managers who really run the corporations, whereas he wants to bear hard on "those which derive from inheritance." His approach is first to minimize the size of top management rewards in private industry. Then he argues that outsize rewards for managers are inevitable in any economic system.

The proof to which he appeals is the "very high bereaucratic and managerial rewards even in the closed societies of the Communist bloc." He is not attacking this, you understand; he is accepting it as natural and proper. "The process," he explains, "began with Stalin's famous speech in 1931 in which he denounced 'equity-mongering' and called for a new attitude of 'solicitude' towards the intelligentsia. . . ." Even though the trend has been "partially reversed" under Khrushchev, "the goal is by no means egalitarian."

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..Did this perhaps develop under Stalin because of the fact of dictatorship? This is not adequate explanation, he argues: Lenin was wrong and Stalin was right—

> For the original impetus towards inequality came not from political motives of tyranny or self-aggrandisement, but from the harsh *economic* necessities of the First Five-Year Plan. Lenin thought that with large-scale production the functions of management "have become so simplified and can be reduced to such simple operations . . . that they can be easily performed by every literate person, can quite easily be performed for ordinary 'workmen's wages,' and can (and must) be stripped of every shadow of privilege, of every semblance of 'official grandeur.'" Stalin found otherwise; and *the extreme inequalities of the Stalin era represented a hardheaded economic policy designed to remedy the desperate scarcity of managerial and technical personnel*... [Emphasis is added but the history is Crosland's.]

There has been a change under Khrushchev, true—

> But the Soviet rulers continue to believe that substantial differentials are a necessary condition of rapid growth; and in particular they attach a central importance to the creative role of management in fostering growth. *In view of their actual growth-rate, it is hard to say they are wrong.* [Emphasis added.][12]

One rubs one's eyes: so Stalin was right after all. If it was right for him to institute these policies under Harsh Economic Necessities, then is it easy to say he was wrong in also instituting the only political policies which could make the Russian people accept these harsh necessities—i.e., the Stalinist terror? Don't misunderstand: Crosland himself is a democrat and a humane Englishman; it is a good thing he did not personally face Stalin's harsh necessity.

WE HAVE SEEN THAT, to Crosland, bureaucratism is not a socialist concern. We can now add that there is little room left in his scheme for workers' control or workers' democracy in industry. Crosland does not reject the idea *in toto*; after all there are always the joint consultation schemes. An article by him on this subject comes out unusually pointless (he does usually *say* something), with a conclusion about leaving the question to sociologists for research.

However, the major relationship between Crosland's program and this question does not appear in his explicit discussions. It emerges from the nature of his proposals for the extension of public ownership, in those instances where he is willing to consider such steps. He is for government share-buying:

> . . . the object is not to acquire *particular* capital assets with a view to their control; it is *generally* to increase the area of public ownership. There is therefore no need for the compulsory purchase of entire firms or industries; it is sufficient to extend public investment in any direction... Indeed, it would be a positive nuisance to be saddled with control... [CE, p. 47–48.]

What stands out about this method of extending "public ownership" is that it is the one which guarantees completely leaving

12. References are to CE, pp. 29–33.

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all management rights and relations undisturbed. It is designed to leave the same bosses in control no matter what level of "public ownership" is thereby reached. Crosland is utilizing the well-known split between share-ownership and management control *to introduce the same schism between public ownership and public control.* His program for "extension of public ownership" is at the same time a program for maintenance of managers' control.

IF WE FIND HEAVILY BUREAUCRATIC-COLLECTIVIZED NOTIONS informing the new social-democracy of Crosland, we need not be surprised to find that he is willing to go along with the increasingly popular theory of the *convergence* of Western society with the bureaucratic collectivism of the East. This has not played a big role in Crosland's writing up to now, but it is interesting that it makes its appearance in the last chapter of his last book. Douglas Jay plays it bigger [SNS, p. 102].

Now the perspective of convergence of the two societies does not make any sense within the framework of Crosland's *rhetoric.* If we in the West are already in a new, progressive, advancing social order, with *more* democracy and equality than ever, and more coming, then even if Crosland swallows the tales about the coming liberalization and democratization of Russia, the picture that results is not of convergence but of a slow catching-up at the best. The real theorists of "convergence" mean, as they must, that a collectivized capitalism gets bureaucratized while a Stalinist-type bureaucratic collectivism gets "liberalized"; the two systems move in each other's direction.

Now this is what is actually happening not only with Crosland's "Statism" but also with the social-democratic theory *about what is happening.* Hence Crosland as well as Jay can in fact accept the reality of "convergence" perspective which makes no sense at all in terms of their theory.

It is the historical function of the new social-democratic reformism to act as the ideological formulation of one of the main processes in the bureaucratic collectivization of capitalism and its society. This is the reality behind what Crosland calls the "new progressive social order"—just as, analogously, a finished form of totalitarian bureaucratic collectivism is the reality behind the vaunted "victory of socialism in one-fifth of the globe."

HAL DRAPER, *former Editor of* The New International *and* Labor Action *is a member of the Editorial Board of* NEW POLITICS.

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George Lichtheim

Aspects of Contemporary Socialism: 3

Emancipation From the Past



SOCIALISTS CURRENTLY ENJOY the peculiar satisfaction of knowing that their traditional concerns have become everyone's business. No need to elaborate—any glance at the newspapers confirms the truth of this platitudinous statement. By now there is hardly a country in the world which, in one way or another, does not exemplify the contemporary trend toward public ownership, economic planning, and other departures from liberal orthodoxy. Yet we seem to be getting no nearer that synthesis of socialism and democracy, state regulation of the economy and fulfillment of labor's traditional aims, which the fathers of the movement inscribed on its tablets. In what follows I propose to throw out some reflections on this theme; their casual and unsystematic nature will, I hope, be forgiven. The present moment is anyhow more favorable to criticism than to systematization.

In order not to waste time upon preliminaries, we may start from the assumption that the original aims of the old European-cum-American Social-Democratic movement have in 1963 been more or less secured, so far as political democracy and the rise of labor to genuine bargaining power are concerned. Next year it will be a century since the founding of the First International opened the Social-Democratic phase of labor's history. The significance of this event is still obscured in quarters where Marx's authorship of the 1864 *Inaugural Address* is treated as a theme of lesser importance compared to his impassioned pamphlet on the Paris Commune. It cannot be denied that the *Civil War in France* makes better reading than the somewhat pedestrian *Inaugural Address,* but in the long run the labor movement got more out of Marx's reluctant conversion to democratic socialism than from his impulsive championship of the Commune, which was really a throwback to an earlier phase. At least for those not wedded to the myth of the October Revolution, the idea of "proletarian dictatorship" is now

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quite dead. Where it is alive—as in Cuba, for instance—we think we know why: it is due to immaturity, and we may look forward to the day when even Latin Americans will have passed out of this stage.

Since 1918 at the latest, i.e., since the Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, and Romanov empires collapsed, it has been evident that European Social-Democracy had reached its goal. What the Bolsheviks made of this historic opportunity is another story. So far as Central and Western Europe are concerned, the attainment of a democratic foundation meant that socialism was henceforth a matter of economics: notably of the technique of planning. Since 1945 it has become possible to say that this is true of *all* advanced industrial countries. Consequently it is no longer sensible to talk of "reformism" when socialists speak of structural change within present-day capitalist society, for such change is the only "revolution" now possible in an industrial democracy. Insofar as the residual Communist parties in Western Europe refuse to see this, they are turning themselves into sects, as in France. Insofar as they are trying to adapt to the reality, as in Italy, they are inevitably becoming "reformist." And so another chapter is closed, or almost closed. Perhaps the only additional point worth mentioning in this context is that the Italian Communist Party (unlike the French) was founded by intellectuals and has been led by them ever since, whereas Stalinization elsewhere resulted in the rise of a peculiarly narrow, sectarian, uneducated and (if the truth be told) somewhat woodenheaded leadership of indisputably proletarian origin, which duly proceeded to mold the movement in its own image. So much for this theme which (it must be confessed) for most people resident in Western Europe is now invested with a certain tedium.

I started out by remarking that we seem to be getting no nearer the goal of a concrete living synthesis of the two elements out of which the socialist concept was originally constructed: scientific planning and industrial democracy; or, if one prefers it, socialism and syndicalism. What is happening under this head in East and West is obviously unsatisfactory. Setting aside the Stalinist experience, one cannot really take seriously the current experiments with "workers' councils" in Poland or Yugoslavia, save perhaps as faint harbingers of future change. Nor has Israel—to name a democratic country—turned into that promised land of socialism which for a moment seemed to beckon in 1948. Political and economic pressures are steadily reducing Israeli socialism to the status of a subsidized component within a society constructed on familiar mixed-economy lines: though with a disproportionately large public sector and a politically dominant labor party of the Social-Democratic type. In Western and Southern Europe, even this degree of democratic socialization seems at present unattainable. With the

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Communist split immobilizing the French and Italian labor movements, the only planning now being done in these countries is of a kind that may satisfy the technical intelligentsia, but leaves too many traditional working-class aims unfulfilled to be described as an advance toward genuine socialism.

Skepticism is not diminished by the sight of the museum in which the British Labor Party displays its totems. The wearisome quarrel over "Clause Four" (public ownership) having ended from sheer exhaustion, the next Labor Government (by now a distinct possibility, though for quite extraneous reasons) will be faced with the task of modernizing an antiquated economy along lines dictated partly by circumstances, and partly by the growing recognition that *some* kind of central planning cannot be avoided much longer. Thus once more the advance from liberalism (which some self-styled liberals have now joined) leads to something that socialists can only with difficulty relate to the historic aims of the labor movement: social equality, the elimination of private ownership of productive resources, and "the self-government of the producers." Not to mention the "elimination of the profit motive" which, in a moralizing environment such as the British, had considerable sentimental importance for the older generation of socialists. For if anything is certain, it is that publicly owned industries will have to make a profit, unless it is agreed that only branches of the economy in need of subsidies should be nationalized: which would hardly constitute socialism. Conceivably it might be argued that the sordid business of profit-making can be left to the surviving private entrepreneurs, while the community turns its attention to the nobler task of redistributing its wealth. But this presupposes either an extremely efficient and flourishing private sector willing and able to "carry" the rest of the economy (the Swedish case); or else a tacit understanding that there is to be no, or hardly any, further economic progress: consequently no further rise in living standards. And this is something the electorate is unlikely to sanction. Yet rapid economic growth—the principal shibboleth of modern, "revisionist" socialism à la Gaitskell (or Mendès-France)—entails premiums for efficiency, hence marked economic and social inequalities: witness that recent manifesto of French revisionism, Mendès-France's *La République Moderne*. There is no getting away from it: if socialism is to make economic sense, and to attract the growing white-collar element, it must prove its capacity to promote a planned economy with a fast rate of growth. And this seems incompatible with some, at least, of labor's traditional aims.

II

IN THE REMAINDER OF THIS ARTICLE I want to suggest some of the reasons why this, by now familiar, predicament was not at first

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recognized; which in turn leads to a somewhat unorthodox reconsideration of certain Marxist concepts; notably the belief that the nature of the workers' movement is such as to provide a built-in guarantee that the ultimate aims specified in the classical socialist texts are in fact attainable.

One of the inherited assumption here is that the working class, or "fourth estate," gradually replaces the bourgeoisie, or "third estate," as the controlling element of society. This notion goes back to the French Revolution and was taken up by some of the early socialists (though not by the Saint-Simonians who believed in control by a technocratic élite). Marx then gave it a formulation which reconciled the democratic and the socialist aspect, by emphasizing the numerical growth of the industrial working class under capitalism. This assumption has lately begun to look questionable, and so has the syndicalist concept (also held by Rosa Luxemburg) of a homogeneous working class with a unified socialist consciousness forming the expression of *its* peculiar place in society, as against the instinctive liberalism of the bourgeoisie. By now it is apparent that industrial society has given birth to a new hierarchy of ranks, ranging from the controllers, via scientists and technologists, to skilled and unskilled workers equipped with varying degrees of political consciousness. A homogeneous proletariat (led by self-appointed professional revolutionaries) still exists in backward countries but is fading out elsewhere, even in the USSR, where the Khrushchevian style of plebeian rhetoric may soon strike his better-educated countrymen as somewhat old-fashioned. As for syndicalism, it seems quite likely to become the affair of an élite of technologists with a degree of political awareness rather different from that of most of their fellow workers.

Along with these unpredictable social changes which have made it necessary to qualify some of the older certainties, there goes the intellectual problem already mentioned for whose formulation Marx must take some responsibility: I mean the rather ambiguous notion that the working class in some sense "replaces" the bourgeoisie, somewhat in the manner in which the latter is supposed to have risen to the top in modern society, after the medieval-feudal system had disintegrated. The ambiguity here has to do with the fact that what is called "the rise of the middle class" was originally a function of successful capital accumulation. The bourgeoisie, it is true, did start from rather modest beginnings, but quite early on it was already a possessing class. Moreover it was, so to speak, an outsider when considered from the viewpoint of the old feudal society, in which the landowners confronted their laboring serfs. In Communist literature (including the *Manifesto*) these serfs are treated as the historic ancestors of the modern proletariat, with the obvious implication that the modern "pro-

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letarian revolution," too, represents a revolt by the oppressed majority. This overlooks the fact that the peasant rebellions of the Middle Ages were all notably unsuccessful. Indeed, it is safe to say, that there has never, in the whole of history, been a successful peasant revolution, just as there has never been a victorious slave revolt. The triumphant popular risings of which the history books are full (notably when they get on to 1789 and all that) were by-products of what Marxists, quite correctly, call the "bourgeois revolution"; in other words, they were made possible by the rise of a new socially dominant class which combined with the peasants against the landlords. In itself all this is trivial, but it is not a trivial matter that most Communists—following in this instance Marx's unfortunate precedent—have gone on talking as though "the workers" were something like a class of modern serfs; in which case it is safe to say they could never win power. Of course, the Marx of 1864—the Marx of the First International and of *Capital*—had stopped believing this, but then few Communists are inclined to draw such distinctions in public, whatever they may think of the matter in private.

On the other hand, the second strand of the argument is not very inviting either. For if the rise of labor is to be likened to the antecedent rise of the "middle class," then it must be remembered that this class got its chance because it exercised an essential economic function: that of capital accumulation and investment. The least one can say is that any hypothetical successor to this class must demonstrate its capacity to further the technological revolution. This doubtless need not entail the competitive accumulation of capital—though as we have seen publicly owned industries cannot afford to run losses all at once—but it presumably requires a capacity for direction similar, or even superior, to that of the entrepreneurs. But the exercise of such a function clearly must be the prerogative of a minority, which in turn makes rather a large hole into one of the traditional assumptions of labor socialism. One can formulate it by saying that the stratum which replaces the bourgeoisie must take over its function of social coordination. Can this be done by a class which in its great majority remains at a subordinate level within the industrial pyramid of the present and the immediate future? It is easy to see how Marx and his followers originally extrapolated their argument from the actual process of the bourgeois revolution, and up to a point, of course, they were quite right. The difficulty arises from the fact that, if the parallel is pursued to its logical conclusion, it leads to consequences which look somewhat undemocratic: there is no built-in guarantee that socialism can be realized under conditions where it is more or less synonymous with working-class rule. In fact, the contrary seems more likely.

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How did this particular problem come about in the first place? In Marxist literature, starting with the *Manifesto,* the proletariat was treated as the modern equivalent of the medieval serfs, while its future rise to power was at the same time likened to the slow maturation of the old urban bourgeoisie. This blurred the important circumstances that, by the time it was able to make a bid for political power, the bourgeoisie had accumulated capital and became the controlling stratum of a new social pyramid which slowly arose alongside the old medieval-feudal pyramid of landowners and serfs. For a popular revolution to have taken place in medieval society, the serfs would have had to rise up and get rid of the nobles. But we know that no such victorious uprising ever took place, except quite late in the day as a by-product of the "bourgeois revolution." On this analogy, a "proletarian revolution" is either impossible, or possible only in circumstances where a new directing stratum stands ready to usurp the place of the entrepreneurs. This event in turn would signify the displacement not just of the bourgeois top-stratum, but of the entire social pyramid controlled by the entrepreneurs: small businessmen, artisans, merchants, farmers, independent professional men, etc.; in short, what Marx himself called "bourgeois society." It is not difficult to see why he did not put the matter in these terms. In his time the industrial revolution had not advanced sufficiently far for anyone—even when gifted with Marx's powers of perception—to envisage a situation where the economy would be effectively socialized under the direction of a new stratum resting upon the industrial working class, but not identical with it. Instead he said just enough to make it possible for his followers to visualize the socialist revolution on the analogy of the bourgeois one. The result, on the whole, has been unfortunate, and it is now not easy to ged rid of all the ensuing muddles.

The matter becomes a little clearer if one thinks of medieval, bourgeois, and modern post-bourgeois industrial society, as three structures respectively controlled by the landowners, the entrepreneurs, and a new directing stratum whose outlines are currently beginning to take shape. It is then evident that one cannot seriously speak of the industrial working class "replacing" the bourgeoisie. For such a thing to have happened, the industrial technology of the mid-19th century would have had to be conserved, with elected representatives of the workers taking the place of the entrepreneurial stratum, but otherwise conserving a social order built around small and medium-scale property. In actual fact, just as the feudal "pyramid" was displaced by a bourgeois one, so the latter is giving way to a distinctive society with a new controlling stratum which in turn finds its appropriate "mass basis" in the modern industrial working class. This conclusion is quite independent of one's views

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about the East-West conflict, the future of Soviet society, and other topical subjects. It is a truism that, to an African or Asian, Eastern and Western Europe look pretty much alike, and there have lately been some signs that the USA and the USSR may come to look alike to the Chinese. What such observers see is the reality of modern industrial society. Whether it is run on capitalist or socialist lines becomes a secondary matter, almost a question of one's personal taste and fancy. In their own way, the modern anarcho-syndicalists of the "New Left" are drifting toward the same conclusion.

Here too one cannot altogether abstract from the manner in which Marxism posed the problem. To Marx and his followers, socialism was the "successor" of capitalism in the sense that the working class was expected to take over from the entrepreneurs. The movement was expected to culminate in the socialization of capitalist property. Although some such process has in fact occurred, it has gone farthest in countries where, for some reason or other, the capitalist form of industrialization had failed or had not been given a chance. As a result we now have a situation where capitalism and socialism confront each other, so to speak, horizontally in space instead of vertically in time. The two systems are rivals for the promotion of similar aims, their common denominator being the drive toward total industrialization and scientific control of production. In the political field this would become more evident if East and West came to a genuine agreement about coexistence and peaceful rivalry, but it is already the reality underlying their global conflicts. Nor need it be seriously affected by the slow erosion of the market economy in the Western half of the world. For various historical and cultural reasons, there will continue to be two different types of industrial society: one stemming from the old free-wheeling universe of the private enterpriser, the other brought into being through state direction from the top. Though Western society will presumably continue to be both freer and richer, both systems will jointly set the pace for the transformation of the rest of the world (assuming there is no catastrophe).

This picture clearly does not fit the Marxist-Leninist framework, inasmuch as it suggests that authoritarian planning of the Soviet type is simply an alternative way of promoting certain aims common to both systems; while in the West, democratic socialists are increasingly obliged to operate a planned economy not responsive to genuine control from below. Of course this latter conclusion may be challenged, but the critics will have to explain just exactly how "workers control" can function on any level above the primary one of the factory floor. If they have to concede that the higher reaches of the system must be operated by a group other than the working class (however defined), we are back with our

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original problem: in what sense can the "emancipation of labor" be likened to the rise of the bourgeoisie? Does it not resemble rather the peaceful and gradual emancipation of the former serfs? And is it not a fact that the successors of these serfs, the free peasant-farmers of Western Europe and America, for all the change in their status, remained throughout the 19th century in a position of social subordination to the new bourgeois ruling class of *their* day?

Whichever way one looks at it, there is no getting away from the conclusion that something has gone wrong with the vision of a socialist democracy in which "the workers" would be the rulers, in the sense of taking over from the entrepreneurs. The solution adopted in the so-called Communist countries is to call everyone, or practically everyone, a "worker," and to define socialism in terms of universal state control. One may suspect that this juggling with concepts will not long survive the discovery that a new and highly differentiated society has come into being, in which the top "workers" coagulate to form a new privileged class. The political conflicts of the future will then turn upon ways of preventing this from happening. But even if some halfway satisfactory balance is attained—satisfactory in the sense that it is regarded as valid and proper by all concerned—socialists who take their intellectual heritage seriously must still do something to bring it up to date. Currently this aim is being pursued with some reluctance, and the resulting lag is largely responsible for the terminological confusion into which so many socialist intellectuals tend to fall when confronted by a new phenomenon, whether in Sweden or Cuba; not to mention the tolerance extended to nationalist demagogues who have discovered the uses to which the "socialist" label can be put.

III

SOME OF THE NOTIONS I have lightly sketched out are now commonly accepted, usually with the pessimistic implication that the modern working class stands in the place of the ancient farm population, from which it follows that labor socialism is utopian: as utopian as agrarian democracy once was. This is Burnham's standpoint, and in varying degrees it represents the conclusion of those former socialists (not to mention the numerous fugitives from Stalin's chaingang) who have settled down to an attitude of stoical defeatism. Clearly there is some warrant for pessimism if one continues to picture the socialist revolution as a romantic uprising of the oppressed; whereas if one thinks of it as a social transformation which brings a new directing stratum to the top, one may go on believing that this process is potentially beneficial. This latter is the Fabian attitude, which however is qualified in the case of many British socialists by a somewhat muddled perception of what

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is implied by "socialism." The fact is that most people who intellectually support the Labor Party have not thought beyond social-democracy, i.e., the welfare state and full employment. This is not socialism, unless it leads to a planned economy with a public sector embracing *at least* all the major industries. But given such an outcome (which in principle is quite possible and politically may become feasible within the current decade) the resultant system may legitimately be styled "socialism" even if it falls short of the democratic and egalitarian aims of the founding fathers: they could not have forseen the rise of the new technology which places such a premium upon skill and education, and makes such relentless demands upon the organizing function of the new directing stratum. Now this stratum represents not just Burnham's "managers," but the entire technical intelligentsia: the class which must inevitably hold a key position in any planned economy, whether democratically run or not. And it is going to depend very largely upon the political orientation of this group whether political freedom survives or goes under. In saying this one must not allow oneself to be confused by fashionable polemics which befog the issue by treating democracy as synonymous with parliamentary government. In particular, one must not fall in with the current silly fashion of bewailing the so-called collapse of democracy in France: all that collapsed in France was a particularly musty, and *not very democratic*, version of parliamentarism. In a sense the Gaullist regime is both more technocratic and more democratic than its predecessor, in that it responds directly to popular choices and pressures. At the same time it has—provisionally—solved the problem of providing a stable executive. This is essential in any modern country, doubly so in a country which is now experimenting with a semi-planned economy. Such an economy is not compatible with parliamentarianism of the bourgeois-liberal type, as socialists should have been the first to perceive. It was their obstinate adherence to an outworn political model that made the Gaullist revolution possible, and it has yet to be shown whether the democratic Left is capable of rising above its heritage of 19th-century slogans, or whether it will continue to dance around its parliamentary totem pole to the chant of ancient war cries. In the latter case one may confidently predict that the entire technical intelligentsia will become tired of socialism, and settle for the authoritarian version of planning now peddled by the more left-wing Gaullists. If the coffee-house sages have their way, France may get a bout of Popular Frontism. That would be the provisional end of socialism as a political force, for it would compel all the more intelligent people on the Left to attach themselves to de Gaulle.

In Britain the problem is simplified inasmuch as no one expects the next Labor Government (which will probably have to

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lean heavily on Liberal support) to go very far in the direction of national economic planning; though it may be pushed far enough by economic pressure to antagonize the unions. The latter know quite well that genuine planning is impossible unless it comprises both profits and wages, i.e., does away with the free-for-all on which the prestige of the minor union leaders depends. A Labor Government is always in danger from the unions (the 1945–51 Labor administration in Britain was effectively ruined by them, insofar as it was not undermined by the quiet sabotage of the "nonpolitical" Civil Service), and needs a good deal of faith in socialist planning to break their resistance; much as a strong authoritarian regime of the Gaullist type has to be tough with employers and farmers in order to make *its* brand of planning work. The common denominator in both cases is the ability of the planners to inspire confidence in the bureaucracy and the technical intelligentsia. This is the modern counterpart of "business confidence," i.e., the willingness of private investors to part with some of their savings. A Labor Government which looks efficient and competent will get the support of the key stratum even if it goes in for drastic socialization; a weak and pliable administration will not. The present likelihood is that Britain in 1963 or 1964 will get an ineffective Labor Government, which will fail in its essential task of modernizing the country, whereupon the next turn of the wheel will bring the authoritarian planners of the political Right to power. Unless, that is, the country simply prefers to slide further downhill, with the present muddled setup which effectively prevents anyone from doing anything whatever.

It may be asked why, even if the preceding analysis is regarded as correct, socialists should consider it their business to operate a society which does not, in some major respects, correspond to the commandments engraved on the tablets. The answer is that if they don't, it will be done by other people who will have few compunctions about establishing a new and authoritarian political system. For the political consequences flowing from social change can never be uniform or unequivocal. Choices are always open, and it depends on the participants whether the remaining options are taken up. The gradual disintegration of parliamentary government need not signify that freedom is on the way out; it depends to some extent on us how much of it can be salvaged. That no modern industrial society can be *wholly* democratic, in the sense of being wholly responsive to intelligent decisions by an informed majority, should be evident; but it does no harm for people to hold on to this as a distant aim, while in the meantime doing the best they can with an increasingly complex and hierarchical setup. It may even come to be accepted that a socialist regime needs a syndicalist labor opposition to keep it reasonably

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democratic: not only in Eastern Europe but elsewhere too. This may sound like an odd conclusion to the socialist goal of an organic community of self-governing producers, but after all ideals are seldom realized in their pristine state.

It may even turn out that in this manner we shall eventually discover common ground with some of the new movements in the East now stirring uneasily under the surface of the post-Stalinist regime. The London *Times* on December 31, 1962, reported an interview in Paris with the young Soviet poet Andrei Voznesensky, from which some unusual thoughts emerged. Asked how he accounted for the popularity of his own, highly formal, stylized, and sophisticated poetry, and who were the readers of his works (with printing orders up to 120,000) he replied:

> Above all, I should say, our young technical intelligentsia. There are millions of them in Russia now. Many of them work on sputniks and other enormously complicated machinery, and they want poetry to be complicated too. They have no use for rhymed editorials. Yes, we have entered a new era in Russia, an era of artistic freedom. I am no longer afraid of being called names like 'formalist.'

Artistic freedom, *pace* Andrei Voznesensky, is still a long way off in Russia, but it is interesting that a young writer should be so conscious of his literary constituency, and of the social change it represents. There is a considerable step forward here from Khrushchev's populist concern for the more backward strata and *their* thought processes. If young men like Voznesensky were free to do so, they might say: "There is the socialism of the masses and the socialism of the intelligentsia. We represent the intelligentsia." As of course they do.

It now remains for their opposite numbers in the West to muster up sufficient courage to proclaim their own emancipation from the intellectual deadweight imposed upon them by the past. Not with a view to breaking away from the working class, but in the interest of seeing that class as it really is: not a homogeneous mass, but a stratified social fabric, almost a miniature society, with its own internal gradations and with correspondingly different levels of insight and awareness. The socialist party, school, or movement, which is first with this news, can count on a large and responsive audience.

GEORGE LICHTHEIM *was born and educated in Germany and now makes his permanent home in Britain. He is the author of* Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study *(1961) and has recently published a study of contemporary Western politics and economics,* The New Europe. *A frequent contributor to British and American journals specializing in sociology and political science, he describes himself as a revisionist Marxist and a democratic socialist.*

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The Siqueiros Affair

For over a year and a half, the world Communist movement has been waging a much-publicized campaign to free the Mexican painter, David Alfaro Siqueiros, from prison. In the United States, the campaign has taken the form of petitions and paid advertisements carrying the names of many prominent liberals and radicals demanding the release of Siqueiros in the name of artistic freedom.

Siqueiros was arrested in Mexico City in 1960, following a demonstration, and sentenced to eight years in prison under the provisions of the Ley de Disolucion Social, a statute adopted by Mexico during World War II, and supported at that time by the Mexican Communist Party, which authorizes up to 12 years of imprisonment for the "dissemination of ideas . . . which disturb public order or affect the sovereignty of the Mexican State."

In the international furor that has been created over the jailing of Siqueiros, nothing has been said by his supporters about his political past. Reviewing a Siqueiros exhibit in 1962, Brian O'Doherty, art critic for The New York Times paid tribute to the Mexican painter as "an old revolutionary (who) has always had the courage of his convictions," and said further that since the exhibition was designed to show the Mexican government that Americans are concerned about Siqueiros' imprisonment, any one attending would be doing "social work" in a good cause. When Dwight MacDonald wrote a letter to the Times outlining Siqueiros' role in the armed attack on Leon Trotsky in May 1940, the Times refused to print his letter. It also refused to print a letter of the same nature signed by the following: Lionel Abel, Saul Bellow, Eric Bentley, James T. Farrell, Philip Guston, Irving Howe, Dwight MacDonald, Robert Motherwell, Barnett Newman, Harold Rosenberg, Meyer Schapiro, Delmore Schwartz.

Last year, in France, an attempt was made to set up an exhibit of Siqueiros' paintings as an "Exhibit of Homage" to the Mexican artist. Among those approached to form a committee to sponsor such an exhibit were: Picasso, Pignon, Tristan Tsara, Picard le Doux, Leon Moussinac, Philippe Soupault, Jean Lurcart, Maurice Andre.

Below we print a letter sent to these French artists. It appeared originally in the Bulletin d'Information issued by the Commission Pour La Verité Sur les Crimes de Staline.

Following the French letter is a short article on Siqueiros by Victor Alba, writing from Mexico.

The Letter by French Intellectuals

DEAR SIR:

We learn that a committee of which you are a member plans to sponsor the scheduled "Exhibit of Homage" to the painter, David Alfaro Siqueiros, who is now imprisoned in his country for—as you say—"militant action in defense of democratic rights." In the name of freedom of expression, you propose to demonstrate your "solidarity" with the artist and "to help in his release."

Without prejudging the charges against David Alfaro Siqueiros or the arbitrariness of a long sentence, we would like to offer you the following facts about his character and some of

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his activities since you are concerned with defending freedom for an artist to express himself in his own way.

1. According to Mme. Siqueiros' letter to the French newspaper *L'Express*, in March 1961, David Alfaro Siqueiros was arrested while he was painting a fresco for a public building commissioned by the government. One can hardly designate as non-conformist, a painter who participated in an official Mexican exhibit in Paris in 1952, along with other Mexican painters, and whose twenty canvasses will be exhibited at the forthcoming official exexhibit at the Petit Palais.

2. A famous and immensely wealthy painter David Alfaro Siqueiros, was permitted to set up a studio in the penitentiary where he is confined and is able to execute numerous commissions, some of them of a semi-official nature, such as the portrait of the great writer, the late Alfonso Reyes, financed by the National College of Mexico (equivalent to our French College). A retrospective exhibit of his works was organized by Vera Cruz University. He is directing a theatrical group in prison where he enjoys all kinds of privileges. Though deprived of liberty, he is perhaps, not quite the victim you imagine him to be.

3. The preceding facts would not have moved us to send you this letter if David A. Siqueiros had not proved himself capable of committing a crime which, in our eyes, disqualifies him as a man and makes him unworthy of any solidarity. Although he can reconcile his position as an official painter with membership in the Communist Party, one cannot forget the essential reason for his notoriety: the part he played (as instigator and principal figure) in the attempt to assassinate Leon Trotsky in Mexico City on May 24, 1940.

You may recall that Leon Trotsky, exiled by Stalin, expelled from France and then from Norway, had finally received a visa to stay in Mexico where numerous republican and revolutionary Spaniards had also found refuge after Franco's victory. He immediately became the object of gross calumnies by Mexican Stalinists. In their press and at their meetings, particularly after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, they called incessantly for the murder of the great revolutionary. We know now that the slanderers did not act on their own, that Stalin had sent his agents to Mexico to physically liquidate the foremost adversary of his counter-revolutionary policy.

David Alfaro Siqueiros could have been content to play a part in these concerted attacks against Leon Trotsky. He did better. History records, as a matter of fact that on May 24, at dawn, an armed gang led by the painter Siqueiros attacked the house (Trotsky's) in accordance with a minutely worked out plan. Some of the gang were dressed in police uniforms which permitted them to neutralize the special guard set up outside and to have a door opened to them; others spread out in the garden, firing their sub-machine guns through the window where Leon and Natalia Trotsky were sleeping. Their mattress and pillows were riddled with bullets. Sieva, the young grandson, was wounded. One of Trotsky's guards, a political friend, was kidnapped by the gang. His body, buried in lime, was found a month later near a country cottage rented by Siqueiros' wife.

Leon Trotsky who had miraculously escaped death, denounced his would-be murderers, notably David Alfaro Siqueiros. Arrested, then released on bail, Siqueiros fled to Cuba, then to Chile. When he returned, another killer (not unknown to Siqueiros) successfully carried out the job which Siqueiros had attempted. Trotsky was murdered and the police file on the Siqueiros case mysteriously disappeared. In 1947, the beneficiary of a statute of limitations, David Alfaro Siqueiros boasted that he considered "the Coyoacan attempt (of which he was the instigator and principal participant) one of the greatest honors of my life." He calmly resumed his activities as official painter and executor of vile deeds for the NKVD.

These are the facts. This is the man. We ask you to judge both. Your de-

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cision to sponsor or participate in "The Exhibit of Homage to Siqueiros" can then be made with an awareness of what is involved.

We underline our concern for the defense of democratic rights.

(Signed): THEO BERNARD, FRANCOIS BONDY, ANDRÉ BRETON, FERDINAND CLARBIT, MICHEL COLLINET, FRANCOIS FEJTO, ANDRÉ FERRAT, JULIAN GORKIN, GERARD JAQUET, ANDRÉE LINBOUR, PIERRE LOCHAK, JEAN-DANIEL MARTINET, EDGAR MORIN, MAURICE NADEAU, LOUIS-MARTIN CHAUFFIER, PIERRE NAVILLE, AIMÉ PATRI, ANDRÉ PHILIP, GERARD ROSENTHAL, ALFRED ROSMER, DAVID ROUSSET, MANÈS SPERBER, LOUIS DE VILLEFOSSE.

A Communication from Victor Alba

OCCASIONALLY, A LITTLE anecdote, less important than its implications, reminds us that labels are not always guarantees of a product's quality, (as the investigations of Senator Kefauver's committee have shown so effectively). At the present time protest petitions are being circulated under a "progressive" and "liberal" label bearing some very well known names. But, as the truth is revealed, it becomes evident that many of these liberals and progressives are unwittingly parties to a fraud.

The fraud becomes clear as one reads the protests which have been circulated in France, Mexico and the United States against the jailing of the painter, David Alfaro Siqueiros. "Rembrandt and Goya are being persecuted along with Siqueiros," wrote a Mexican novelist who has never stopped to consider that along with those persecuted and jailed in Cuba are Lopez, Gomez and Perez.

Siqueiros is one of a group of 10 or 12 Communist militants and leaders who were sentenced for having organized demonstrations in 1959, in which some demonstrators and police were wounded. The accused were tried and sentenced; they appealed and their sentence was upheld. They have appealed again.

They receive visitors in their cells in the penitentiary (which the Mexican code permits). Those who are writers, have published articles and books, (Siqueiros, himself, has just published a savage attack on the government.) Those who have a profession practice it in jail. (Siqueiros, for example, paints murals in jail and his pictures continue to sell in the city's galleries, mainly—as usual—to North American tourists.)

The Mexican Communists and their fellow-travelers hardly mention Siqueiros in their campaigns. The painter's wife even complains about this, and many of the protests appearing in the newspapers, in the form of paid advertisements, are signed by her. Why do the local Communists refrain from defending Siqueiros? Because they know that in Mexico the painter does not enjoy any prestige, in any social strata. He is no longer regarded as an artist because the young painters know him as the creator of an artistic monopoly who, in the guise of defending socialist realism, acted as an obstacle to the appearance of new values and, with his friends, kept an exclusive grip on the artistic market. The young Mexican artists know (and say) that Siqueiros is one of those responsible for the fact that, for decades, Mexican painting has not been taken seriously.

People know that there are sinister chapters in Siqueiros' biography. He led the first abortive attempt to assassinate Leon Trotsky. Shortly after the attempted murder, the corpse of Trotsky's guard, Sheldon Harte, was found buried in a farmhouse rented by Siqueiros' wife, on the outskirts of the capital. Here, no one has forgotten that Siqueiros' arrest was then ordered on a charge of homicide and the painter responded by fleeing the country.

The Mexican Communists know that there would be a very unfavorable re-

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action in the country if a special defense were made for Siqueiros while the others sentenced with him, remained in prison.

What is fantastic is that outside of Mexico, the campaign is not conducted on a political but on a personal plane. Many of the signatures in behalf of Siqueiros would never have been obtained if they had been requested for Perez or Lopez. But Siqueiros is a famous painter. And it is easy to obtain signatures to protest the imprisonment of a celebrated artist.

What is it the petition signers defend? Are they defending the man who wrote that he considers the Coyoacan attempt on Trotsky's life one of the great honors of his life? Are they defending the organizer of demonstrations in which there were victims? Let them speak clearly because no one prevents them from allying themselves publicly with a frustrated assassin or with a Communist agitator. Apparently, however, these signers are neither defending the man who aspired to be Trotsky's assassin nor the one who organized demonstrations under circumstances which the laws of the country (good or bad) considered criminal. The signers are defending the painter. What they are complaining about, what they are protesting against is that a painter —and, oh horror, a famous painter— has been jailed like any simple mortal ... like the others involved in the same trial, about whom the signers do not appear too concerned. At least they do not complain that Siqueiros was arrested and sentenced because he is a painter. They know this is not true and that even in jail the painter continues to receive commissions from the Mexican government which has always been one of his best and steadiest clients.

Of course, it would be an act of barbarism to jail someone for being a painter. Everyone would protest (personally, I protest putting anyone in jail no matter what he has done since I am against jails anywhere.)

All painters are equal, but Siqueiros is more equal than the others in the eyes of these signers. Above all, more equal than the artists jailed by Stalin, the writers imprisoned and assassinated by the Stalinists during the Spanish civil war, the painters persecuted by Fidel Castro, in whose defense I do not remember having seen so many indignant signatures.

I, personally, do not believe that art is much indebted to Siqueiros. I suspect that if I were a Communist, I would not consider that "the cause" owes him much. The life of this artist has been a total failure. Even now, he must know that his image is more the product of his own propaganda than his real worth.

Translated from the Spanish by Abe Farbstein

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Bruno di Pol is Secretary of the Milan Chamber of Labor, a Secretary of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) and a leading member of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI).

Problems of the Italian Labor Movement

Bruno Di Pol

A LIVELY DEBATE is in progress in our country on the role of trade unions in capitalist society. The present stage in this debate has been reached after a long period of investigation conducted on various levels in the labor movement. It picked up momentum due to the necessity of dealing with ideological problems on an organizational level, problems created by the new political framework of the Center-Left coalition* and the program of the government, different and better than any proposed by previous governments.

Without going into great detail on the directly "political" issues, the new Center-Left solution has introduced new factors in the trade-union discussion. It has revealed new problems which, yesterday, were either non-existent or academic, and has raised the basic problems of the relations between the unions and political power, on the one hand, and between the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) and the socialist-oriented parties on the other.

In order to understand fully the complicated Italian situation, it is necessary, without any claim to interpreting history, to recall the traditional trends in Italian trade unionism and their development.

"White" trade unionism inspired by Christian sociology, practically originated with Pope Leon XIII's social encyclical "Rerum Novarum," using as its point of departure the Catholic mutual assistance and cooperative movement based on the extensive network of the "Congress Work" organization. Its organizational development was rather slow since it was inhibited from the start by the concept of the "mixed union" which encompassed both employers and employees, and by the inter-class concept around which it finally consolidated.

"Red" trade unionism originated much earlier and had undergone its first experiences of struggle through the workers' societies and trade

* The coalition of Christian-Democrats, Social-Democrats and Republicans with the support of the Socialists.

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leagues soon after 1850. Its development was dynamic, characterized by an extensive strike movement, with the rise of organizational structures like the Chambers of Labor, provincial unions, National Professional Federation. Two opposing currents soon revealed themselves—the reformist and the revolutionary—causing a series of splits before and after the founding of the CGL.*

For many years, the Italian General Confederation of Labor was practically dominated by the reformist current. After 1921, the Communist current made its first appearance competing with the Socialist tendency. The anarcho-syndicalist tendency was confined, at first, in the Unione Sindacale Italiana. After World War I, a split took place which produced the UIL.** The influence of the Republican tendency gradually diminished over the years.

IT IS INTERESTING TO MENTION the origins of the Italian trade union movement because the main tendencies of political thought—the inter-class tendency in the CIL (the Catholic union), the reformist-revolutionary tendencies in the CGL—reappear after the Liberation, under changed circumstances but still easily recognizable.

Free trade unionism, which was relegated to the shadows during the long years of fascism but not destroyed—as the Liberation struggles so amply demonstrated—was revived with the "Rome Pact" in 1944. Under the Pact, "representatives of the three main trade-union tendencies—the Socialist, the Communist and the Christian," founded the new CGIL with equal representation for these three tendencies on leading bodies. The political agreement reflected the external situation. Although the trade-union tendencies attempted to follow a policy of their own, they adopted certain attitudes from the parties which led to internal conflicts. These conflicts were sharpened by the dissolution of the "National Council of Liberation," a government coalition created during the resistance period. The Christian trade-union tendency placed a growing stress on its function as a "controlling" factor and on the contradictions in the internal arrangement of the organization. The differences between the Socialist and Communist currents, partly as a result of the unity of action pact between the two parties, remained more apparent than real and manifested themselves in the struggle over posts rather than political issues.

Attempts were made to raise the debate to a more fundamental level, but the Cold War atmosphere and the fact that the trade-union movement was assigned the role of providing foot soldiers in the "decisive" attack against capitalism resulted in their failure. Head-on battles followed other head-on clashes. The attempt against Togliatti's life in 1948 and the Communist reaction gave the Christian tendency the opportunity to implement a decision arrived at after many months of consideration. The first split of the post-war period took place with the emergence of the Free Italian Trade Union Confederation (CISL). Unity was broken. A year

* Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGL)—General Confederation of Labor—was founded in Milan in 1906. It included the professional federations, the first of which, the Typographers, was organized in 1893, and the Chambers of Labor which originated in 1891 in Milan and Turin and spread throughout Italy.

** Not to be confused with the present UIL, which was founded in 1949, includes social-democratic and Republican workers and is affiliated to the ICFTU, like its Catholic counterpart CISL. (Ed.)

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later, a group of Socialist and Republican trade unionists left and formed the Italian Union of Labor (UIL). The CGIL retained the majority of the Socialist and Communist tendencies, with the latter definitely in a controlling position.

The electoral system which had hitherto governed the internal life of the CGIL, with separate tickets for each of the three main tendencies, was abandoned in 1949. From then on, questions of internal representation were settled in a "unitary" manner and the weight of the Socialist tendency steadily diminished.

WHILE THE THREE ORGANIZATIONS which had emerged from the splits were involved in destructive factional in-fighting and the trade-union movement as a whole grew weaker, the country at large slowly began to change. First, productivity increased. Initially, the rise in productivity did not create new jobs, nor did the unions have the bargaining strength necessary for enforcing "modern" solutions to the problem of connecting wages to increased productivity. At the same time, capitalism increased its control over the industrial and economic structure. Mechanization and rationalization increased the relative weight of constant capital over variable capital, and the increase in capital expenses as opposed to labor costs created the need for more accurate planning of production and consumption within the capitalist framework. Management spokesmen extolled the need for regularity in production, uninterrupted by industrial struggles. In short, Italian capitalism created new technological bases for itself. The increase in their power led to a growth of authoritarianism in the plants.

The trade-union movement, confining itself to denouncing the restrictive effect of the major monopolies on the market, was unable to anticipate the massive development of the productive forces. Under the impact of this development, the Italian economy underwent an irregular and uneven growth which created an imbalance between regions as well as sectors of the economy and strengthened existing contradictions. None of this, however, happened by chance. Social structures, power relations and the basic structure of the economy all changed together in accordance with the new "neo-capitalist" pattern. Naturally, there were repercussions in the trade unions. Fresh attempts were made to integrate the working class into the new pattern. The two sides of the coin were: psychology and intimidation; paternalism and reprisals; docile unions and factory police.

However, this process of capitalist development under the leadership of the monopolies soon produced widespread effects on employment. With the assistance of massive emigration, it reduced the number of unemployed, cutting it down to a tolerable level. The workers' standard of living rose as a result of steadier employment and improvements in union contracts. A new situation had arisen as a result of capitalist planning and organization of productive growth. During this period, the frontal attacks by the labor movement, the struggle for political power, had only reinforced the cohesion of the class enemy. Finally, the trade unions met the new reality on a new basis.

After a long period of self-examination initiated in April 1955, and concluded at its Fifth Congress in 1960, the CGIL moved from a policy of frontal attack to one of multiple demands. An increasing stress was

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placed on political independence, necessary for reversing the traditional attitude on unity with other trade-union organizations and reconstructing trade-union policy on the basis of membership needs. During the same period similar changes in outlook took place in the other trade-union organizations, influenced to some extent by the changes which occurred in the CGIL, more so in the CISL than in the UIL.

The internal fights in the trade-union movement came to a halt. The CGIL slowly but surely lost the "political" burden, i.e., the close identification with the policies of the workers' parties. The result was a growing unity among the workers. United struggles conducted by the three trade-union organizations confirmed the new policy of the Confederation and reduced the opportunities for labeling the CGIL an extension of the Communist Party.

Concrete results were soon apparent. The fight for national contracts aiming at over-all regulations to safeguard the interests of the workers in marginal positions (those working for very small enterprises, for instance), was conducted simultaneously with a flexible struggle on many fronts aimed primarily at the large corporations and setting up special patterns for industrial relations in these corporations. It should be said, as well, that the increase of united action was accompanied by a democratization in the internal life of the CGIL. Precisely because the struggles were no longer ordered by the leadership but grew directly out of the social and economic needs of individual factories or specific sectors of industry, certain elements of distortion of the class union disappeared while the influence of the rank and file grew.

THIS LENGTHY SURVEY leads us back to the problem raised at the beginning. The new political situation in Italy and the Center-Left coalition with its new program have introduced new complications into the trade-union situation on several distinct but related levels. It is now apparent that the economic program of the new government—the coalition of Christian-Democrats, Social Democrats and Republicans supported in Parliament by the Socialists—provides for two stages, the first of which calls for the preparation of instruments to implement the long-term program. A planned policy naturally implies priorities in the choice of these instruments. The object is to eliminate social and economic inequalities, to allow the workers to participate in the gains of productivity by increasing their share of the total revenue, to prepare the economic and social bases for a new "forward leap" of the entire society. These objectives are based on the assumption that the accumulation of capital will continue at a rapid rate and that the national income will grow. The basis for the "forward leap" will have to be a reduction in profits. This, and not the traditional method of inequalities, low wages, degeneration of entire regions, can lead to a further growth in investments. This is the perspective in which the discussion on trade-union struggles and their aims must be understood.

The CGIL has claimed repeatedly that the general line, distinctive for a class organization in the Italian situation, is determined by the necessity for an organic view of the condition of the working class and the development and change of social institutions. Our Confederation can-

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not confine itself to demanding the institution of more civilized and advanced labor relations or center its struggles merely around a more equitable distribution of the national revenue. It must necessarily raise its sights and stress that even the basis for this activity will disappear if the union fails to deal with the over-all problem of the development of the economy, if it does not stress the necessity of taking away from the monopolies the commanding positions they now hold. Our multiple demands are a part of this perspective, building bargaining power on the plant level capable of counterbalancing management's demands, pointing out the contradiction in the social structures and showing the way through economic and political action to a different orientation.

It is on this level that the reformists and revolutionaries make contact. There is no longer a narrow view of workers' struggles on whatever level they make take place, along with a neglect of fundamental aims and structure, nor is there an attempt to thrust on the workers' organization—which should be the organization of all workers and therefore not based on a single set of ideological principles—the task of building a "political" workers' power. To a large extent, the CGIL today has this sense of a unified general struggle against the capitalist power. This makes the question of defining political and trade-union alternatives even more urgent than it was previously. In recent months, a curious deformation has grown up around this group of questions.

According to some, workers have a political task to fulfil in the trade unions. Under this assumption, there is a triple order of priorities: 1) the establishment of workers' power in the plants; 2) the refusal to allow for a distinction in the activity of parties and trade unions; 3) the concept of a trade-union organization which, in order not to stand aside from this upsurge of the workers must consider itself as wholly outside of the system, fighting simultaneously on the level of social institutions and of economic structures.

Actually, a look at the facts reveals that these assumptions are pure academic exercises and their supporters contradict themselves when they assert that management seeks to neutralize the workers' struggles with wage concessions. In reality, if the basic motivation of workers' struggles was political, obviously no wage concession could neutralize it and, given the unitary character which underlies almost all trade-union campaigns, they must concern themselves primarily with immediate demands. But, at the same time, these immediate demands are a transitional phase leading to a new kind of bargaining power, a general strengthening of the union. It is a mistake to confuse this transitional stage with a springboard for the conquest of political power.

We have already said that the content of the struggle shows, at least for the CGIL, the constant attempt by the union to reinforce the unitary character of a policy which aims at opposing the capitalist power and at increasingly revealing its contradictions. This can be achieved on two levels. If positive results are obtained from the multiple struggle, one moves in the direction of a different distribution of revenue, more favorable to the workers. This type of struggle, if successful, eventually produces a more rapid growth of the productive forces and thereby increases the pressure on the relations of production. It is, by itself, capable of

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laying the groundwork for a change in the existing balance of social power and it prepared the second stage, in which the question of a take-over by public power can be raised. These struggles obviously have limits. The first is traceable to their content, which is quite different depending on the sector of the industry or on the region involved.

The method of economic development desired by monopoly management has created zones of intense productive concentration while others are left in a degrading state of stagnation. This also has repercussions on the trade union, which often finds ample room for maneuver in the zones of highly concentrated production while its demands must be considerably scaled down in the predominantly agricultural sectors. It is precisely this diversification of trade-union struggles, which induces some to seek the lowest common denominator, that justifies a diversified policy for the union. The union operates in a society where the capitalist structures appear to be barely scratched and in a period in which the level of technology present in the Italian economy has produced reserves of wealth that cannot be ignored, both on the national and regional levels. While there is economic uncertainty in certain sectors, it is almost certain that the period of economic boom is going to continue for some time. The problem is whether this probable development will still be controlled by the monopolies and lead to new, more sharply defined forms of imbalance. To proclaim, in this situation, that the trade union must declare war on the system means viewing the entire problem in terms of wishful thinking. We, on the other hand, are working to modify the labor relations inside the plants and of entire sectors, and to utilize this activity to exert pressure on the general policies followed by the government. These are considerations which have no immediate bearing on the question of the separation between the sphere of activity of the trade unions and the political parties.

The trade union's function is to effect a change in work relations based on social injustice. It moves along the traditional path of its institutional tasks when it reminds public opinion of its duty to remove the structural causes on which these injustices are based. It is unthinkable, at this point, that the workers and their unions should be entrusted not only with the task of improving working conditions in, say, a given monopolistic enterprise, but also with that of determining matters relating to investments and consumption in order to oppose the policies of the monopolist groups. In the past, this was sometimes attempted in the course of one and the same struggle, with much noise and little effect. In fact, there is a division of labor and while it is the union's job to cut into industry's profits with its immediate demands, it is the task of the political parties to forecast developments and present a program for the balanced development of the economy and the democratic development of the country.

Our union has asserted its autonomy from the present and from previous governments. The CGIL does not believe that the union should be an instrument used for or against parliamentary majorities, or for this or that declaration or program. We realize, of course, the necessity of avoiding an attitude of passive inactivity toward the new program at the

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same time that we refused a subordinate position toward the political power. The trade union is an instrument of democratic struggle against the present condition of the working class, at every stage of social and economic development. It must remain so. If it gave up this role, even the prospects of over-all planning would not be what they are today. The pressure of workers' participation would be missing, and bureaucratic degeneration would set in.

On the other hand, a trade union set on a sectarian course refusing to take reality into account, would become an instrument for another purpose, basing its policies on an abstract and ineffective kind of opposition, and on a refusal to deal with the real problems.

THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT PLANNING and of its implementation has introduced a new factor in the traditional thinking on relations between trade unions and the political power. The content of the present plan reflects, in large measure, the demands of the unions. This is true on the level of piece-meal economic and social improvements (such as the proposed increase in old-age pensions, the regulation of employment, the greater reliance on the unions as a democratic force) and it is also true on the level of general policy (elimination of economic imbalance, greater autonomy for the regions, nationalization of electric power, tax reform, a more efficient school system).

Under the circumstances, the old tradition of all-out trade-union opposition to the government, based on an enormous disparity in aim, is evidently shaken. At the same time, the new situation raises another problem, within the CGIL, regarding the relations between the Socialist and Communist tendencies. In a rather successful formula, Fernando Santi, a Socialist and Vice-Secretary of the CGIL, recently remarked that the union was either being stuffed with tranquillizers or with stimulants, depending on the type of government it had to deal with. He recalled that during the Milazzo experiment* the Sicilian trade unions, stuffed with tranquillizers, slept and, as a result, the regional government also slept. Both dangers are real, but not present to an equal extent.

The structure of the Confederation rests on the recognition of the tendencies. There is no doubt that on "fundamental" questions, such as declarations of program, the balance between the two tendencies will continue to conform to the formal provisions. In daily practice, however, the position is rather different. The Socialist current has a very limited number of top-level positions in the industrial unions and in the Chambers of Labor. In the provincial organizations, this difference in weight is even more pronounced. This fact alone would suffice to bring closer the danger of having trade-union struggles used as a political instrument against the Center-Left coalition, a coalition which is bound to spread to the regional and local levels if it is successful nationally.

One must also keep in mind the persistent effects of the favorable picture presented for years concerning the subordinated and vassalized po-

* In Sicily, the provincial (original) government presided over by the dissident Christian-Democrat Miazzo was supported by a majority which included the Socialist and Communist parties.

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sition of the trade unions in the socialist countries. The broadcasting of this myth is an indication of how deeply the concept of the subordination of the trade union to political ends is rooted, and how easily it can be used in reverse when a government is involved that does not include the Communists.

In simple terms, the problem may be summarized as follows: the Socialist and Communist parties are politically divided in their estimate of the new Center-Left government. The Center-Left formula, including the Socialists and leaving the Communists in opposition, is already operating in many local administrations and will spread tomorrow to the regional governments, as soon as regional autonomy becomes a reality. Will the class union be able to preserve and reinforce its independence under these circumstances, even though the internal control of the Communists is so extensive?

The present situation raises great hopes, but also creates new dangers. The hopes are that the unity of all unions and of all workers will contribute to changing the workers' condition and the general structure of society in a progressive direction. The danger is that the real progress of workers' unity will be met by a militant return to the concept of the trade union as a political instrument. To face these dangers, and to revive the hopes, the Socialists within the CGIL will have to defend and bring up to date the position which sees the trade union as a unitary, independent and democratic movement. The end of certain political myths already represents a great step forward for our position, and the entire question of trade-union unity and independence is now posed in rather more acceptable terms than was the case in the past. At the same time, the plaintive appeals for unity within the CGIL, used in the past to enforce conformity, have lost their effect. People want to see clearly, to discuss issues, to weigh decisions, particularly those which affect policy. As Socialists and as trade unionists we are about to face decisive tests, which must be successfully overcome.



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Notes From Abroad

Stephan Thomas

Soviet Challenge In Germany



THE SOVIET ZONE OF GERMANY, the so-called "German Democratic Republic" (GDR), provides historic proof of the futility of trying to graft Soviet Communism onto a modern, industrial society. That, indeed, is the result of the experiment which was begun in 1945, and concluded on August 13, 1961 at the Berlin Wall.

Does Moscow understand that the Soviet experiment in power which Stalin started in Germany in 1945, has failed? Is Khrushchev prepared to accept the consequences of the bankruptcy of Stalin's German policy? Evidently not, if Khrushchev's role at the Sixth Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in January 1963, is any measure of his response to this problem.

In 1945, Stalin very clearly outlined the Soviet power perspective: "As conquerors we will force our system upon the conquered!" Soviet policy in Germany developed under this Stalinist law of power which inspired and determined the two decisive Sovietization attempts in the Zone: the Second Party Conference of the SED in July 1952, and the Fifth Party Congress of the SED in July 1958.

The Second Party Conference proclaimed "The Building of Socialism." This meant the attempt at total collectivization of agriculture and transplanting Soviet industry norms to the labor conditions in the Zone. This first, full-scale Sovietization experiment ended in the uprising of June 17, 1953, which could be called—to paraphrase Hegel—the judgment of history. The attempt to force a foreign system on the German people, based on completely foreign assumptions, did not succeed. It is very interesting that the revisionist opposition to Ulbricht in the SED Politburo took exactly this view during the June crisis of 1953. Zeisser, Herrnstadt and Ackerman, at that time, tried to prove with arguments from Marx and Lenin, and references to Hegel that the Stalinist experiment in Germany had to fail because it could not be exported to another people with different economic, political and social conditions. "This Muscovite experiment must fail in Germany!" cried Herrnstadt, the Editor in Chief of *Neue Deutschland*, as he tried to settle accounts with the Muscovite and arch-Stalinist, Ulbricht.

IN THE SUMMER OF 1953, three months after the death of Stalin, his heirs in Moscow were not ready to sacrifice their best man in Germany, Ulbricht. He remained; his opponents were removed from political power. Five years later, in the Summer of 1958, the Communist leadership tried again to tie the threads severed by the June 1953 uprising. The Fifth Party Congress of the SED proclaimed "the completion of the socialist transformation" and in the framework of its Seven-Year Plan for 1959–1965, the basis of the transition to communism was to be created by 1966. Concretely, the "completion of the socialist transformation" means the nationalization and collectivization of

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all enterprises remaining in the private sectors of the economy. In the period ending in 1962, the remaining independent farms and handicraft factories were to be totally collectivized, and the remaining private enterprises in industry, transport and commerce, nationalized. A considerable increase in production was anticipated in the nationalized and collectivized enterprises by raising work norms. The Seven-Year Plan included a promise to the Zone population that by 1961, its standard of living would catch up to and surpass the standard of the Federal Republic. The Fifth SED Party Congress declared:

> The principal task of the Seven-Year Plan is to develop the national economy within the next few years to such an extent that the superiority of the socialist society over capitalist rule will be proved decisively. Therefore, the per capita use of the principal necessities and consumer goods by the working class must exceed the per capita use in West Germany. We propose to solve this prime economic task of the next three years by 1961.

Instead of the realization of these goals, on August 13, 1961 the Wall had to be built because the Zone population had answered the new wave of Sovietization in its own way.

In villages and factories resistance began to stir again and in December 1959, the SED Central Committe plenum had to admit that "among some of our Party comrades and also among other workers, there is doubt about our perspectives and about the correctness of our policy. We face the symptoms of Social Democracy," said the SED statement, "the effect of which looms especially large now that we are struggling to fulfill the Seven-Year Plan." As the Ulbricht regime intensified Sovietization, the flight from the Zone increased.

The production plans for industry were not fulfilled. The planned increase in productivity led to raising the work norms at the expense of the workers and other employees. Likewise, in agriculture, production goals could not be reached. In fact, in agriculture there was a reverse. The 1960 farm yield was considerably lower than it was the previous year. Despite these developments and warnings from his own Communist ranks, Ulbricht, in order to conform to Stalinist goals, the Spring of 1960, the total collectivization of agriculture a necessity for the increase in agricultural production. In the Spring of 1960, the total collectivization of agriculture in the Zone was carried out. The proportion of collectivized useful land was increased from 40 per cent to 100 per cent. The immediate result was the disruption of the agricultural economy, the mass flight of the peasants and a deepening of the food crisis; exactly what occurred in the first wave of collectivization in 1952–1953. In addition, the enormous decline in farm yield caused a shortage of fodder and led to a decrease in livestock with the result that, at the Congress of the SED Central Committee in December 1962, the leading farm manager of the Zone, Leuschner, had to admit that, "there are one million fewer pigs," and many people in the Zone are of the view, "that things have become worse."

Eighteen years after the end of the war, the food situation in the Soviet Zone is such that some basic foods are rationed. Potatoes are obtained in small quantities with a card. Butter, meat and sausage are obtained only in certain stores where one is regis-



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tered as a customer. Fresh milk is provided only to a limited circle of people. This does not imply that everything else is available in sufficient supply. Just the reverse! There is also an inadequate supply of fruits, vegetables, tropical fruits and the very valuable vegetable fats. The Sixth Party Congress of the SED in 1963, could not even promise an improvement in the food supply in the new Seven-Year Plan. Rather, it was laconically stated that the food supply could be improved only through an increase in agricultural production, not by additional imports. For the farm workers, the prescription was the same as the one given to the industrial workers: for the same, and sometimes lower wages, you must work more. In other words: the people under the Communist regime are to compensate for the failures of the Communist system with their labor. In Ulbricht's speech to the Sixth SED Party Congress it went like this: "The workers' living conditions can be further improved only insofar as we succeed in increasing production."

And in Khrushchev's speech:

> For the present, the West German workers have a higher productivity than you do. [Productivity in the Federal Republic is 25 per cent higher than in the Soviet Zone.—S. T.] Therefore, you must look behind the mirror, as the saying goes. The struggle to increase productivity is a law which has validity for our country in the same way as for all socialist countries. Not every worker is able to understand the complete development of the economy. Many think like this: Fritz, who works in the GDR gets so much, and Hans who works in the West gets so much. In this manner, they determine which is better and which is worse.

Exactly! On this point, Khrushchev is correct. Only he forgot to say that over 4 million refugees have fled the Zone, while the others who are forced by the Wall, barbed wire and terror to live under the Ulbricht dictatorship are opposed to the Communist regime. On the one side are Ulbricht and his apparatus, on the other, the German people. This is the political reality of the Soviet Zone in the 18th year of the Communist experiment in Germany.

Since 1952, the "Building of Socialism" has provoked strong resistance from the population, among the members and functionaries of the SED, its auxiliary organizations and among the cadres of the state power apparatus. The revision of Ulbricht's political line is demanded continually by the functionary cadres of the regime. Therefore, revisionism was called the "principal danger" in the Party organization at the Sixth Party Congress. The report of the Central Committee to the Sixth Party Congress in January 1963, said:

> The Party Control Commissions concerned themselves, above all, with those Party organs and members who displayed serious symptoms of softening and decomposition. The experience gained from this work emphasizes the view of the Central Committee that opportunism and revisionism, are the principal dangers in the Party. This was displayed in such phenomena as the open rejection of the leading role of the Party in the construction of socialism, the rejection of democratic centralism, revisionist distortion of Party policy and the spreading of enemy ideologies.

This is a confession that all the previous cleansing operations in the SED could not overcome revisionism. The Sixth Congress especially attacked the writers, artists and cultural functionaries of the Party for revisionism. The regime intended a particularly important role for this group in the "ideological revolution" of the Zone. They were to rouse enthusiasm for the "Building of Socialism." But the Party Congress in January 1963, reproached them for being soft or presenting only a negative view. On this, Ulbricht said:

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> Some writers and artists are trying to use the destruction of the cult of personality as a struggle against socialist realism. They are trying to smuggle in petty bourgeois ideology. They do not understand certain problems of socialist development and see much gray on gray. Therefore, they limit themselves to negative formulations. Many busy themselves with the Theory of the non-Hero and construct an entire theory about why contemporary man with all his strong and weak aspects cannot be represented in the theater. Also, the distance theory plays a role; the conception that the writer must maintain a distance from the events or problems in order to view them realistically. This theory is a flight from the present. These writers conceive of socialism as an abstract ideal, a completed harmony, and therefore, entirely miss the complicated problems of the socialist transformation. The artistic result is a distorted picture of reality.

This critique of Ulbricht's is directed against both the older Party members and the younger generation of writers and artists. Even this materially privileged group is so heavily influenced by negative social developments, the dissatisfaction and resistance of the people, that most of them refuse to sing the paeans of praise to Ulbricht's "Socialism" which the regime demands.

One of the principal demands of revisionism in the Zone is the removal of Ulbricht and an end to his dogmatic policy. This demand was raised in 1953, in the context of the June uprising; it was also the position of the Zeisser - Herrnstadt opposition group. It was raised again after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, when the Schirdewan-Wollweber-Ziller opposition group appeared.

In recent years, this demand has not been muted; prior to the Sixth Party Congress it was proclaimed with more emphasis than ever as a result of the demand for de-Stalinization in the USSR, Poland and the other East European satellites. The broad revisionist opposition reflects the general political opposition of all strata of the population within the power apparatus. Ulbricht gave a striking hint of this when he said:

> The members of our party, especially in the Capital have the task of convincing the people, who are confronted with a hostile ideology brought to them by radio and other means, of the development of socialism.

The population responds by political resistance to the Ulbricht regime. Cutting off the roads to flight to West Berlin, constructing the Wall of Shame, the sharpening of terror, were all efforts to break this resistance. These measures further aroused the people of the Zone against their oppressors.

UP TO NOW, THE SED REGIME has been unable to attain the total Sovietization of the territory of the GDR. The resistance to the policy of Sovietization is permanent and one of the causes of the crisis of the regime. This crisis encompasses all spheres—economics, politics and the Party itself.

The attempts to subvert the German Federal Republic, to weaken it and make it ripe for a Communist takeover, produced no results. In fact, the striving for a national united front of democratic forces to combat Communism in Germany is growing.

Despite this negative balance, Ulbricht maintains the fiction that the Stalin-conceived German policy is now, as in the past, attaining new successes in strengthening the GDR and weakening the German Federal Republic. This version—with some slight differences—coincides, as usual, with Moscow's conception. In this sense, Moscow is still shoring up Ulbricht in order to realize the old aim of a united Communist Germany.

In view of this situation, it would be foolish to imagine that it might be easy to do away with the SED regime or convince the Soviets to give up their conceptions. Soviet faith in the forceful advance of Communism, the decline of all non-Communist societies and the

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expansion of the Communist sphere of power, makes it very difficult to press Moscow to examine Stalin's still unquestioned prediction that sooner or later Germany will fall like a ripe fruit into the hands of Communism.

To capitulate before the difficulties would be folly and disaster. It is possible for the democratic forces of Germany to make the Soviets aware of the realities of German life and prove that their view of Germany is false. That might lead to a reassessment of the German situation by Moscow, similar to Khrushchev's reassessment of Russian internal life. The first thing that must be demonstrated to the Soviet is that the East German population will not endure the imposition of the Soviet regime by force too much longer. This is something that the East Germans themselves must demonstrate. They have displayed remarkable courage, will and readiness to sacrifice. However, they need the encouragement and solidarity of the German Federal Republic and its Western allies. "Capitalists" from the Federal Republic as well as those from other Western countries who, for the sake of their profits get involved in liaisons with the SED regime, political delegations which visit the overseers of the alien Communist regime in the name of "friendship" and "equality," act as strikebreakers. They discourage the East German people and give prestige to the regime.

Second, it must be proved to the Soviets that the Federal Republic is solidly established as a social, constitutional state and that the democratic forces are capable of a united all-German policy, as well as an active East German policy; most important, that the democratic social order is impervious to Communist infiltration and subversion.

Third, we must prove that it is impossible to separate the German Federal Republic from its friends in the West or identify it with the Nazi-fascism of the past. This must also be the concern of the German people and their friends abroad.

When we succeed in demonstrating all of this as indisputable and unchanging reality, the moment will have arrived for the Soviet regime to examine the "German question" realistically; to reassess the GDR and the leadership of the "Ulbricht group" which has contributed one defeat after another to international Communism.

Translated from the German by Richard Schoen

STEPHAN G. THOMAS *is chairman of the East Bureau of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.*



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Eric Heffer

Prospects Bright For British Labor Party

I HAVE HELD UP this letter pending clarification of the issue of the Parliamentary Labour Party leadership following the death of Hugh Gaitskell. Of three candidates for Gaitskell's position in the Party—Harold Wilson, George Brown and James Callaghan—Wilson, the winner, is undoubtedly the most popular among the Party rank and file. A former Bevanite, Wilson has not been closely identified with the Left Wing of the Party for some years. His position is now left of center. On the other hand, George Brown, who never made any secret of his affinity for the Party's Right Wing, firmly supported Gaitskell except on the Common Market issue. Brown favors entry, while Gaitskell's position was basically one of opposition. Brown is undoubtedly a courageous man, openly fighting for his beliefs. However, over the years, he has built a public image as an overly impetuous man; even many of his friends feared he would damage the Party in the eyes of the general public. Some Right Wingers, disturbed by Brown's public image, and the possibility of an open brawl in the Party, decided to nominate the more moderate James Callaghan. But Callaghan is not too popular with the rank and file. At last year's Party Conference, he lost his seat on the National Executive Committee of the Party to the more popular Centrist, Anthony Wedgewood-Benn (now Lord Stangate). Had the Right Wing agreed on one nomination, they may well have won the contest.

What sort of man is Harold Wilson? The press portrays him as an enigmatic figure: the cat who walks alone; the slippery professional politician who waits on the sidelines to see which way the majority is going before making a pronouncement. This is, of course, only partly true. It must never be forgotten that Wilson resigned a Cabinet post, together with Aneurin Bevan, when, in fact, had he remained in the Government he could have gained great personal advantage. He stood against Hugh Gaitskell after the 1960 Scarborough Conference for the leadership of the Parliamentary Party. At that time, Wilson accused Gaitskell of creating disunity in the Party, by refusing to accept the Conference decision on the H Bomb. Wilson made it clear that, although opposed to Britain having an independent nuclear deterrent, he was not a unilateralist. However, he argued that a Party Conference decision should not be flouted. (Eventually, Gaitskell's own position veered sufficiently to embrace opposition to the independent nuclear deterrent. This fact, more than any other, created the subsequent unity within the Party.)

Wilson has never at any time moved from his adhence to the famous Clause 4 in the Party's Constitution: "To secure for the workers by hand or brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service." Wilson, then, is not a revisionist. On the contrary, he has always opposed any revision of the Party's basic socialist beliefs and the flexibility of which he is legitimately accused is not over fundamentals. In the House of Commons, on February 18, he was challenged by Gerald Nabarro, a dyed-in-the-wool Tory M.P., who demanded to know if Wilson believed in extending nationalization. Wilson's answer was to reiterate his fealty to Clause 4 as did the entire Party. This may have caused some dismay among certain Right Wing Labour M.P.'s but could only be greeted with great enthusiasm in the country, especially among the rank and file Party members. It is this kind of forthright declaration on basic principles that will rally the membership, assuring La-

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bour a wide margin of victory after the General Election.

Wilson's path will not be roses all the way. The position of George Brown has not yet been defined. After the election, he said he wanted a few days to consider his position. Under pressure from Right Wing friends, he finally decied to continue as Deputy Leader. He did want the position of Shadow Foreign Minister, but Harold Wilson was not prepared to grant him this, giving the post to Patrick Gordon Walker instead. Most of the Front Bench of the Labour Party (that is the Shadow Cabinet) are known to have opposed Wilson's election. However, now that a General Election is approaching with the promise of political power, it is not likely that any of them would rock the boat. Indeed, some will become Wilson's lieutenants, hoping for political office once a Labour Government is formed. This point is very important, because while the Front Bench members are elected to do certain jobs when in opposition, there is no guarantee that the Labour Prime Minister will automatically select them for ministerial positions in a future Labour Government. That is why the position of Labour leader is so important, especially prior to a General Election.

Wilson is no neutralist. He will continue to support NATO while opposing Britain's independent nuclear deterrent, proposing that Britain's future contribution to NATO should be more in the form of conventional weapons and forces. He has consistently opposed Britain's entry into the Common Market. Without changes in the European Economic Community. Britain, as a member, he argues, could not fully plan her economy and socialism would be stifled.

WILL LABOUR GET POWER and Wilson enter 10 Downing Street as Premier? It looks almost certain. The stock of the Government has never been lower. At the time of writing there are approximately 900,000 unemployed, the highest figure since 1947. The Government has introduced a pay pause; the balance of payments trade gap has increased and efforts to get into the European Economic Community ended in a fiasco. Successive Defense Ministers announced a costly abandonment of a particular nuclear missile, and now Britain has finally settled for the Polaris weapon which means complete reliance on U.S. policies. In 1962, even safe Tory seats went down before the rising tide of opposition.

There has been much speculation about an early General Election. Macmillan himself had hinted of this. However, on the basis of a speech on February 16, to a Young Conservative rally in London, it would appear that any early plans have been abandoned. From the Tory point of view, this is good sense. To chance an election now would be committing political suicide. The election will probably be held either in late Spring or early Summer 1964; constitutionally, it must be declared prior to October of that year. Despite efforts that will be made to improve the economic situation, and with it the unemployment problem—which will be partially successful—Labour will probably win. The growing mood in the country is for a change. The atmosphere of political ferment (not organized, but present) among the people is reminiscent of the pre-1945 days.

The Liberals (and here I may be sticking my neck out) will not gain many, if any, seats. They have sought to win over traditional Labour areas,

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without any great success. Where they have gained spectacularly has been at the expense of the Conservatives. The working class, particularly trade unionists, has remained with Labour. The middle-of-the-road policies of the Liberals, changing with each new development, have little appeal for the workers who appreciate the more clearly defined policies of the two major parties. My guess is that many who voted Liberal in the by-elections, will vote either Conservative or Labour in a General Election, knowing that it is only from one or the other of these parties that a Government can be formed. Third party politics in Britain are not as difficult as in the U.S., but to some extent, similar factors operate.

It has been suggested that the death of Hugh Gaitskell will have an adverse effect on Labour's chances. Certainly, Gaitskell had developed in stature in the last year or so, and his loss at this time harmed the national image of the Party, but the harm could not be decisive. Despite all the talk of the difficulties in replacing Gaitskell, he has been replaced. It is now admitted by the pundits that Wilson is just as experienced, if not more so, that his academic qualifications are even greater than Gaitskell's, that his judgment is sound and that he is not given to rash and stupid actions. History may yet decide that the man in the shadows will prove himself one of the great reformers of the British political scene, and, more important, of the British political system.

The Conservatives are also going through a leadership crisis. Increasingly, Tory M.P.'s are growling about Macmillan's Premiership. His wholesale dismissal of old friends has caused much discontent, especially since the reshuffling has not produced results. Indeed, the situation has worsened for the Tories. Voices are now heard in upper and lower Party echelons, calling upon Macmillan to defer to a younger man. The difference between Labour and the Conservatives in choosing a leader is that where Labour *elects* its leader, the Tory Party plays hide-and-seek, maneuvers and ultimately *selects* the man who can promise the most. As Harold Wilson said in the House of Commons when heckled about an earlier election, the Tories could not expect to understand the working of democracy; it would be like trying to explain the principles of vegetarianism to a tribe of cannibals.

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Ben Bella Takes Over the Unions

Francis Roy

IN MARCH 1956, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) organized the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algerians (UGTA) to counter the labor organization created a month earlier by its Messalist adversaries [followers of Messali Hadj—tr.]. The UGTA was established on Algerian territory only since the leaders of the FLN advised their adherents in France to remain in French unions. This obviously hindered the development of the UGTA, for what progress could the union struggle make in an Algeria fighting against an army of 700,000 men? As a result the organization had a number of leaders but no mass base.

With Algerian independence (July 1, 1962) the UGTA leadership hastened to create union branches wherever it could. The political crisis which rav-

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aged the FLN and Algeria in July, August and September 1962, facilitated this work by postponing the inevitable moment when the party would resume control of the union organization. During the power struggle between Ben Bella and his opponents, the UGTA did not take a stand in favor of any one group, a position which gained it the lasting enmity of the Political Bureau and its two heads, Ben Bella and Khidder.

Once their power was secured, the Ben Bellists undertook to bring into line all the active elements which were independent of the party, undermining the remaining military autonomy of the Willayas 3 and 4, then suppressing rival political groupings (declaring the Communist Party illegal, tracking down the militants of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, etc.) and disbanding the Union of Algerian Women. There remained only the union.

THE UGTA HELD ITS first convention from January 17–20 of this year. On January 22, for the first time since independence, a French minister, M. de Broglie, visited Algeria at the invitation of the Ben Bella government. The same day, the spokesmen of two large oil trusts (CNP and SN Repal) held a press conference during which they declared themselves "satisfied with the normalization of the conditions of production." The timing of the three events is not accidental; the first determined the other two.

The attitude of the union during the political crisis led to considerable friction between the Political Bureau of the FLN and the UGTA. Thus, issue No. 3 of *L'Ouvrier Algerien* published on November 1, the anniversary of the Algerian revolution, was seized by the government because of an article entitled, "The UGTA Confronts the Party." The article contained nothing "subversive" but held that the union had the right to determine freely its attitude toward the party. That was too much.

The FLN leaders could not, however, attack the union too vigorously without legal cover, i.e. the endorsement of a convention. They, therefore, began to negotiate with the UGTA on holding a "regular" convention as soon as possible. They signed liberal agreements with the leadership of the UGTA: the agreement of December 20, 1962 signed by the Political Bureau and the UGTA stipulates that "the workers [may] hold their meetings and organize their convention freely." The UGTA wanted to prepare the convention for the Easter holiday 1963. The Political Bureau, on the other hand, had no intention, whatsoever, of allowing a prepared convention; it therefore selected January 17, 1963 as the convention date and decided to create a preliminary organization committee for the convention, directed by a member of the Political Bureau, Benghazi. This committee worked on printing delegates' credentials which were distributed to people more than half of whom, according to the UGTA leadership, never participated in union activities.

ON JANUARY 17, the convention opened with an address by Ben Bella setting the tone.

> In the country's interest, during its constructive phase, there must be absolutely only one line of political thought. It is the Party which should determine the political thinking of the country... Political unity necessarily implies that all Algerian organizations, and particularly the unions, submit to national discipline. One must guard against certain temptations which exist in Africa, namely: Idealization of the Worker. The convention will have achieved its purpose if in its future sessions 80% of the delegates will be wearing turbans, that is to say, will be peasants.

On the afternoon of the following day, after the "delegates" from the Political Bureau had completed their litany of formalities, the convention got off to an abrupt start with the speech of Tahar Gaid, Secretary of

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the Federation of Postal Workers. He declared: "In Algeria, 200,000 Algerians live better than the average Frenchman, almost a million, like the unskilled laborer, and the rest of the population live in complete misery. Therefore, the job of union organization is to further the construction of a planned socialist economy." Affirming the necessity of union democracy, Tahar Gaid denounced the false unionists who were trying to capture the union—a remark which caused a stir through the hall. When calm was restored, he launched a more serious charge: the Algerian government had tried to buy the union leaders (and had been refused), using funds advanced for "equipment" by French imperialism. Such maneuvers are among the classical methods of the "revolutionary" countries of Africa and Asia to neutralize opposition from the left and, at the same time, establish a small layer of parasitic and docile functionaries:

> The leaders of the UGTA refused positions which had been offered them in the Administration or the Ministries which would have payed 250,000 or more francs a month, choosing to remain instead at their 1954 salaries ...

Tahar Gaid was followed by representatives of the federations of Social Insurance, metallurgy, railroad workers, who largely supported his point of view.

At 6 A.M. on January 19, the Political Bureau's planted delegates took seats in the convention hall. A new chairman and staff graced the platform, appointed no one knew by whom ... This first *coup de force* was denounced by a delegate, Deckar, who shouted above the tumult: "It's an attempt to finish off the UGTA with a single blow. You think you have won, but the last card hasn't been played yet."

The first assault, apparently insufficient, was followed by a second during the noon hour, when the UGTA leaders remained in the convention hall, despite the efforts of government agents to make them leave. The Ben Bellists gathered large numbers of unemployed from the poor sections of Algiers and poured them by the hundreds into the convention hall where they shouted down the "former" leadership of the UGTA and forced them by threats to leave the platform. The militants of the UGTA then distributed a tract denouncing the parody of the morning session and "the masquerade which followed it." Nothing more could be done. The convention was finished.

AN INCIDENT TO SHOW how rapidly the situation evolved: the afternoon of that same day, the secretary of the civil aviation union was booed by the government's men because he cried out: "I don't belong to either one of the two factions." While Omar, a leading member of the "minority" was held illegally to prevent him from coming to the convention, the general secretary of the UGTA, very recently swung over to the government (officially since the day before), explained that his comrades were mistaken but sincere revolutionaries. Thereupon, Khidder, who was present since that morning, rose and declared: "These are leftist counter-revolutionaries whose actions are counter-revolutionary." And Ben Bella added: "Experience has shown that one can be sincere and take a counter-revolutionary position."

A third confederate of the Political Bureau, Rabah Bitat, summarized the outcome: "The UGTA has become, under the aegis of the party, the FLN, one of its national organizations." Thus, in three days, Ben Bella completely integrated the unions into the state, by depriving them of autonomy. (In France, General de Gaulle is pursuing the same aim: to integrate the unions into the state apparatus, as every Bonapartist regime has sought to do. Two days after the UGTA "convention," Ben Bella declared:

> Under the impetus of General de Gaulle, France knows a political stability and an upswing in all domains which enables it serenely to

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face the tasks which await it in a world in rapid evolution.

The Algerian government now has no further obstacle to the imposition of its political thinking and policies.

On January 22, Mr. de Broglie, Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs, landed at Algiers, and the same day Ben Bella affirmed that "Algeria and France will travel the road to the future together." Certainly, Gaullist France and Ben Bellist Algeria make a fine pair.

Changes in Russia's Economy and Party

Bruno Kalnins

THE NOVEMBER 1962 PLENUM of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decided upon a basic reorganization of the Party. This decision was a conditioned reflex to a long speech by Nikita Khrushchev who also explained that the reorganization plan had already been worked out by the Presidium of the Central Committee. During the four-day "debate" all the Party first secretaries of the 15 Union Republics took the floor and announced that the plan had also been previously discussed and approved by their Central Committees, as well, and reported on the way the reorganization would be carried out in their Republics. Thus, everything had actually been prepared in advance of the Moscow Plenum. All the speakers, of course, supported the Presidium's reorganization plan, expressing their "heartfelt thanks to Nikita Sergeyevich" for his brilliantly conceived reforms.

In January and February 1963, local and regional conferences are taking place throughout the country to reorganize the Party according to Khrushchev's plan and at the highest Party levels new leaders are being chosen and new institutions organized. The Komsomol (the Party youth section) and the trade unions have reported that their structure will conform to that of the reorganized Party.

How is the new structure of the Party to be viewed? Briefly: the membership is to be divided into *two* independent organizations. One is to take in all Party members who work in *industry,* the other, those who work in *agriculture.*

In its industry based section, Communists in a factory or institution comprise the basic unit of the Party organized on a city-wide scale and directed by a City Committee (Gorkom). In large cities, however, where there are more than one raion [County would be the American equivalent —Ed.] organization for the different parts of the city, the present City Committees will be dissolved and the raion committees will be subordinate to the larger Regional [or Provincial] Committee (Obkom).

In this manner, the Regional Committee is to become the most important Party institution on the Regional level for Party members in industry and it will direct all industrial production within the Region. There are to be some one hundred such Regional Committees in the entire Soviet Union, 45 of them in the Russian Republic alone.

The agricultural based sections of the Party will have, as formerly, their basic units in the Collectives (Kolkhozes) and State farms (Sovkhozes), as well as in the agricultural schools and supply centers. Directly above in the agricultural Party hierarchy are the Party committees in territorial "production administrations" of the Sovkhozes and Kolkhozes. These Administrations were set up some months ago. Now it has been decided to enlarge significantly their jurisdiction, substituting their authority for that formerly held by the rural raions. Most rural raion committees have now been dissolved. In the Russian Republic, for example, 1,957 rural raions became 965 production administrations. For each production administration, there is a corresponding Party com-

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mittee with jurisdiction not only of Party units in the countryside, but of all agricultural production in the administrative area, as well.

The Party committees of the territorial production administrations are subordinate to the next Party level, the agricultural Regional Committee.

Thus in almost all Regions of the Soviet Union there will be *two* Regional Committees: one for the Party organization in industry, the other for the organization in agriculture. There will be no common Party committees on the local and regional level.

On the next level of the Party pyramid are two bureaus in each of the 15 Union Republics. One is to direct industry, the other, agriculture. A Secretary of the Party Central Committee of a Union Republic will be placed at the head of the two bureaus. Higher yet, is the Presidium of the Union Republic's Central Committee and its First Secretary coordinating the activity of the two bureaus and dealing with general problems in the Union Republic.

At the Party pinnacle in Moscow, similar organizational changes have been carried out. Even in the Presidium of the Central Committee, two new bureaus have been organized; a Central Committee for Industry and Construction, headed by A. P. Rudakov, and a Central Committee for Agriculture with V. I. Polyakov at its head.

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY along production lines signifies a complete division within the Party which henceforth will have a leadership in common only at the top in the provincial Republic Parties and in the Central Committee in Moscow. This is completely novel in the history of Russian Communism. This division can in time sharpen inner contradictions, since on most concrete questions the interests of the Communists in industry conflict with the interests of Communists in agriculture.

This drastic and fantastic change was executed from above without regard for Party statutes which had just been revised last year. The new Party structure is not provided for by those statutes and only a Party Cognress has the right to amend them. Such a Congress was not called into being. Khrushchev simply disregarded the statutes and permitted the Central Committee to decide the organizational reform. The much-praised "internal Party legality" of the post-Stalin years is still in a bad way.

What motivated Khrushchev in dictating the changes in Party structure was, first of all, the necessity to increase production in industry and agriculture; the belief that economic shortages could be eliminated only by strengthened and more direct Party control over the Soviet economy. The reform also seems to have a political end. Khrushchev is trying to bring younger Party functionaries who are his followers and also experts in their fields into the new bureaus and committees. Thus, not only a new generation is brought into the Party apparatus, but the older pro-Stalinist apparatus men are removed to make way for Communists, untarnished by participation in the Stalin terror. In this respect, the reorganization is a further step in destalinization.

At the same time, similar organizational reforms took place in the Komsomol and the trade unions. The radical breakdown of the trade union structure is especially important.

The trade unions today have a membership of 66 million. Of these, 40 million work in industry, transport and contruction, and 10 million in agriculture. And now, with the Party as model, an organizational bisection is also taking place in the unions. In the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions in Moscow and in Councils in all 15 Union Republics *two* bureaus are formed: one for industrial, another for agricultural unions. In 74 Regions (out of a total of 116) two completely independent regional trade union councils have also arisen: an industrial trade union economic council and an agricultural trade union economic council.

A NEW, VERY IMPORTANT, organ of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Council of Ministers of the Government, the Committee for Party

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and State Control, has been created. The Party Secretary and former Chief of the State Security Committee (KGB), A. N. Schelepin, was named Chairman of this new super-bureaucratic central body. At the same time, he was promoted to Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers while still holding his job as one of the present twelve Secretaries of the Central Committee. This is the first case in the history of the Soviet Union of a Party Secretary holding a high state office at the same time. Here is an important break with tradition.

Similarly, a completely new organ has been created on the all-Soviet level for coordinating current economic planning: the Economic Council of the USSR. This new central body is to direct the Republic and Regional Economic Councils (Sovnarkhozes) which were formed in 1957. Up to now, they numbered 104; they are to be reduced to 60. This return to centralization markes a further strong retreat from the economic decentralization of 1957. The Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, W. E. Dymschiz, was named Chairman of the new Central Economic Council in Moscow. Also the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was completely reorganized. In contrast to the current economic questions, with which the Economic Council is to concern itself, the new Gosplan works only on planning in perspective for the future. The Chairman of the Gosplan will be P. F. Lomako, a former high Party bureaucrat.

Another transformation in the top economic bureaucracy is the reorganization of the State Committee for Construction in the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at whose head will be another Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, L. T. Novikov. And four other new State Committees have been created in the Council of Ministers in Moscow: for the electrotechnical industry, light industry, food industry and commerce. In recent years, there have been no central ministries in Moscow for these sections of the economy, their control having been left, in the wake of decentralization, to those ministries in the Union Republics directly concerned. Now, once more, new centralized positions are being created which will oversee the corresponding provincial ministries.

IN THE WAKE of the present strengthened central bureaucratization of the regime, the number of Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers has grown from 6 to 9. Including the two first deputies, A. N. Kosygin and A. I. Mikoyan, Khrushchev now has ten Deputy Chairmen, more than any head of the Soviet government up to now!

The government itself again has, as in Stalin's time, an incredible number of members, consisting presently of one Chairman, ten Deputy Chairmen, 15 Ministers, 31 heads of various state committees and 15 Chairmen of Councils of Ministers of the all-Union Republics. Khrushchev's mammoth government consists of 71 members in all, at the present time.

At the same time as it strengthened Party control and centralization of the economy, the Party Plenum and the Supreme Soviet discussed expanding the rights of local economic councils and factory directors.

Until now, nothing has actually been done in this area. Probably the jurisdiction of the Economic Councils of the Union Republics and Regions will be somewhat increased where practical current planning is concerned. This will, however, be of little significance since their number has been reduced by half, and the smaller Republics will apparently be controlled by the new Central Economic Council in Moscow.

It was to be expected that the two Congresses would adopt Professor Liberman's position on the reorganization plans. Liberman had suggested enlarging the rights of factory management, its release from the guardianship of central authority, the transition to a profit economy with genuine economically based prices of commodities. Liberman's plans were heatedly discussed for more than two months in the Soviet press and in various conventions of economic experts. It

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seems as though the Party Presidium which in the Fall, looked kindly upon Liberman's proposals, *suddenly* changed its attitude. The debate was broken off without any explanation. The plan, and other proposals raised in the discussion, have been turned over to the Academy of Sciences and to the Gosplan "for careful consideration." It is possible that Liberman's proposals will be interred there. In any case, everything that was determined in the November and December Congresses runs counter to Liberman's concepts.

The Party Plenum nevertheless determined to work out a special "Law of Socialist Industry" to increase somewhat the rights of factory management that might include some of Liberman's proposals. But in its December Congress, the Supreme Soviet adopted no such law.

THIS IS THE FOURTH REORGANIZATION of the Soviet economy in the ten years since Stalin's death. In 1953, the number of central ministries of the economy was radically reduced. In 1955–56, thousands of large enterprises were taken out of the jurisdiction of the Moscow government and placed under Union Republic and Regional authority. There followed, in 1957, the formation of local economic councils and the much-lauded decentralization of economic management.

By 1960, it was already apparent to the Party leadership that none of the three reorganizations had achieved the desired results. In the Summer of 1960, most of the decentralization was done away with, as the Republic and Regional economic councils lost many of their tasks to the central bodies in Moscow. Little mention of this was made in the Soviet press, but it was a fact.

However, this return to centralization did not help; it provided no way out. The lag in industrial and agricultural production, in terms of Khrushchev's proclaimed goals, became increasingly apparent, obliging the Party Presidium to seek new reforms.

The present reorganization means, on the whole, a further return to centralization that will increase bureaucratic confusion and promote a jurisdictional muddle of the many central bodies. At the same time, there is an unprecedented fusion of Party, State and economic authorities in contrast to their strict separation that has existed since Lenin's time. Thus, an important principle of Marxism-Leninism is, in fact, done away with. The Communist Party is not merely a "guiding force of Soviet society" as depicted in all the literature up to now, but the immediate authority over the economy, directly responsible for everything that happens in industry and agriculture.

The aim of the latest reform—to accelerate the development of the Soviet economy—cannot be achieved by the new reorganization. The economy will be made neither more efficient nor more versatile. For the Party apparatus to administer the economy is in obvious conflict with everything that we know of in the West as modern economic methods. The Soviet economy needs no new Party fetters, but the reverse: a radical liberation from Moscow and Party control. The factories must finally become independent in fact. And the basic reason for the agricultural difficulties is and remains the collectivization; without the abolition of the Kolkhozes there can be no upswing in Soviet agriculture. Here, Poland and Yugoslavia have shown the way.

Under such circumstances it is to be expected that the present reorganization will not be the last. As with Khrushchev's previous economic reforms, this one will soon need revision.

Translated from the German by Richard Schoen

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CORRESPONDENCE

Controversy Over Article on C. P. Snow

To the Editor:

Albert Fried basis his whole criticism of C. P. Snow on two very short books—no more than essays, in fact, as Mr. Fried points out. It might be argued that all of the ideas Sir Charles develops in his novels and elsewhere can be found in *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* and *Science and Government,* but *The Two Cultures,* at least, really addresses only a very limited problem: higher (scientific *and* humanistic) education in England. And in *Science and Government,* where he considers a more general problem (the nature of "open" and "closed" politics), Sir Charles is careful to point out that his experience has been with British politics, although he believes that "closed" politics works the same in the East and the West.

In fact, Snow is careful to qualify almost everything he says; it is just this paradoxical combination of extreme diffidence and unbridled self-confidence that makes Snow's style of delivery so annoying to many people. I can sympathize with Mr. Fried's exasperation when he complains that it is as though Snow were talking informally to colleagues at Cambridge High Table, but I cannot excuse him for distorting Snow's ideas by omitting the qualifications. Every quotation from *The Two Cultures* that Mr. Fried adduces in order to prove that Snow "is convinced that scientists deserve to be the governing elite" is accurately given, but every one of them is followed in *The Two Cultures* by passages, sometimes rather lengthy, that give a very different meaning to the quoted passages from Mr. Fried's. As far as I can tell, Snow is convinced of nothing of the sort.

* See, "Scientific Culture of C. P. Snow," Albert Fried, NEW POLITICS, Vol. I, No. 4.

But Mr. Fried is exercised over many ideas he attributes to Snow that I simply can't find in the two books. Sir Charles has been criticized for his lack of knowledge of the Soviet literary scene—quite properly it seems—but Mr. Fried's discussion after the excerpt from *The Two Cultures* is ridiculous. Sir Charles means what he says—that Soviet novelists can assume in their audience a rudimentary knowledge of what industry is all about. He doesn't say the novelists express the feelings of Russian society, he doesn't praise a hack novelist for writing favorably about science; why all the hysteria? And if Snow has said that the Soviet Union is the scientific society par excellence, as Mr. Fried claims, I'd like to know where.

When it comes to *Science and Government,* Mr. Fried's understanding is even more faulty, if possible. He says that Snow is persuaded that the temperament and morality of scientists specially equip them to make political decisions. In the first place, Sir Charles is very specifically talking about political decisions pertaining to *scientific* matters, in particular, military science. He warns against having a solitary scientific overlord. He says that there is a kind of scientist to whom no power at all ought to be given. (He means Lindemann here. Even if Sir Charles is wrong in his conclusion, his statement shows how wrong it is of Mr. Fried to write as if scientists formed a homogeneous class.) He says that scientists, especially young ones, often make poor administrators—and at the levels Sir Charles is discussing, administrators make policy decisions. Once again he means what he says: that we need scientists when it comes to making certain decisions, and we had better get the right scientists.

It is no wonder Mr. Fried gets such

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wrong notions about Snow's ideas, since he garbles the saturation bombing story so badly. Besides his inept summary, which is misleading enough, Mr. Fried comes to the wrong conclusion. The facts are that aside from the question of human decency involved (and Snow makes Tizard's feelings on this explicit), Tizard and P. M. S. Blackett independently came to the conclusions that Lindemann's estimate of the expected number of casualties was five (Tizard) or six (Blackett) times too high. A study after the war showed that Lindemann's figure was ten times too high. The scientific discipline involved here is operational research (in which Blackett pioneered); Lindemann's calculations were wrong, because he had made faulty assumptions and had omitted essential considerations; Tizard's and Blackett's were scientifically correct (that is, they had predicted the right "order of magnitude"). The bad *political* decision was the result of accepting bad (or wrong) science. This is all made very explicit in the Appendix to *Science and Government* (published as a separate pamphlet, and included in the Mentor edition). If Mr. Fried had not been in such a hurry to get his wrong-headed moralizing in print, he might have had time to read the Appendix.

Obviously, C. P. Snow's ideas are open to criticism—they must be: everybody is furnishing it. With regard to *Science and Government,* I for one prefer to take the word of R. H. S. Crossman, who not only approved of the book in his review in *Encounter* but also saw in it a valuable lesson for socialists, than to take the word of Mr. Fried, who doesn't even understand what the book says. Mr. Fried's article seems to me to be one more example of the annoying tendency of the left to single out as its real enemies not the Russian power elite, nor our own military, nor big business reactionaries, nor the segregationist office-holders in the South, but the likes of Sidney Hook, The Congress for Cultural Freedom, and—C. P. Snow.

JEROME S. SHIPMAN

Mr. Fried Replies:

Mr. Shipman's patronizing and offensive letter is hard to answer. Shall I insist that I *do* understand Snow, that my "notions" are not "wrong," "misleading," "garbled," or "ridiculous?" I wonder why Mr. Shipman bothered to write the letter.

He leaves no doubt that *he* at least understands Snow. This is strange in view of his own admission that Snow "is careful to qualify almost everything he says," that Snow's "style of delivery" is a "paradoxical combination of extreme diffidence and unbridled self-confidence." One would think, given these difficulties, that Mr. Shipman would have learned from Snow and tempered his own self-confidence with a little diffidence.

Mr. Shipman asserts that Snow qualifies each of the passages I quoted in my article and that these qualifications "give a very different meaning" than the one I gave. It is too bad Mr. Shipman does not submit any of them to the reader's judgment. I have read *The Two Cultures* many times and have failed to find any such qualifications.

Mr. Shipman is being sophomoric in asking where Snow explicitly said that Soviet Russia is the scientific society par excellence. I never suggested that he "said" it. My point was that he meant it. Snow measures England and Russia by the standard of scientific progress. England is still ruled by literary culture and has fallen far behind. Russia has raised scientific culture to preeminence and now has an increasing advantage over the West. This, I thought, was what Snow meant.

On the matter of Soviet literature I criticized Snow precisely because he was content to say *only* that Soviet novelists "assume in their audience a rudmentary knowledge of what industry is all about." It is what Snow omitted from his discussion that is significant. Is knowledge of industry the essential thing in the Soviet novel? What is the quality of the novel? Who is the novelist? Snow fails entirely to deal with these questions in the course of applauding Russia's integration of the two cultures.

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Mr. Shipman finds my understanding of *Science and Government* to be "even more faulty, if possible." Happily I am not alone in my fault. So many criticisms of *Science and Government* have been made, so many people have misunderstood it, that Snow has had to write an Appendix, two-thirds the length of the original essay, answering his critics. (I did not consult the Appendix because the Mentor edition of *Science and Government,* which includes it, came out long after I wrote the article; it was not because I hurried [how would Mr. Shipman know?] "to get my wrong-headed moralizing into print.")

The Appendix qualifies the life out of the essay. In the essay Snow writes: "Scientists have it within them to know what a future-directed society feels like, for science itself, in its human aspect, is just that. That is my deeper reason for wanting scientists in government." In the Appendix he writes: "If you are going to have a scientist in a position of isolated power, the only scientist among non-scientists, it is dangerous when he has bad judgment." Who would quarrel with that empty truism?

My point in the article was that Snow gives scientists a privileged moral status which his example of the Lindemann-Tizwell controversy refutes. Lindemann and Tizwell were scientists involved in a political decision; their political, not their scientific, attitudes determined their decision. Mr. Shipman asserts that "The bad *political* decision was the result of accepting bad (or wrong) science." Of course there is no such thing as bad or wrong science. Political decision-makers will have the science they prefer. The scientist's task, qua scientist, is to determine whether the means are adequate to the ends that have been laid down for him. The scientist who enters the kingdom of ends leaves behind his science.

The last paragraph of Mr. Shipman's letter comes out of left field. The only thing it has in common with the rest is a certain tone of contempt. Why does he think he has to choose between "socialists"—R. H. S. Crossman or me? Besides is he certain that I am a socialist? And if he is certain does he know what kind? Except in the broadest sense there is nothing in my article to suggest my politics—not that it is a secret, only irrelevant. Mr. Shipman's last sentence joins ignorance to bad taste and is better left unanswered.

Objects to Review

To the Editor:

When the *National Review* attacked my book on the Spanish Civil War, I was neither surprised nor anxious to answer. The review in *New Politics* did very much surprise me. I should like a chance to reply briefly.

Two minor points. It is not correct to say that I pay close attention to the "academic view" of the political spectrum of the thirties. I pay attention to the political spectrum itself. If my analysis is academic, no wonder—I'm an academic. And it is incorrect to say that the book terminates with Hemingway and the dilemma of primitivism and progress. The text ends with a 10-page epilogue and conclusion, in which I attempt to say again what was implicit for most readers throughout the entire book: namely, our policy was mistaken. We should have lifted the embargo and aided the Republic.

A major point. Your reviewer calls me effete because I do not expose escapism, specifically the escapism of the romantic view of Spain. In the first place, the "romantic" view wasn't escapist. Those I discuss in the chapter referred to were almost all active partisans of the Republic. Secondly, American policy failed because of the *liberal* view and its limitations. See pp. 115–121. If your reviewer were more sensitive to irony, to tone, to implication, *and* to direct statements, he would have discovered that the book *is* an attack on the liberal position. If effeteness is the liberal's vice, a tendency to shrill polemic is the socialist's.

Let me also recommend a collection of materials on the American embargo

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and the Spanish war, soon to be published by D. C. Heath for the Amherst series. The collection, which I edit, includes an ardent lecture in which I denounce American policy. I trust this will cheer your reviewer; I hope he'll not be irritated that I reprint a colleague of mine as representative of the opposing position.

ALLEN GUTTMANN
Amherst College

The Value of Freedom

To the Editor:

With a certain fifteen year-old whom I know everything is "neat," from a favorite story to her kitten's eyes. She uses the word with such relish, because it is popular among her associates.

How we make words *change*, to serve and satisfy our needs.

It is Christmas now, birth of The Prince of Peace, and we celebrate with a HULLABALOO, while the word *peace* is fast becoming taboo—(you might get called before a committee).

The most popular word in the air today is *freedom*. Hardly any "right sort" of person can open his mouth without uttering it.

Well, what does it mean?

When is one free, and when is one not free?

Those who are locked up in prisons are not free.

And no slave is free, regardless of to whom or to what he is enslaved.

There have been whole ages when no one was free, the Dark Ages, when no mind dared deviate from what the Church said "think." Many in prisons today are more free than were these.

Looking closely, one sees that bondage is not so much a matter of bars and chains, as it is a matter of restrictions upon the mind, of compressions about the soul.

Seeing that the populace of whole nations can lose their freedom, with only a handful of the inhabitants being aware of what is happening, and that millions can live for ages in stagnant servitude without knowing or understanding the tragic pity of their plight, one comes to know that freedom must be defended, first for the intellect. For without freedom of mind all other so-called freedoms are dross.

ANNELLE EASLIC

Good for Our Morale

To the Editor:

I want to commend you on your coverage of the Cuba crisis. You've managed to present a real diversity of points of view on the question of U.S. policy. I consider this not only an editorial achievement of rank, but a sign of moral and political vigor.

Of all the articles on the Cuba question, I think Hal Draper's is the best. I am completely in sympathy with his stand, and I share his anger.

Enclosed is a small donation to further your efforts.

HORST BRAND

To the Editor:

Congratulations on the wonderful articles you are printing which should help to prevent war. Promoting Enduring Peace believes that face-to-face contacts are also important. Next summer, leaving New York on July 7th, we are conducting two non-profit International Goodwill Seminars abroad. One tour is under the direction of the noted expert, Karl Baehr, and goes to Egypt, the West African countries, to Israel, Lebanon and Greece. The other goes to Scandinavia, Russia, taking in the major cities including Turkestan, and also goes to England and France. Anyone interested should write to me and I will send full details.

JEROME DAVIS,
489 Ocean Avenue,
West Haven, Conn.

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Book Notes

The Corrupt Judge: An Inquiry into Bribery and Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors in the Federal Courts. By Joseph Borkin. Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., New York, 1962. 310 pp. $6.

This is an exciting foray into that area in which legal "justice" and bourgeois profiteering collide. Joseph Borkin presents studies in depth of three Federal judges who became corrupt—and attempts to show both why they did and how they operated. In doing so he offers one of the few serious studies (neither "sensational" nor platitudinous) of the corruption problem in the Federal courts.

He delimits his field sharply. He pays no attention to corrupt State judges (who, after all, are numerous beyond counting) and concentrates instead upon two Federal Circuit Judges (Martin T. Manton of the Second Circuit and J. Warren Davis of the Third) and one Federal District Judge (Albert W. Johnson) who resigned from the Bench, faced with impeachment, in 1939, 1941 and 1945 respectively. Two of these, at least, are well-chosen. Johnson seems to have been included for comic relief but the others are the stuff of which high tragedy is made. Before their fall, Manton and Davis were among the brightest and most influential stars in the Federal appellate judiciary. Both became corrupt in the early thirties but were not exposed until 1939. Their tragedies, sketched with lucidity and insight, give Borkin's book its excitement and its social importance.

The Manton and Davis stories fit a common pattern. Its motif is three-pronged: each judge was financially ruined by the 1929 crash; each played an at least suspicious role in bankruptcy proceedings involving the movie magnate, William Fox; and each subsequently received large bribes in connection with certain major patent litigations between 1932 and 1939 The first of these three prongs provides motivational background, or a view of what set the judges up for corruption, and the second a glimpse of a field (bankruptcy proceedings) in which comparatively small-scale corruption has been notoriously rampant. But the third is what "makes" the Manton and Davis stories, for it was this aspect of their lives that involved them in the monopolizing struggles of giant capitalist corporations. But for such involvement, their corruption would have been of no world-historical import and would probably never have been detected.

Borkin's conclusions are prosaic: he wants the Supreme Court to supervise the business involvements of Federal judges and he points out the utter inadequacy of the current removal (impeachment) procedures. As to the connection between monopoly capital and judicial corruption he has little, conclusion-wise, to say, perhaps because he can see no cure. But though his *proposals are tame, his facts are dynamite.*

B. H.

The Soviet High Command. By John Erickson. St. Martin's Press, 1962, 889 pp. $15.00.

Seventy years ago Count Alfred von Schlieffen said: "The Russians can no longer be taken by surprise." The Count had not really anticipated Stalin. On that early Sunday morning of June 22, 1941, Soviet soldiers sent urgent radio messages to their commanders: "We are being fired on.

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What shall we do?" And the first replies from headquarters were sharp and disdainful: "You must be insane. And why is your signal not in code?"

But to blame Stalin alone, or his psychopathic appeasement of the Nazis in the spring of 1941, for the debacle of that fateful summer is far from sufficient in the author's opinion. Erickson holds that: "Basically Stalin's method did not encourage independence of mind in any field. The Red Army and its command were shot through with the failings of the Stalinist system."

Erickson has written a detailed and authoritative military-political history of the Soviet armed forces and their command. He carries the engrossing narrative from the formation of the first Bolshevik military organizations in 1917 to the Battle for Moscow: November-December 1941. If the Nazi panzers achieved a stunning success in the fighting which carried them to the suburbs of Moscow the Red Army "counter-stroke before Moscow was an undeniably remarkable undertaking by an army which had been so terribly and continually mauled."

Considering the disadvantages which Stalin and the Stalinist system had created for the Red Army, the heroism of the Soviet soldiers and the skill of commanders such as Zhukov are all the more notable. The purges of the thirties had stripped the Soviet army of leadership at all levels. It was a massacre unique in history. The interests of the Red Army were subordinated to the political-personal control which Stalin was determined to achieve. Even more ominous was the degree to which this clutching for control jeopardized the interests of the Soviet Union.

The painstaking research that went into the writing of this history is indicated by the 90 pages of notes. In almost all cases the author has used primary sources and checked these against most available evidence. Where there is a question about the reliability of a source Erickson points this out. In addition to the historical narrative he provides a biographical index to the leading military personalities. In the appendices Erickson gives detailed figures on the strength and composition of the Red Army, 1918–1941. These also include documents on the formation of the Red Army, tables of organization, and other valuable data about the development of the Soviet armed forces.

There is considerable objectivity in the entire work; but one might desire a somewhat sterner appraisal of Pilsudski's aggression in 1920 and of the White Guard cabal. Though the ground has been covered before, the account of the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin is vivid and informative. This will in all probability remain the standard reference work on the history of the Red Army.

J. C.

The Pen and the Sword. By Michael Foot. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1962. 387 pages. $7.50.

Fifteen months during the first quarter of the 18th century are put under the microscope in this detailed evocation of a political crisis during the reign of Queen Anne. The week-by-week, or even sometimes day-by-day, course of events is laid out with something of the breathless anticipation of periodical journalism. The focus is on the point where literature intersected politics, where Grub Street confronted Whitechapel, in the form of political journalism.

Now the author is one of the best political journalists in England today (long editor of the left-Labor weekly *Tribune*), and so it is easy to understand the preoccupation of the book. The title tells it: the pen was Jonathan Swift, not yet the author of *Gulliver's Travels* (he was learning how to write it); and the sword was the Duke of Marlborough, the greatest soldier of England, powerful and able statesman, and mainstay of the Whigs. If Swift is in some sort the hero of Foot's book (though Foot might not agree), the same period was written up with a different hero in the biography of Marl-

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borough by another political man, Winston Churchill, his descendant.

And the pen was mightier than the sword. So Foot seems to be saying. For Swift's Tory side won out. Swift's pamphleteering services to his patrons were no doubt great; among other things he thought up the arguments they should use when they could not think of them themselves, in the traditional relationship of indentured intellectuals to the men of power. Grub Street showed itstlf a political force, and this seems to be the main moral of the episode to the author from the viewpoint of social history.

It all makes a fascinating story, told with skill and style and suspense.

Part of the suspense is due to the fact that we never find out what was under the surface. The intrigue, the wire-pulling, the games of political musical chairs all take place in an historical vacuum, where anything can happen. When finally Queen Anne pulls the rug from under the Whigs by packing the House of Lords with Tories, she is nothing but a *dea ex machine*, and one feels like kissing the playwright for a trick.

It is perhaps strange, but left-Labor editor Foot does not have the slightest interest in what the fight between the Tories and the Whigs was all about, that is, not in this book. Even the surface issues, the ones they debated, are referred to only glancingly, as they obtrude on the story; any deeper issues are scarcely raised. This is underlined heavily when Foot adds a special appendix "Whigs and Tories" —and confines it to a technical discussion of the propriety of using the *terms!*

If a book should be criticized only in terms of what it sets out to do, however, Foot cannot be chided. Swift as Tory penman does not make a very savory hero, either politically or otherwise, and Foot could hardly have gotten so deeply involved in the exciting story if he had approached it another way. But perhaps it could have been written with less involvement and more penetration.

H. D.

Trade Union Democracy in Western Europe. By Walter Galenson. University of California Press. Berkeley, 1961. 97 pp. $2.25.

Despite its title, Prof. Galenson's brief study appears to be concerned mainly with trade union democracy in the U.S. Nonetheless, it is a very useful summary of trade union practices in Western Europe. That in itself is its value.

Unfortunately, it is not easy to sift out Prof. Galenson's conclusions about the determinants of trade union democracy. At one point it is "if there is one lesson to be learned from the European experience it is that union security, in broader sense, is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for internal democracy." But at another place it is that "most of the specific devices for the regulation of union government . . . are not necessarily conducive to greater worker welfare."

However, Galenson does look with some favor upon greater union rivalry, not only in organizing, but in raiding—such as exists in Belgium, Holland and Austria—as a possible source of greater democracy. Also he finds some merit in the British system of a permanent general secretary for "if the outcome of a factional victory were a change in union policy rather than in job holders, differences of opinion might be less suspect."

Perhaps the difficulty with the book is that it tends to treat trade union democracy as susceptible to a series of mechanical solutions—no one of which is particularly favored.

There is repeated emphasis that if this or that proposal were adopted in the U.S., it would be necessary to give unions greater security from business attacks. This seems strange in view of the fact that nowhere in Western Europe is there the equivalent of the National Labor Relations Act which gives a union exclusive bargaining rights protected by law.

S. B.

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NEW HORIZONS FOR AMERICAN LABOR. By Joseph A. Beirne. Public Affairs Press, 1962, 89 pp., $3.25.

ONE WISHES THE PRESIDENT of the Communication Workers of America had been able to develop the questions he touches on in this slim volume. Beirne deals with automation, industrial growth, the changing composition of the American labor force, organizing the white collar workers, labor participation in community affairs, organizing the unorganized and other urgent problems facing labor today. But in each case he poses the problem, shows the need of a new approach, and leaves it to the reader to figure out how this new approach will be achieved, or exactly what it is. The author does make one point quite clear—that the national labor center must occupy a much more important role than it does today in labor activities. To allow local autonomy to interfere with the necessary action that must be taken to solve the new problems facing labor is to weaken the labor movement.

STUDIES OF WAR. By P. M. S. Blackett. Hill and Wang, 242 pp., $3.95.

THE DISTINGUISHED BRITISH Nobel prize winner has assembled a number of his essays and articles written between 1948 and 1962 on military strategy. He regrets the decisions made in the past to reply primarily on nuclear weapons for defense. Professor Blackett urges that conventional military forces should not be neglected by the West. Indeed, it is a puzzling aspect of the popularity the author enjoys in rather rigid left-wing circles, why there is so much enthusiasm for increasing our armed forces. Blackett does indicate that both the Soviet Union and the United States wish to avoid nuclear warfare. He suggests that the reason Russia fears inspection is "because they had so little to inspect." One wonders. And one also wishes that Professor Blackett was as much concerned with history as with military strategy. But his views are always expressed in lucid style and contribute to intelligent discussion of the big issue of our time.

PREVENTING WORLD WAR III: Some Proposals, edited by Quincy Wright, William M. Evans and Morton Deutsch. Simon and Schuster, New York. 460 pp. $6.95.

THIS COLLECTION OF ESSAYS starts from the proposition that although the military is an old and respected profession, there is no profession concerned with the maintenance of peace.

Twenty-eight prominent social scientists contribute to this symposium organized around three categories: stopping the arms race, reducing international tensions and building a world society. The editors do not claim that these contributions are complete or exhaustive plans of action, rather they are an inventory of "original and significant proposals which, if implemented, would lessen the chances of World War III." As wide a range of schemes as it is possible to imagine emerges from a multitude of academic disciplines converging on the problems of the arms race and the balance of terror—political scientists, economists, sociologists, lawyers, psychiatrists, international relations specialists, English professors, linguists, philosophers, chemists, physicists, industrial engineers, and mathematical biologists.

Among the arms inspection proposals offered are: the use of lie-detector tests administered by UN technicians, armed arbiters to settle differences between the two nuclear-armed blocs, the use of hostages to deter attacks. There are discussions of the economics of disarmament along with proposals for arms control, graduated uniateral initiatives, unconditional unilateral disarmament and proposals to study the use of nonviolent techniques against any trangressor of the disarmament agreement.

Reading further one encounter proposals for converting fights into de-

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bates with appropriate rules, the creation of an auxiliary world language to minimize the use of language as a mask for national interest and conflict, and a suggestion that a good way to promote peace would be to establish worldwide weather stations and services.

The volume draws to a close with appeals for world law. One approach is for a network of bilateral and multilateral treaties administered by an International Court of Justice while another believes that informal or tacit understandings may be more effective than written agreements.

The Truth About Soviet Lies. By R. H. Shackford. Public Affairs Press, 1962, 219 pp.

As Scripps-Howard foreign correspondent, Shackford has covered the Soviets in many places for many years. This book consists of Soviet claims—or lies as Shackford puts it—and a rebuttal to each one by the author. It contains much valuable factual material. However, a strident tone, and the constant reiteration of Soviet faults and American virtues impairs the force of the arguments. Some of the historical data is not too carefully researched as, for example, the statement that Antonov-Ovesenko was shot in the 1930's. True, Stalin made this old Bolshevik an un-person. But after the 20th Congress he was "re-habilitated," with this advantage over other victims of Stalin: he was still living.

The Winds of Freedom. By Dean Rusk. Beacon Press, 1962, 351 pp. $4.95.

Ernest K. Lindley, special assistant to the Secretary of State, has compiled some of the speeches and statements of the Secretary from the period January 1961–August 1962. In view of the dominant role which McGeorge Bundy is reportedly playing in the conduct of foreign affairs, one wonders about the statement of Dean Rusk: "We have a President who will rely heavily upon the Department of State for the conduct of our foreign relations. This will not be a passive reliance but an active expectation on his part that this Department will in fact take charge of foreign policy." That may cause some eyebrows to be raised among those who wondered why Rusk did not even attend the Nassau conference.

It is good to read in one of the Secretary's speeches that an element in the Cuban tragedy "was the failure of the dictatorship which preceded Castro to concern itself with the elementary needs of a people who had a right to be free." It might have been well to add this dictatorship was actively supported for many years by two rather disparate forces—the Cuban Communists and the U.S. State Department.

An Alternative to War or Surrender. By Charles E. Osgood. University of Illinois Press, 1962, 183 pp., $1.45.

We don't have to be either red or dead in Professor Osgood's view. And as an alternative to military aggression or to appeasement of the aggressor he offers a program he calls GRIT.

GRIT stands for Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction, a phrase that comes easily to the director of the Institute of Communications Research at the University of Illinois. The arms race, Osgood points out, is a tension-increasing system. He would reverse the trend by decreasing tensions through unilateral actions. This definitely does not mean unilateral nuclear disarmament or otherwise opening up our country to attack by a potential aggressor. The author would give up nuclear deterrents last. The idea is to announce some tension reducing measure, such as the elimination of trade barriers with China, and then waiting for a sign of reciprocal action in reducing tension by the other side.

Perhaps it's a weakness of the book that the strength of the psychology, of which the author is clearly a master, is not quite matched by a similar knowledge of history.

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The Story of Spanish Refugee Aid

There are 100,000 Spanish Republican refugees, many of them old, sick, and destitute, living in exile in France. SPANISH REFUGEE AID (Honorary Chairmen, Pablo Casals and Salvador de Madariaga) a non-profit committee formed in 1953, has raised and distributed over $600,000 to help these forgotten refugees. SPANISH REFUGEE AID has given direct aid of $10 a month to more than 3,500 families, has sent more than 47 tons of used clothing abroad, and has provided sewing machines, carpenter's tools, dental care, etc. In 1961 we opened the Foyer Pablo Casals, a warm, friendly center for old Spaniards in Montauban, France which gives monthly food packages to 193 aged refugees. By keeping expenses to a minimum, SPANISH REFUGEE AID has managed to give the help which has made a difference in the lives of thousands of these victims of totalitarianism, but the need continues ever greater than our means.

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PANORAMAS

PUBLICACION BIMESTRAL

Editada por el CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS Y DOCUMENTACION SOCIALES, A.C.

Numero 3 Mayo-junio 1963

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